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  anyone	  could	  expect	  or	  hope	  for.	  To	  my	  boys,	  James	  and	  Luke,	  who	  were	  always	  ready	  with	  hugs,	  kisses,	  and	  hijinks	  when	  I	  needed	  them	  most.	  And	  to	  baby	  boy	  #3,	  whose	  imminent	  arrival	  inspired	  me	  to	  finally	  finish	  this	  dissertation,	  I’m	  looking	  forward	  to	  meeting	  you	  soon.	  	   	  W.	  Brett	  Robertson	  
Washington	  University	  in	  St.	  Louis	  
May	  2016	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  on	  Racial	  and	  Socioeconomic	  Segregation	  by	  William	  Brett	  Robertson	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  of	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  in	  Education	  Washington	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  in	  St.	  Louis,	  2016	  Professor	  Odis	  Johnson	  Jr.,	  Chair	  	  For-­‐profit	  charter	  schools	  are	  a	  controversial	  new	  development	  in	  public	  education.	  They	  combine	  a	  structural	  imperative	  to	  maximize	  profit	  for	  private	  shareholders	  with	  the	  social	  good	  of	  providing	  public	  education.	  This	  dissertation	  describes	  two	  analyses	  of	  for-­‐profit	  charter	  schools	  designed	  to	  explore	  their	  impact	  on	  racial	  and	  socioeconomic	  segregation.	  The	  analyses	  utilize	  geographic	  information	  systems,	  multilevel	  modeling,	  and	  logistic	  regression	  to	  determine	  whether	  and	  how	  for-­‐profit	  charter	  schools	  are	  likely	  to	  locate	  in	  demographically	  different	  neighborhoods,	  and/or	  educate	  demographically	  different	  student	  populations	  from	  other	  types	  of	  public	  schools.	  The	  results	  indicate	  that	  for-­‐profit	  charter	  schools	  are	  less	  likely	  than	  other	  types	  of	  schools	  to	  locate	  in	  low-­‐income	  neighborhoods	  and	  educate	  low-­‐income	  students.	  Further,	  in	  districts	  where	  there	  are	  significant	  numbers	  of	  for-­‐profit	  charter	  schools,	  there	  may	  be	  a	  market-­effect	  whereby	  other	  types	  of	  charter	  schools	  in	  those	  districts	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  behave	  in	  profit-­‐maximizing	  ways	  akin	  to	  for-­‐profit	  charter	  schools.
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Chapter 1: Introduction 	  
“Economic	  models	  conventionally	  emphasize	  efficiency	  in	  pursuing	  privately	  held	  interests;	  
they	  focus	  attention	  on	  the	  choice	  of	  means	  and	  regard	  the	  determination	  of	  ultimate	  ends	  to	  
be	  unproblematic	  or	  externally	  derived.	  The	  story	  of	  [school]	  choice-­in-­practice,	  however,	  
reminds	  us	  that	  the	  conflicts	  that	  are	  most	  compelling	  and	  difficult	  to	  resolve	  revolve	  around	  
questions	  about	  the	  kind	  of	  society	  we	  wish	  to	  become.”	  (Henig,	  1994,	  p.	  116)	  	  This	  dissertation	  explores	  the	  impact	  of	  for-­‐profit	  charter	  schools	  on	  racial	  and	  socioeconomic	  segregation.	  This	  chapter	  lays	  the	  foundation	  for	  that	  analysis	  by	  providing	  background	  on	  the	  topics	  of	  segregation	  and	  charter	  schools,	  and	  suggesting	  how	  the	  two	  may	  be	  linked.	  The	  racial	  and	  socioeconomic	  segregation	  of	  schools	  leads	  to	  educational	  inequity	  and	  the	  reproduction	  of	  social	  inequality.	  This	  educational	  inequity	  leads	  to	  demands	  for	  school	  reform.	  	  The	  current	  phase	  of	  school	  reform	  centers	  on	  “school-­‐choice”	  which	  encompasses	  many	  innovations,	  most	  notably	  charter	  schools.	  The	  rise	  of	  charter	  schools	  is	  occurring	  concurrently	  with	  the	  re-­‐segregation	  of	  public	  education,	  with	  school	  choice	  replacing	  explicitly	  equity-­‐focused	  initiatives	  (Orfield	  &	  Frankenberg,	  2013).	  Both	  charter	  schools	  and	  the	  processes	  that	  lead	  to	  the	  increased	  racial	  and	  socioeconomic	  segregation	  of	  schools	  are	  rooted	  in	  conceptions	  of	  education	  as	  a	  zero-­‐sum	  struggle	  for	  competitive	  advantage.	  A	  contemporary	  increase	  in	  racialized	  socioeconomic	  inequality	  has	  corresponded	  with	  an	  increase	  in	  educational	  inequity	  along	  racial	  and	  socioeconomic	  lines.	  Schools	  are	  the	  primary	  public	  institution	  designed	  to	  provide	  opportunities	  for	  individuals	  to	  subvert	  the	  inter-­‐generational	  reproduction	  of	  socioeconomic	  inequality	  via	  the	  social	  mobility	  accorded	  through	  educational	  achievement	  and	  attainment.	  (Hochschild	  &	  Scorovnick,	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2003).	  Meanwhile	  public	  education,	  particularly	  for	  many	  low-­‐income	  city	  students,	  is	  changing	  from	  a	  homogenously	  public	  system	  to	  a	  deregulated	  landscape	  of	  school	  choice.	  Prominent	  in	  this	  are	  charter	  schools,	  which	  are	  publicly	  funded,	  but	  privately	  operated.	  The	  centrality	  of	  charters	  in	  contemporary	  education	  reform	  means	  that	  the	  emergence	  of	  these	  quasi-­‐public	  schools	  necessarily	  impacts	  the	  reproduction	  of	  inequality.	  This	  dissertation	  explores	  for-­‐profit	  charter	  schools	  because	  they	  represent	  a	  fuller	  realization	  of	  a	  competitive,	  “neoliberal”	  ideology	  in	  comparison	  to	  other	  types	  of	  charters.	  By	  exploring	  this	  subset	  of	  schools,	  it	  may	  facilitate	  a	  clearer	  understanding	  of	  how	  neoliberal	  ideology	  translates	  to	  the	  real	  world,	  its	  impacts	  on	  racial	  and	  socioeconomic	  student	  sorting	  patterns,	  and	  by	  extension	  on	  segregation	  and	  educational	  equity.	  There	  are	  three	  key	  recurring	  themes	  to	  this	  dissertation:	  1)	  educational	  inequity,	  and	  the	  reproduction	  of	  social	  inequality,	  occur	  largely	  due	  to	  spatially	  segregated	  opportunity	  structures,	  2)	  for-­‐profit	  charter	  schools	  are	  attuned	  to	  norms	  of	  market-­‐style	  competition	  that	  necessarily	  obstruct	  equity,	  and	  3)	  for-­‐profit	  charter	  schools	  utilize	  distinct	  marketing	  and	  locational	  strategies	  that	  lead	  to	  the	  market-­‐ization	  of	  school	  districts,	  which	  in	  turn	  creates	  a	  market-­
effect	  that	  pressures	  other	  schools	  to	  behave	  in	  similarly	  profit-­‐maximizing	  ways.	  	   This	  chapter	  begins	  with	  a	  broad	  overview	  of	  social	  and	  economic	  inequality.	  Inequalities	  will	  be	  framed	  spatially,	  in	  order	  to	  highlight	  the	  geographic	  clustering	  of	  poverty	  and	  privilege	  and	  the	  inter-­‐dependent	  nature	  of	  racial	  and	  socioeconomic	  inequalities.	  The	  resulting	  residential	  segregation	  leads	  to	  segregated	  schools	  that	  institutionalize	  social	  inequality	  via	  educational	  inequity.	  Thus	  the	  connection	  between	  the	  intergenerational	  reproduction	  of	  inequality	  and	  inequitable	  access	  to	  social	  institutions	  is	  spatial	  and	  largely	  perpetuated	  through	  racial	  and	  socioeconomic	  school	  segregation.	  The	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development	  and	  current	  landscape	  of	  charter	  schools	  will	  be	  briefly	  discussed.	  The	  rationale	  for	  considering	  questions	  of	  equity	  in	  relation	  to	  charter	  schools	  will	  follow.	  This	  will	  set	  the	  groundwork	  for	  the	  theoretical	  framework	  in	  Chapter	  2,	  which	  will	  describe	  how	  the	  operation	  of	  schools	  by	  profit-­‐seeking	  corporations	  is	  likely	  to	  have	  adverse	  impacts	  on	  educational	  equity.	  	  
Geographies	  of	  Inequality	  and	  Inequity	  “[W]e	  are	  witnessing	  a	  nationwide	  return	  of	  concentrated	  poverty	  that	  is	  racial	  in	  nature,	  and	  …	  this	  expansion	  and	  continued	  existence	  of	  high-­‐poverty	  ghettos	  and	  barrios	  is	  no	  accident.	  These	  neighborhoods	  are	  not	  the	  value-­‐free	  outcome	  of	  the	  impartial	  workings	  of	  the	  housing	  market.	  Rather,	  in	  large	  measure,	  they	  are	  the	  inevitable	  and	  predictable	  consequences	  of	  deliberate	  policy	  choices.”	  (Jargowski,	  2015,	  p.1)	  	  	   The	  United	  States	  has	  a	  long	  history	  of	  racial	  segregation,	  with	  accelerating	  trends	  of	  spatial	  isolation	  of	  wealthy	  from	  poor	  and	  people	  of	  different	  races	  from	  each	  other	  (Massey	  &	  Denton,	  1993;	  Massey,	  2007).	  Inequality	  is	  reproduced	  by	  the	  separation	  of	  people	  in	  space,	  by	  race	  and	  socioeconomic	  status,	  simultaneously	  denying	  those	  who	  are	  not	  wealthy	  and	  white	  access	  to	  the	  best	  opportunity	  structures,	  of	  which	  schools	  are	  a	  large	  part	  (Briggs,	  2005).	  This	  highlights	  the	  importance	  of	  conceptualizing	  inequality	  and	  inequity	  spatially	  (Hogrebe	  &	  Tate,	  2012).	  Racial	  and	  socioeconomic	  inequality	  is	  largely	  maintained	  by	  the	  production	  of	  spaces	  by	  privileged	  individuals	  and	  groups	  in	  which	  poverty	  and	  privilege	  are	  alternatively	  concentrated	  (LeFebvre,	  1991,	  Harvey,	  2009:1973,	  Soja,	  1989,	  2010).	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Income	  and	  Wealth	  Inequality	  	   By	  a	  number	  of	  measures	  of	  income	  and	  wealth,	  the	  US	  is	  becoming	  an	  increasingly	  unequal	  society.	  Between	  1979	  and	  2012,	  the	  lowest	  two	  quintiles	  of	  wage	  earners	  saw	  decreases	  in	  real	  family	  income	  (Institute	  for	  Policy	  Studies	  webpage	  “Income	  Inequality”).	  Meanwhile,	  the	  third,	  fourth	  and	  fifth	  quintiles	  saw	  respective	  increases	  of	  8.4%,	  20.3%,	  and	  48.8%	  in	  real	  family	  income.	  The	  highest	  1%	  of	  wage	  earners	  accounted	  for	  21.2%	  of	  all	  income	  in	  2013.	  Wealth	  inequality	  is	  even	  starker.	  In	  2013,	  the	  least-­‐wealthy	  90%	  of	  the	  population	  of	  the	  United	  States	  held	  25%	  of	  the	  total	  wealth	  in	  the	  US,	  while	  the	  wealthiest	  10%	  of	  the	  population	  controlled	  75%	  (Institute	  for	  Policy	  Studies	  webpage	  “Wealth	  Inequality”).	  The	  top	  10%	  also	  control	  85%	  of	  financial	  assets.	  Saez	  and	  Zucman	  (2014)	  have	  calculated	  that	  the	  top	  0.1%	  of	  wealthiest	  individuals	  has	  a	  nearly	  equal	  share	  of	  household	  wealth	  to	  the	  bottom	  90%	  (22.0%	  to	  22.8%).	  Significant	  racial	  wealth	  gaps	  also	  exist.	  	  In	  2013,	  the	  median	  net	  worth	  of	  white	  households	  was	  13	  times	  higher	  than	  that	  for	  Black	  households,	  up	  from	  6	  times	  higher	  in	  2001	  (Institute	  for	  Policy	  Studies	  webpage	  “Wealth	  Inequality”).	  All	  of	  these	  measures	  point	  to	  a	  large	  and	  growing	  divide	  between	  wealthy	  and	  poor	  individuals	  and	  families.	  Moreover,	  the	  problem	  is	  worse	  than	  commonly	  perceived,	  as	  Americans	  consistently	  and	  dramatically	  underestimate	  the	  degree	  of	  socioeconomic	  inequality	  in	  the	  United	  States	  (Norton	  &	  Ariely,	  2011).	  The	  increase	  in	  absolute	  socioeconomic	  inequality	  has	  coincided	  with	  the	  increasing	  spatial	  concentration	  of	  wealth	  and	  poverty	  (Reardon,	  2013,	  Massey,	  2007).	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Racial	  and	  Socioeconomic	  Segregation	  Segregation	  is	  the	  process	  by	  which	  inequality	  is	  rendered	  and	  reified	  in	  space.	  The	  long	  history	  of	  residential	  segregation	  by	  race	  in	  the	  United	  States	  has	  effectively	  constructed	  a	  system	  of	  “American	  apartheid”	  (Massey	  &	  Denton,	  1993).	  Richard	  Rothstein’s	  (2014)	  case	  study	  of	  policy	  factors	  facilitating	  and	  maintaining	  current-­‐day	  Black-­‐white	  segregation	  in	  the	  St.	  Louis	  region	  could	  be	  applied	  with	  little	  change	  to	  virtually	  any	  other	  large	  metropolitan	  area	  in	  the	  nation.	  The	  many	  policy	  factors	  he	  cites	  in	  the	  creation	  and	  maintenance	  of	  segregation,	  quoted	  at	  length	  here	  are:	  “Racially	  explicit	  zoning	  decisions	  that	  designated	  specific	  ghetto	  boundaries	  within	  the	  city	  of	  St.	  Louis,	  turning	  black	  neighborhoods	  into	  slums;	  Segregated	  public	  housing	  projects	  that	  separated	  blacks	  and	  whites	  who	  had	  previously	  lived	  in	  more	  integrated	  urban	  areas;	  Restrictive	  covenants,	  excluding	  African	  Americans	  from	  white	  areas,	  that	  began	  as	  private	  agreements	  but	  then	  were	  adopted	  as	  explicit	  public	  policy;	  Government	  subsidies	  for	  white	  suburban	  developments	  that	  excluded	  blacks,	  depriving	  African	  Americans	  of	  the	  20th	  century	  home-­‐equity	  driven	  wealth	  gains	  reaped	  by	  whites;	  Denial	  of	  adequate	  municipal	  services	  in	  ghettos,	  leading	  to	  slum	  conditions	  in	  black	  neighborhoods	  that	  reinforced	  whites’	  conviction	  that	  “blacks”	  and	  “slums”	  were	  synonymous;	  Boundary,	  annexation,	  spot	  zoning,	  and	  municipal	  incorporation	  policies	  designed	  to	  remove	  African	  Americans	  from	  residence	  near	  white	  neighborhoods,	  or	  to	  prevent	  them	  from	  establishing	  residence	  near	  white	  neighborhoods;	  Urban	  renewal	  and	  redevelopment	  programs	  to	  shift	  ghetto	  locations,	  in	  the	  guise	  of	  cleaning	  up	  those	  slums;	  Government	  regulators’	  tacit	  (and	  sometimes	  open)	  support	  for	  real	  estate	  and	  financial	  sector	  policies	  and	  practices	  that	  explicitly	  promoted	  residential	  segregation;	  A	  government-­‐sponsored	  dual	  labor	  market	  that	  made	  suburban	  housing	  less	  affordable	  for	  African	  Americans	  by	  preventing	  them	  from	  accumulating	  wealth	  needed	  to	  participate	  in	  homeownership.”	  (p.	  6)	  	  These	  factors	  demonstrate	  some	  of	  the	  many	  ways	  that	  racial	  inequality	  is	  created	  and	  reproduced.	  	  Due	  to	  the	  exceptional	  measures	  taken	  to	  maintain	  racially	  segregated	  housing,	  a	  durable	  pattern	  of	  inter-­‐generational	  reproduction	  of	  racial	  segregation	  has	  been	  perpetuated.	  Black	  children	  are	  more	  than	  ten	  times	  as	  likely	  as	  white	  children	  to	  reside	  in	  high	  poverty	  neighborhoods	  (66%	  to	  6%),	  and	  are	  much	  less	  likely	  to	  experience	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inter-­‐generational	  mobility	  out	  of	  poor	  neighborhoods	  (33%	  to	  60%),	  reflecting	  the	  social	  reproduction	  of	  racialized	  poverty	  (Sharkey,	  2013).	  	  Socioeconomic	  segregation	  is	  increasing	  as	  well.	  Both	  poverty	  and	  affluence	  are	  increasingly	  concentrating,	  as	  “middle-­‐class”	  neighborhoods	  decline.	  Bischoff	  and	  Reardon’s	  (2013)	  analysis	  of	  neighborhoods	  by	  income	  found	  that	  “In	  1970,	  65	  percent	  of	  families	  lived	  in	  middle-­‐income	  neighborhoods…	  by	  2009,	  only	  42	  percent	  of	  families	  lived	  in	  such	  neighborhoods.”	  (p.	  11).	  During	  this	  time	  the	  proportion	  of	  families	  living	  in	  both	  “affluent”	  (those	  with	  the	  highest	  concentration	  of	  income)	  and	  “poor”	  (concentrated	  low-­‐	  to	  no-­‐income)	  neighborhoods	  more	  than	  doubled.	  Increasingly,	  the	  rich	  are	  spatially	  segregating	  themselves	  from	  the	  rest	  of	  society.	  Meanwhile,	  a	  range	  of	  local,	  state	  and	  federal	  policies	  serve	  to	  continue	  to	  concentrate	  low-­‐income	  individuals	  and	  families,	  often	  along	  racial	  lines	  (Rothstein,	  2014;	  Jargowski,	  2015).	  	  	  
The	  Interdependence	  of	  Residential	  and	  School	  Segregation	  Traditionally	  in	  the	  United	  States,	  public	  schools	  have	  been	  idealized	  as	  a	  mechanism	  for	  inter-­‐generational	  socioeconomic	  mobility	  (Coleman,	  1968).	  One	  of	  the	  key	  justifications	  for	  the	  public	  funding	  of	  education	  is	  that	  it	  is	  supposed	  to	  ensure	  that	  the	  most	  intelligent,	  hardest	  working	  students	  are	  able	  to	  access	  the	  most	  economically	  rewarding	  jobs	  (Parsons,	  1959).	  Public	  education	  has	  thus	  served	  as	  a	  powerful	  rhetorical	  tool	  for	  furthering	  the	  ideology	  of	  meritocracy,	  the	  idea	  that	  any	  individual	  is	  capable	  of	  succeeding	  to	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  they	  demonstrate	  natural	  ability	  and	  hard	  work	  (McNamee	  &	  Miller,	  2009;	  Bowles	  &	  Gintis,	  2011:1976).	  There	  has	  always	  been	  a	  gap	  between	  the	  ideology	  and	  the	  reality,	  and	  a	  child’s	  family	  socioeconomic	  status	  remains	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one	  of	  the	  strongest	  predictors	  of	  their	  educational	  achievement	  and	  attainment	  (Reardon,	  2011,	  Bowles	  &	  Gintis,	  2002).	  Schools	  in	  racially	  and	  socioeconomically	  segregated	  metropolitan	  areas	  tend	  to	  be	  similarly	  segregated.	  Residential	  choices	  are	  highly	  influenced	  by	  perceived	  school	  quality,	  and	  perceived	  school	  quality	  influences	  real	  estate	  prices	  (Lareau	  &	  Goyette,	  2014).	  Along	  with	  racially	  restrictive	  laws	  and	  regulations,	  real	  estate	  values	  and	  racial	  steering	  strategies	  operate	  to	  prevent	  non-­‐white	  and	  low-­‐income	  families	  from	  residing	  in	  predominantly	  white	  and	  wealthy	  school	  districts	  and	  catchment	  zones.	  Population	  shifts	  lead	  to	  the	  realignment	  of	  school	  catchment	  zones	  or	  exit	  of	  white	  and/or	  wealthier	  families	  from	  school	  districts.	  The	  funding	  of	  schools	  is	  largely	  tied	  to	  local	  property	  taxes,	  meaning	  that	  wealthy	  neighborhoods	  also	  tend	  to	  be	  able	  to	  provide	  higher	  levels	  of	  financial	  support	  to	  their	  schools.	  The	  result	  is	  broad	  gaps	  in	  school	  quality	  according	  to	  the	  racial	  and	  socioeconomic	  composition	  of	  neighborhoods,	  and	  lack	  of	  access	  to	  quality	  education	  for	  low-­‐income	  and	  non-­‐white	  populations	  (Rothwell,	  2012).	  Because	  charter	  schools	  can	  in	  theory	  draw	  students	  from	  a	  broader	  geographic	  range	  than	  traditional	  public	  schools,	  some	  charter	  advocates	  have	  suggested	  that	  they	  may	  allow	  families	  to	  overcome	  these	  linkages	  between	  racial	  and	  socioeconomic	  segregation	  (A.	  Thernstrom	  &	  S.	  Thernstrom,	  2004).	  However	  charter	  schools	  have	  not	  been	  found	  in	  practice	  to	  provide	  this	  theorized	  de-­‐segregating	  effect,	  instead	  they	  have	  tended	  to	  have	  the	  opposite	  effect	  (Mickelson,	  Bottia	  &	  Southworth,	  2008;	  Zimmer	  et	  al,	  2009).	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Individual,	  Family,	  Neighborhood,	  and	  Peer	  Effects	  	   School	  segregation	  matters	  both	  because	  of	  the	  unequal	  resources	  available	  to	  different	  schools	  and	  because	  the	  composition	  of	  families,	  schools	  and	  neighborhoods	  profoundly	  influence	  student	  achievement.	  Due	  to	  the	  long	  history	  of	  racial	  discrimination	  and	  subsequent	  unequal	  access	  to	  quality	  education	  in	  the	  United	  States,	  there	  are	  persistent	  achievement	  gaps	  evident	  between	  racial	  groups,	  with	  Asian	  and	  white	  students	  consistently	  achieving	  at	  a	  higher	  level	  than	  Black	  and	  Hispanic/Latino	  students.	  Some	  of	  these	  achievement	  gaps,	  such	  as	  the	  Black-­‐white	  achievement	  gap	  have	  decreased	  somewhat	  in	  the	  past	  50	  years,	  but	  are	  still	  substantial	  (Duncan	  &	  Murnane,	  2011).	  Increasingly,	  socioeconomic	  status	  is	  predictive	  of	  educational	  outcomes.	  Reardon	  (2011)	  found	  that	  “the	  income	  achievement	  gap	  is	  now	  considerably	  larger	  than	  the	  black-­‐white	  gap,	  a	  reversal	  of	  the	  pattern	  fifty	  years	  ago.”	  (p.	  110).	  Farkas	  (2011)	  notes	  “social-­‐class	  differences	  in	  test	  score	  measures	  of	  cognitive	  performance	  are	  the	  largest	  sources	  of	  inequality	  in	  schooling	  and	  earnings	  achievement”	  (p.	  86).	  	  	   In	  addition	  to	  the	  impacts	  of	  family	  socioeconomic	  status	  on	  student	  outcomes,	  neighborhood	  socioeconomic	  status,	  and	  school	  mean	  socioeconomic	  status	  also	  impact	  student	  achievement	  (Borman	  &	  Dowling,	  2010;	  Rumberger	  &	  Palardy,	  2005).	  The	  level	  of	  academic	  achievement	  for	  a	  student	  of	  any	  given	  socioeconomic	  background	  would	  be	  expected	  to	  be	  higher	  if	  that	  student	  attended	  a	  school,	  and/or	  lived	  in	  a	  neighborhood	  with	  primarily	  high	  socioeconomic	  status	  families	  than	  if	  they	  attended	  a	  school	  and/or	  lived	  in	  a	  neighborhood	  with	  primarily	  low	  socioeconomic	  status	  families.	  Thus	  segregation	  impacts	  a	  student’s	  likely	  academic	  performance	  in	  at	  least	  three	  ways.	  It	  isolates	  their	  family	  from	  socioeconomic	  opportunity,	  it	  locates	  them	  in	  neighborhoods	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where	  they	  are	  further	  disadvantaged	  by	  concentrated	  poverty,	  and	  it	  compels	  them	  to	  attend	  schools	  where	  they	  are	  likewise	  disadvantaged	  by	  concentrated	  poverty	  and	  lower	  per-­‐pupil	  expenditures.	  	  	  
Educational	  Equity	  and	  Social	  Reproduction	  	   Schools	  are	  expected	  to	  provide	  individuals	  an	  opportunity	  for	  economic	  mobility.	  However,	  the	  degree	  to	  which	  socioeconomic	  inequality	  is	  reproduced	  inter-­‐generationally	  raises	  questions	  about	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  they	  actually	  provide	  these	  opportunities	  for	  economic	  mobility	  (Bowles	  &	  Gintis,	  2002).	  Academic	  achievement	  and	  attainment	  are	  a	  primary,	  though	  not	  sole,	  determinant	  of	  an	  individual’s	  future	  life	  prospects.	  Where	  there	  is	  systemic	  educational	  inequity,	  it	  serves	  to	  bolster	  the	  reproduction	  of	  socioeconomic	  inequality	  in	  the	  projected	  life	  courses	  of	  students	  from	  different	  racial	  and	  socioeconomic	  backgrounds	  (Willis,	  1981,	  1981:1977;	  Giroux,	  1983).	  This	  violates	  our	  common	  notions	  of	  fairness.	  This	  failure	  in	  turn	  leads	  to	  successive	  waves	  of	  school	  reform	  directed	  at	  “failing”	  urban	  schools	  and	  districts	  (Tyack	  &	  Cuban,	  1995;	  Anyon,	  2014).	  The	  current	  wave	  of	  education	  reform	  promotes	  a	  market-­‐based	  model	  of	  school	  choice.	  At	  the	  forefront	  of	  the	  school	  choice	  movement	  is	  charter	  schools.	  
	  
The	  Growth	  of	  Charter	  Schools	  &	  Education	  Management	  Organizations	  The	  first	  charter	  schools	  opened	  in	  Minnesota	  in	  1992.	  From	  that	  time,	  charters	  have	  expanded	  rapidly.	  Since	  1999-­‐2000,	  the	  increase	  of	  charter	  schools	  has	  been	  roughly	  linear,	  with	  the	  total	  number	  of	  charter	  schools	  increasing	  by	  300-­‐400	  each	  year.	  From	  1999-­‐2000	  to	  2013-­‐14,	  the	  number	  of	  charters	  grew	  from	  approximately	  1,542	  to	  6,440	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(National	  Alliance	  for	  Public	  Charter	  Schools	  Dashboard,	  2015).	  In	  the	  2012-­‐2013	  school	  year,	  charter	  schools	  educated	  over	  2.3	  million	  students,	  representing	  4.6%	  of	  all	  public	  school	  students	  in	  the	  United	  States	  (National	  Center	  for	  Education	  Statistics,	  Charter	  School	  Enrollment).	  Approximately	  5.8%	  (5,619	  out	  of	  96,372)	  of	  all	  public	  schools	  were	  charters	  in	  2011-­‐2012.	  Charters	  are	  concentrated	  in	  urban	  areas,	  with	  10.9%	  (2,921	  out	  of	  26,693)	  of	  all	  city	  schools	  being	  charters	  in	  2011-­‐12	  (National	  Alliance	  for	  Public	  Charter	  Schools,	  2015).	  They	  are	  proportionally	  under-­‐represented	  in	  suburbs	  (4.2%,	  1,150	  out	  of	  26,324),	  towns	  (2.9%,	  398	  out	  of	  13,880)	  and	  rural	  areas	  (2.6%,	  974	  out	  of	  33,358)	  compared	  to	  their	  proportion	  of	  all	  public	  schools.	  	  Across	  cities,	  the	  distribution	  of	  charters	  is	  uneven,	  with	  certain	  large	  urban	  districts	  having	  increasingly	  sizable	  proportions	  of	  charter	  schools.	  The	  National	  Alliance	  for	  Public	  Charter	  School’s	  annual	  report	  series,	  A	  Growing	  Movement:	  America’s	  Largest	  
Charter	  Communities	  (2014),	  describes	  in	  detail	  how	  charter	  schools	  are	  highly	  concentrated	  in	  certain	  urban	  school	  districts.	  One	  district	  (New	  Orleans)	  has	  over	  90%	  of	  its	  public	  school	  students	  enrolled	  in	  charters,	  two	  have	  over	  50%	  charter	  enrollment,	  four	  are	  above	  40%,	  12	  above	  30%,	  43	  above	  20%,	  and	  148	  districts	  have	  at	  least	  10%	  of	  all	  students	  enrolled	  in	  charters.	  In	  terms	  of	  the	  number	  of	  students	  enrolled	  in	  charters,	  there	  is	  one	  district	  (Los	  Angeles)	  with	  over	  100,000	  charter	  school	  students,	  six	  with	  more	  than	  50,000	  students,	  eleven	  with	  over	  25,000,	  and	  thirty	  with	  over	  10,000	  students	  in	  charters.	  The	  top	  five	  districts	  in	  total	  charter	  enrollment	  enroll	  14%	  of	  the	  total	  number	  of	  US	  charter	  school	  students,	  the	  top	  10	  enroll	  22%	  of	  the	  total,	  the	  top	  20,	  29%,	  and	  the	  top	  30,	  33%.	  In	  the	  US,	  there	  are	  approximately	  13,500	  school	  districts	  of	  widely	  varying	  size,	  with	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a	  third	  of	  all	  charter	  schools	  located	  in	  30	  of	  these	  districts	  (National	  Center	  for	  Education	  Statistics,	  2015).	  	  
Charter	  Schools	  By	  Management	  Type	  Charter	  schools	  are	  a	  diverse	  phenomenon	  that	  can	  be	  categorized	  and	  sub-­‐divided	  along	  many	  different	  criteria.	  Wells	  et	  al	  (1999)	  note	  the	  importance	  of	  charter	  school	  research	  that	  recognizes	  the	  ”particularistic	  nature	  of	  a	  reform	  that	  defies	  universal	  definitions”	  (p.	  172).	  Charter	  schools	  can	  be	  sub-­‐divided	  by	  curricular	  focus,	  pedagogical	  methodology,	  or	  cultural	  themes.	  Charter	  schools	  also	  have	  diverse	  geo-­‐demographic	  contexts	  and	  funding	  levels.	  For	  the	  purposes	  of	  this	  dissertation,	  charter	  schools	  are	  primarily	  grouped	  according	  to	  their	  operational	  status.	  There	  are	  three	  different	  types	  of	  charter	  school	  operators:	  independent	  operators,	  non-­‐profit	  education	  management	  organizations,	  and	  for-­‐profit	  education	  management	  organizations.	  In	  2009-­‐10	  (the	  year	  of	  interest	  for	  the	  dissertation’s	  analyses),	  there	  were	  3,502	  (71.3%	  proportionally)	  independent	  charters,	  637	  (12.9%)	  for-­‐profit	  charters,	  and	  774	  (15.8%)	  non-­‐profit	  charters	  (NAPCS	  Dashboard,	  2015).	  Non-­‐profit	  and	  for-­‐profit	  charters	  are	  commonly	  grouped	  together	  as	  education	  management	  organization	  (EMO)	  operated	  charter	  schools,	  to	  indicate	  that	  they	  operate	  under	  the	  umbrella	  of	  a	  larger	  organization.1	  	  Early	  charter	  schools	  were	  overwhelmingly	  independent.	  The	  majority	  of	  charter	  schools	  are	  still	  independently	  operated,	  although	  their	  proportional	  share	  of	  the	  charter	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Some	  researchers	  term	  non-­‐profit	  charter	  operators	  charter	  management	  organizations	  (CMO)	  and	  for-­‐profit	  charter	  operators	  EMOs.	  Using	  the	  terminology	  EMO	  for	  both	  types	  and	  differentiating	  between	  for-­‐profit	  and	  non-­‐profit	  when	  appropriate	  provides	  a	  clearer	  etymology	  of	  charter	  school	  types	  and	  thus	  this	  naming	  convention	  is	  used	  in	  this	  dissertation,	  in	  line	  with	  Molnar,	  Miron,	  &	  Urschel	  (2010).	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segment	  has	  been	  steadily	  decreasing,	  and	  as	  of	  2010-­‐11	  stood	  at	  67%	  (National	  Alliance	  for	  Public	  Charter	  Schools	  Dashboard,	  2015).	  The	  growth	  of	  independent	  charter	  schools	  has	  slowed	  significantly.	  In	  the	  three	  years	  between	  2007-­‐08	  and	  2010-­‐11,	  there	  was	  a	  5%	  growth	  in	  the	  number	  of	  independent	  charter	  schools,	  while	  the	  overall	  charter	  school	  segment	  grew	  22%	  during	  this	  time.	  The	  large-­‐scale	  growth	  of	  charter	  schools	  operated	  by	  EMOs	  is	  the	  primary	  driver	  of	  the	  overall	  growth	  of	  the	  charter	  school	  segment.	  Over	  time,	  there	  has	  been	  an	  increasing	  proliferation	  and	  wider	  dispersion	  of	  EMOs,	  and	  an	  increase	  in	  the	  number	  of	  schools	  managed	  by	  larger	  EMOs.	  In	  just	  three	  years,	  from	  2007-­‐08	  to	  2010-­‐11,	  the	  number	  of	  EMO-­‐operated	  charter	  schools	  grew	  from	  934	  to	  1,709,	  a	  growth	  of	  83%,	  representing	  a	  proportional	  increase	  from	  22%	  to	  33%	  of	  the	  overall	  charter	  school	  segment	  (National	  Alliance	  for	  Public	  Charter	  Schools	  Dashboard,	  2015).	  The	  largest	  and	  most	  well-­‐known	  non-­‐profit	  EMO	  is	  the	  Knowledge	  is	  Power	  is	  Program	  (KIPP),	  which	  in	  2015-­‐16	  operates	  183	  schools	  and	  enrolls	  over	  60,000	  students	  (KIPP	  website).	  The	  largest,	  generally	  most	  well-­‐known	  for-­‐profit	  EMOs	  include	  Academica,	  National	  Heritage	  Academies,	  K12	  Inc.,	  and	  Edison	  Learning	  (Miron	  &	  Gulosino,	  2013).	  	  The	  growth	  of	  EMO-­‐operated	  charters	  can	  be	  linked	  to	  the	  desire	  of	  education	  reformers	  and	  policymakers	  to	  rapidly	  expand	  the	  number	  of	  charter	  schools	  in	  particular	  states	  and	  districts	  (Scott	  and	  DiMartino,	  2010).	  A	  key	  characteristic	  of	  EMOs,	  especially	  larger	  EMOs,	  is	  that	  they	  provide	  a	  generally	  replicable	  educational	  template	  that	  can	  be	  transferred	  across	  neighborhoods,	  districts,	  and	  states	  (Farrell,	  Wohlstetter	  &	  Smith,	  2012).	  	  This	  provides	  a	  quicker	  route	  to	  expansion	  of	  charter	  schools	  in	  a	  given	  district	  or	  state	  than	  relying	  on	  grassroots	  community	  based	  groups	  planning	  new	  independently	  operated	  schools.	  In	  this	  way,	  EMOs	  provide	  a	  set	  of	  ready-­‐made	  models	  for	  deployment	  by	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a	  district	  or	  state	  seeking	  to	  rapidly	  add	  charter	  schools.	  	  As	  the	  popularity	  of	  charters	  has	  grown	  over	  the	  past	  twenty	  years,	  public	  pressure	  has	  increased	  in	  many	  urban	  districts	  to	  quickly	  scale	  up	  the	  number	  and	  variety	  of	  charter	  school	  options	  they	  offer	  (Scott	  and	  DiMartino,	  2010).	  	  Influential	  charter	  advocating	  organizations	  assign	  “low	  grades”	  to	  states	  or	  localities	  that	  do	  not	  offer	  a	  large	  number	  and	  wide	  variety	  of	  charter	  schools,	  putting	  additional	  political	  pressure	  on	  politicians	  and	  policymakers	  to	  expand	  the	  number	  of	  charters	  (Chi	  &	  Welner,	  2007).	  EMOs	  have	  become	  increasingly	  prevalent	  in	  the	  charter	  school	  segment	  in	  a	  relatively	  short	  amount	  of	  time,	  and	  considering	  their	  capacity	  for	  rapidly	  expanding	  the	  number	  of	  charter	  schools	  within	  a	  district,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  consider	  the	  characteristics	  of	  the	  students	  they	  serve.	  It	  is	  possible	  that	  the	  rapid	  scaling-­‐up	  of	  these	  charter	  providers	  has	  underexplored	  implications	  for	  student	  sorting.	  The	  primary	  focus	  of	  this	  dissertation	  is	  for-­‐profit	  charter	  schools.	  For-­‐profit	  charter	  schools	  exhibit	  a	  distinct	  range	  of	  market-­‐oriented	  behaviors	  that	  warrant	  special	  attention	  (Brown,	  Henig,	  Lacireno-­‐Paquet	  &	  Holyoke,	  2004).	  For-­‐profit	  charters	  enrolled	  353,070	  students	  in	  637	  schools	  in	  2009-­‐10.	  This	  represents	  slightly	  less	  than	  1%	  of	  all	  public	  school	  students	  in	  the	  United	  States	  (National	  Center	  for	  Education	  Statistics,	  2015).	  However,	  their	  influence	  may	  be	  greater	  than	  raw	  enrollment	  numbers	  would	  indicate.	  First	  of	  all,	  these	  charter	  schools	  are	  continuing	  to	  rapidly	  expand,	  indicating	  their	  influence	  is	  growing.	  Also,	  for-­‐profit	  charters	  are	  highly	  concentrated	  in	  a	  limited	  number	  of	  districts,	  which	  may	  lead	  to	  them	  having	  an	  outsize	  influence	  in	  those	  districts.	  In	  addition	  to	  their	  ongoing	  growth	  and	  concentration,	  the	  existence	  of	  for-­‐profit	  charter	  schools	  may	  precipitate	  fundamental	  changes	  in	  the	  nature	  of	  public	  education	  in	  the	  districts	  where	  they	  are	  located.	  The	  connection	  of	  for-­‐profit	  charters	  to	  a	  neoliberal	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ideology	  promoting	  market-­‐style	  competition	  may	  substantially	  alter	  the	  landscape	  of	  public	  education	  in	  ways	  that	  impact	  educational	  equity.	  The	  hypothesis	  that	  for-­‐profit	  charters	  may	  transform	  the	  public	  school	  landscape	  in	  the	  districts	  where	  they	  exist	  will	  be	  referred	  to	  as	  the	  for-­‐profit	  market-­effect.	  This	  concept	  will	  be	  developed	  further	  and	  discussed	  in	  detail	  in	  the	  theoretical	  framework.	  Beyond	  the	  impact	  in	  particular	  districts,	  the	  transformation	  of	  public	  education	  represented	  by	  for-­‐profit	  charter	  schools	  has	  the	  potential	  to	  foster	  a	  broader	  re-­‐conceptualization	  of	  public	  education	  even	  in	  those	  districts	  where	  they	  do	  not	  currently	  exist.	  	  	  
The	  Geography	  of	  For-­Profit	  Charter	  Schools	  Charter	  policy	  is	  primarily	  determined	  at	  the	  state	  level.	  	  State	  policies	  differ	  significantly,	  and	  greatly	  impact	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  charter	  schools	  can	  and	  do	  grow	  in	  a	  state.	  	  Some	  states	  do	  not	  allow	  charter	  schools	  at	  all,	  while	  other	  states	  have	  continually	  revised	  their	  charter	  laws	  to	  facilitate	  growth	  in	  the	  charter	  school	  segment	  (Holyoke,	  Henig,	  Brown	  &	  Lacireno-­‐Paquet,	  2009).	  	  This	  has	  led	  to	  a	  widely	  uneven	  distribution	  of	  charter	  schools	  across	  the	  United	  States.	  For-­‐profit	  charter	  schools	  are	  heavily	  concentrated	  in	  four	  states:	  Michigan,	  Florida,	  Arizona	  and	  Ohio.	  These	  states	  account	  for	  509	  out	  of	  653	  (78%)	  of	  all	  for-­‐profit	  charters.	  	  Non-­‐profit	  charters	  are	  also	  highly	  concentrated	  in	  four	  states;	  Texas,	  California,	  Arizona	  and	  Ohio.	  These	  four	  states	  account	  for	  562	  out	  of	  733	  (77%)	  of	  all	  non-­‐profit	  EMO	  operated	  charters.	  	  These	  six	  states	  (Arizona	  and	  Ohio	  are	  listed	  in	  both	  groups)	  together	  account	  for	  82%	  (1,131	  out	  of	  1,386)	  of	  all	  EMO	  operated	  charters.	  Of	  these	  six	  states,	  two	  have	  predominantly	  for-­‐profit	  charter	  schools	  (Michigan	  and	  Florida),	  two	  have	  almost	  
	  	   15	  
exclusively	  non-­‐profit	  charter	  schools	  (Texas	  and	  California),	  and	  two	  have	  large	  numbers	  of	  both	  for-­‐profit	  and	  non-­‐profit	  charters	  (Arizona	  and	  Ohio).	  These	  states	  will	  be	  of	  particular	  importance	  in	  analyzing	  the	  impact	  of	  for-­‐profit	  charter	  schools.	  Figure	  1.1	  and	  Table	  1.1	  show	  the	  distribution	  of	  for-­‐profit	  and	  non-­‐profit	  charter	  schools	  across	  the	  United	  States.	  	  
Figure	  1.1:	  Map	  of	  For-­Profit	  Charter	  School	  Distribution	  by	  State	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NP	  &	  FP	  
as	  %	  of	  all	  
Charters	  KS	   0	   0%	   1	   100%	   1	   36	   2.8%	  SC	   0	   0%	   2	   100%	   2	   38	   5.3%	  ID	   0	   0%	   3	   100%	   3	   36	   8.3%	  NV	   0	   0%	   4	   100%	   4	   28	   14.3%	  WI	   0	   0%	   5	   100%	   5	   206	   2.4%	  UT	   0	   0%	   6	   100%	   6	   72	   8.3%	  FL	   13	   8%	   141	   92%	   154	   411	   37.5%	  MI	   23	   11%	   186	   89%	   209	   240	   87.1%	  MO	   2	   13%	   13	   87%	   15	   33	   45.5%	  MN	   1	   20%	   4	   80%	   5	   153	   3.3%	  GA	   2	   25%	   6	   75%	   8	   89	   9.0%	  NC	   2	   29%	   5	   71%	   7	   96	   7.3%	  MA	   1	   33%	   2	   67%	   3	   62	   4.8%	  PA	   12	   39%	   19	   61%	   31	   134	   23.1%	  OH	   70	   44%	   90	   56%	   160	   321	   49.8%	  CO	   10	   45%	   12	   55%	   22	   158	   13.9%	  LA	   4	   50%	   4	   50%	   8	   77	   10.4%	  AZ	   102	   53%	   92	   47%	   194	   509	   38.1%	  IN	   13	   59%	   9	   41%	   22	   54	   40.7%	  NY	   28	   68%	   13	   32%	   41	   140	   29.3%	  MD	   7	   70%	   3	   30%	   10	   36	   27.8%	  AR	   6	   75%	   2	   25%	   8	   29	   27.6%	  DC	   22	   81%	   5	   19%	   27	   96	   28.1%	  OR	   6	   86%	   1	   14%	   7	   102	   6.9%	  CA	   108	   87%	   16	   13%	   124	   808	   15.3%	  IL	   10	   91%	   1	   9%	   11	   101	   10.9%	  TX	   282	   97%	   8	   3%	   290	   537	   54.0%	  OK	   1	   100%	   0	   0%	   1	   18	   5.6%	  TN	   1	   100%	   0	   0%	   1	   22	   4.5%	  NJ	   3	   100%	   0	   0%	   3	   68	   4.4%	  CT	   4	   100%	   0	   0%	   4	   18	   22.2%	  
TOTALS	   733	   53%	   653	   47%	   1,386	   4,728	   29.3%	  	  *	  States	  with	  no	  EMO-­‐operated	  charter	  schools	  are	  omitted.	  	  Data	  from:	  Miron	  &	  Urschel,	  2010,	  Molnar,	  Miron	  &	  Urschel,	  2010,	  National	  Alliance	  for	  Public	  Charter	  Schools	  Dashboard,	  2013	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Why	  Study	  Charter	  Schools	  &	  Segregation?	  	   The	  topic	  of	  charter	  school	  research	  that	  gets	  the	  most	  public	  attention	  is	  the	  question	  of	  educational	  effectiveness.	  Charter	  schools	  exemplify	  the	  latest	  wave	  of	  educational	  reform,	  initiated	  in	  response	  to	  persistently	  low	  achievement	  in	  high	  poverty	  urban	  school	  districts.	  It	  is	  understandable	  that	  the	  public	  wants	  to	  know	  if	  students	  in	  charter	  schools	  achieve	  better	  academic	  results	  than	  those	  in	  traditional	  public	  schools.	  Research	  in	  this	  area	  has	  been	  mixed,	  with	  charter	  school	  results	  varying	  significantly.	  Some	  charter	  schools	  perform	  better	  than	  similar	  traditional	  public	  schools,	  some	  much	  worse,	  many	  perform	  in	  statistically	  indistinguishable	  ways.	  The	  range	  of	  outcomes	  varies	  across	  districts,	  states,	  school	  types,	  and	  between	  different	  charter	  operators.	  A	  number	  of	  factors	  influence	  the	  relative	  educational	  effectiveness	  of	  particular	  charter	  schools.	  At	  this	  time,	  with	  regards	  to	  the	  question	  of	  educational	  effectiveness,	  charter	  schools	  as	  a	  segment	  generally	  perform	  no	  better,	  and	  at	  times	  much	  worse	  than	  comparable	  traditional	  public	  schools	  (Zimmer	  et	  al,	  2009;	  Zimmer	  et	  al,	  2012;	  Lopez,	  2014).	  However,	  a	  narrow	  focus	  on	  the	  educational	  effectiveness	  of	  charter	  schools	  may	  conceal	  more	  than	  it	  reveals.	  	   Simple	  side-­‐by-­‐side	  comparisons	  of	  charters	  and	  non-­‐charter	  schools	  can	  lead	  to	  oversimplified	  notions	  of	  how	  charter	  schools	  influence	  student	  performance.	  Even	  those	  charter	  schools	  with	  a	  demonstrable	  record	  of	  academic	  success	  generally	  come	  with	  caveats	  (Miron,	  Urschel,	  &	  Saxton,	  2011).	  Inequitable	  funding	  structures,	  student	  targeting	  and	  push-­‐out,	  strategic	  geographic	  location	  of	  schools,	  the	  use	  of	  marketing	  or	  school	  thematic	  strategies	  likely	  to	  cultivate	  particular	  student	  populations,	  unrealistic	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expectations	  on	  students,	  families,	  and	  teachers,	  are	  a	  few	  of	  the	  many	  reasons	  that	  direct	  comparisons	  between	  academic	  results	  at	  charter	  schools	  and	  non-­‐charters	  may	  be	  misleading.	  Also,	  the	  focus	  on	  student	  performance	  can	  obscure	  other	  important	  questions	  about	  the	  impact	  of	  charter	  schools.	  One	  of	  these	  is	  the	  question	  of	  equity.	  	  Fostering	  greater	  social	  equity	  has	  long	  been	  considered	  a	  key	  social	  function	  of	  public	  education	  (Hochschild	  &	  Scorovnick,	  2004).	  Significant	  changes	  to	  the	  structure	  of	  public	  education,	  which	  charter	  schools	  certainly	  are,	  have	  the	  potential	  to	  impact	  the	  ability	  of	  public	  education	  to	  foster	  equity	  and	  ameliorate	  the	  inter-­‐generational	  reproduction	  of	  advantage	  and	  disadvantage.	  Since	  1954,	  the	  US	  government	  has	  recognized	  that	  segregation	  creates	  an	  inherently	  inequitable	  educational	  environment	  (Brown	  v.	  Board	  of	  Education).	  This	  dissertation	  represents	  an	  effort	  to	  better	  understand	  how	  one	  particular	  type	  of	  charter	  school	  influences	  broader	  educational	  equity	  via	  its	  impact	  on	  racial	  and	  socioeconomic	  segregation.	  If	  a	  charter	  schools	  demonstrates	  superior	  outcomes	  to	  traditional	  public	  schools,	  but	  does	  so	  with	  a	  demographically	  “advantageous”	  student	  population	  that	  would	  be	  more	  likely	  to	  demonstrate	  superior	  outcomes,	  it	  may	  not	  actually	  represent	  an	  improvement	  of	  public	  education.	  Understanding	  student	  sorting	  patterns	  is	  necessary	  for	  properly	  evaluating	  academic	  performance.	  Further,	  any	  skewed	  student	  sorting	  patterns	  can	  have	  broader	  negative	  equity	  impacts	  if	  they	  result	  in	  increased	  between-­‐school	  racial	  and/or	  socioeconomic	  segregation.	  	  
Summary	  and	  Outline	  of	  the	  Dissertation	  	   This	  chapter	  began	  with	  a	  discussion	  of	  accelerating	  levels	  of	  inequality	  in	  US	  society.	  Socioeconomic	  and	  racial	  inequality	  are	  pervasive	  and	  on	  the	  rise.	  These	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inequalities	  are	  increasingly	  place-­‐based	  in	  an	  ever	  more	  racially	  and	  socioeconomically	  segregated	  society.	  The	  spatial	  concentration	  of	  poverty	  and	  privilege	  in	  turn	  results	  in	  the	  maintenance	  of	  school	  systems	  of	  widely	  unequal	  quality	  by	  geography.	  This	  has	  led	  to	  a	  profoundly	  inequitable	  system	  of	  public	  education	  where	  the	  life	  course	  chances	  of	  children	  are	  increasingly	  dependent	  upon	  the	  location	  of	  their	  birth	  (Duncan	  &	  Murnane,	  2011).	  	   At	  the	  same	  time	  that	  place-­‐based	  inequality	  increases,	  new	  forms	  of	  “school	  choice”	  are	  emerging,	  largely	  in	  the	  lowest-­‐performing,	  highest-­‐poverty	  districts	  in	  the	  country.	  The	  rapid	  increase	  of	  charter	  schools	  in	  these	  areas	  raises	  questions	  about	  their	  impact	  on	  educational	  equity.	  The	  diverse	  nature	  of	  charter	  schools	  means	  that	  it	  is	  difficult,	  if	  not	  impossible,	  to	  assess	  their	  impact	  on	  equity	  by	  treating	  them	  as	  an	  undifferentiated	  whole.	  Thus,	  this	  dissertation	  engages	  a	  study	  of	  the	  subset	  of	  charter	  schools	  operated	  by	  for-­‐profit	  corporations	  because	  the	  profit-­‐maximizing	  constraints	  under	  which	  they	  operate	  may	  have	  a	  distinct	  impact	  on	  racial	  and	  socioeconomic	  segregation.	  The	  next	  chapter	  presents	  in	  detail	  a	  theoretical	  framework	  explicating	  more	  fully	  the	  reasoning	  behind	  the	  formulation	  of	  a	  research	  program	  examining	  the	  impact	  of	  for-­‐profit	  charter	  schools	  on	  educational	  equity.	  The	  research	  methodology	  will	  be	  described	  in	  Chapter	  3,	  the	  findings	  of	  that	  research	  presented	  in	  Chapter	  4,	  and	  policy	  implications,	  discussion	  and	  directions	  for	  future	  research	  offered	  in	  Chapter	  5.	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Chapter 2: Theoretical Framework 	  
Introduction:	  Public	  Education,	  Equity	  and	  Competition	  	   At	  the	  societal	  and	  individual	  levels,	  public	  education	  serves	  two	  competing	  functions	  (Hochschild	  &	  Scorovnick,	  2003).	  At	  the	  societal	  level,	  universal	  public	  education	  is	  supposed	  to	  function	  as	  a	  mechanism	  for	  ensuring	  each	  citizen	  can	  develop	  to	  their	  fullest	  potential	  and	  help	  to	  advance	  society.	  The	  goal	  is	  to	  connect	  a	  person’s	  eventual	  station	  in	  life	  more	  closely	  to	  their	  “innate”	  ability	  and	  demonstrated	  effort	  instead	  of	  the	  conditions	  of	  their	  birth.	  Meanwhile,	  each	  individual	  family	  seeks	  to	  maximize	  the	  future	  life	  opportunities	  of	  their	  own	  child(ren).	  When	  there	  are	  pre-­‐existing	  inequalities	  in	  political,	  economic,	  and	  social	  power,	  families	  may	  be	  differently	  able	  to	  promote	  their	  own	  children’s	  interests.	  Because	  of	  this,	  there	  is	  an	  ongoing	  tension	  between	  the	  institutional	  imperative	  to	  promote	  equity	  through	  public	  education,	  and	  individual	  efforts	  to	  leverage	  schooling	  towards	  the	  pursuit	  of	  competitive	  advantage	  in	  a	  capitalist	  society	  (Bowles	  &	  Gintis,	  2011:1976).	  This	  implies	  that	  public	  schools	  are	  in	  fact	  designed	  to	  optimize	  equity.	  What	  if	  some	  schools	  were	  fundamentally	  incompatible	  with	  the	  promotion	  of	  equity?	  The	  result	  would	  likely	  be	  an	  intensification	  of	  the	  inter-­‐generational	  transmission	  of	  social,	  economic,	  and	  political	  (dis)advantage	  (Bowles	  &	  Gintis,	  2002).	  What	  if	  certain	  public	  schools,	  instead	  of	  being	  oriented	  towards	  equity,	  were	  engaged	  in	  their	  own	  pursuit	  of	  competitive	  advantage	  in	  a	  profit-­‐seeking	  marketplace?	  This	  chapter	  investigates	  how	  one	  particular	  type	  of	  school,	  for-­‐profit	  pubic	  charters,	  may	  exacerbate	  educational	  inequity	  by	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increasing	  racial	  and	  socioeconomic	  segregation	  when	  they	  engage	  in	  profit-­‐maximizing	  behavior	  in	  a	  newly	  competitive	  public	  school	  landscape.	  This	  chapter	  establishes	  how	  for-­‐profit	  charter	  schools	  are	  uniquely	  ideologically	  and	  structurally	  incentivized	  to	  “target	  students	  with	  less-­‐risky	  socioeconomic	  and	  demographic	  backgrounds”	  (Gulosino	  and	  Lubienski,	  2011,	  p.	  20),	  i.e.	  to	  avoid	  non-­‐white	  and	  low-­‐income	  students.	  This	  is	  likely	  to	  exacerbate	  racial	  and	  socioeconomic	  segregation	  in	  school	  districts	  where	  they	  proliferate.	  The	  ideological	  orientation	  of	  for-­‐profit	  schools	  is	  towards	  neoliberal	  principles	  that	  tend	  to	  generalize	  norms	  of	  competition	  in	  ways	  that	  erode	  the	  possibilities	  for	  equity.	  Simultaneously,	  for-­‐profit	  charters	  are	  structurally	  bound	  to	  a	  profit-­‐maximization	  imperative.	  The	  obligation	  to	  maximize	  profit	  incentivizes	  targeting	  “more	  desirable”	  student	  populations.	  Taken	  together,	  there	  is	  substantial	  reason	  to	  believe	  that	  for-­‐profit	  charters	  may	  attempt	  to	  cultivate	  whiter,	  wealthier	  student	  populations,	  and	  that	  this	  may	  exacerbate	  racial	  and	  socioeconomic	  segregation.	  Further,	  this	  may	  create	  an	  insidious	  market-­effect	  that	  compels	  other	  charter	  schools	  in	  districts	  where	  for-­‐profits	  predominate	  to	  engage	  in	  similar	  profit-­‐maximizing	  strategies	  with	  implications	  for	  broader	  charter/non-­‐charter	  school	  segregation	  patterns.	  	  	  This	  chapter	  begins	  by	  outlining	  neoliberal	  ideology,	  with	  a	  particular	  focus	  on	  how	  the	  enactment	  of	  neoliberal	  ideology	  may	  systematically	  undermine	  the	  pursuit	  of	  equity.	  Next,	  the	  historical	  development	  of	  charter	  schools	  will	  be	  described	  in	  order	  to	  distinguish	  for-­‐profit	  charters	  from	  other,	  less	  perfectly	  neoliberal-­‐ized	  charters.	  The	  chapter	  then	  discusses	  the	  tactics	  that	  charter	  schools	  in	  general,	  and	  for-­‐profit	  charters	  in	  particular,	  can	  and	  do	  undertake	  to	  maximize	  profit.	  There	  will	  be	  a	  particular	  focus	  on	  how	  and	  why	  for-­‐profit	  charter	  schools	  may	  be	  incentivized	  to	  cultivate	  particular	  student	  populations	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and	  how	  this	  may	  impact	  racial	  and	  socioeconomic	  segregation.	  Finally,	  given	  the	  ideological	  and	  structural	  particularities	  of	  for-­‐profit	  charter	  schools,	  and	  the	  lacunae	  in	  the	  existing	  research,	  general	  research	  questions	  will	  be	  proposed.	  	  	  	  
What	  is	  Neoliberal	  Logic?	  	   Neoliberalism	  is	  a	  word	  used	  both	  to	  describe	  the	  general	  conditions	  of	  the	  contemporary	  political	  and	  economic	  landscape	  as	  well	  as	  specific	  features	  of	  that	  landscape.	  It	  also	  refers	  to	  a	  particular	  ideology	  which	  preferences	  a	  particular	  set	  of	  political	  and	  economic	  conditions	  and	  guides	  the	  path	  of	  institutional	  development.	  This	  section	  discusses	  what	  is	  distinct	  about	  the	  logic	  that	  undergirds	  neoliberal	  ideology.	  It	  draws	  from	  a	  range	  of	  theorists	  of	  neoliberalism	  to	  locate	  the	  key	  distinguishing	  features	  of	  this	  ideology.	  Most	  importantly,	  neoliberalism	  will	  be	  shown	  to	  systematically	  subvert	  equity,	  indicating	  the	  dangers	  manifestations	  of	  neoliberalism	  may	  pose	  to	  equity	  in	  education	  and	  beyond.	  According	  to	  David	  Harvey	  (2005);	  “Neoliberalism	  is	  in	  the	  first	  instance	  a	  theory	  of	  political	  economic	  practices	  that	  proposes	  that	  human	  well-­‐being	  can	  best	  be	  advanced	  by	  liberating	  individual	  entrepreneurial	  freedoms	  and	  skills	  within	  an	  institutional	  framework	  characterized	  by	  strong	  private	  property	  rights,	  free	  markets,	  and	  free	  trade…	  [I]f	  markets	  do	  not	  exist	  (in	  areas	  such	  as	  land,	  water,	  education,	  health	  care,	  social	  security,	  or	  environmental	  pollution)	  than	  they	  must	  be	  created,	  by	  state	  action	  if	  necessary.”	  (p.	  2).	  	  At	  its	  core	  the	  theory	  of	  neoliberalism	  lies	  in	  its	  distinctive	  vision	  of	  the	  centrality	  of	  markets.	  Daniel	  Stedman	  Jones	  (2012)	  defines	  neoliberal	  ideology	  as	  “the	  free	  market	  ideology	  based	  on	  individual	  liberty	  and	  limited	  government	  that	  connect[s]	  human	  freedom	  to	  the	  actions	  of	  the	  rational,	  self-­‐interested	  actor	  in	  the	  competitive	  marketplace.”	  
	  	   23	  
(p.	  2).	  Jamie	  Peck	  (2010)	  presents	  perhaps	  the	  most	  concise	  definition	  of	  neoliberalism,	  defining	  it	  as	  “[p]olitically	  assisted	  market	  rule”	  (p.	  xii).	  All	  of	  these	  definitions	  point	  to	  the	  centrality	  of	  the	  “free	  market.”	  The	  free	  market	  refers	  to	  profit-­‐oriented	  capitalist	  economic	  activity.	  Neoliberalism	  fundamentally	  promotes	  the	  profit	  motive	  as	  the	  best	  way	  to	  regulate	  all	  of	  human	  activity,	  and	  the	  profit-­‐maximizing	  corporation	  as	  the	  proper	  institutional	  form	  to	  regulate	  this	  activity.	  As	  a	  theory	  and	  an	  ideology,	  neoliberalism	  simultaneously	  provides	  a	  frame	  for	  making	  sense	  of	  the	  world	  and	  a	  guide	  for	  taking	  action.	  This	  is	  the	  construct	  of	  neoliberal	  logic,	  compelling	  in	  its	  simplicity:	  Markets	  are	  the	  ultimate	  expression	  of	  collective	  human	  interest	  and	  the	  more	  they	  are	  generalized	  the	  better	  off	  everyone	  will	  be.	  Neoliberal	  logic	  is	  essentially	  an	  absolute	  faith	  in	  the	  market.	  As	  Philip	  Mirowski	  (2013)	  notes,	  neoliberals	  assert	  that	  “[a]ny	  problem,	  economic	  or	  otherwise,	  has	  a	  market	  solution,	  given	  sufficient	  ingenuity”	  (p.	  65),	  and	  that	  “the	  market	  (suitably	  reengineered	  and	  promoted)	  can	  always	  provide	  solutions	  to	  problems	  seemingly	  caused	  by	  the	  market	  in	  the	  first	  place”	  (p.	  64).	  If	  this	  form	  of	  circular	  logic	  is	  accepted,	  markets	  must	  be	  anywhere	  and	  everywhere	  the	  answer	  to	  all	  questions.	  	  The	  neoliberal	  argument	  for	  market-­‐based	  governance	  is	  essentially:	  1)	  we	  live	  in	  a	  very	  complex	  society,	  2)	  no	  individual	  or	  group	  can	  possibly	  understand	  all	  of	  the	  various	  needs	  and	  desires	  of	  everyone	  in	  society,	  3)	  the	  market	  is	  the	  only	  mechanism	  that	  allows	  us	  to	  fruitfully	  coordinate	  human	  activity,	  and	  therefore,	  4)	  we	  are	  all	  best	  off	  when	  we	  rely	  on	  markets	  (instead	  of	  the	  state,	  e.g.)	  to	  regulate	  our	  coexistence.	  There	  are	  two	  key	  corollaries	  that	  are	  implied	  here.	  First,	  humans	  are	  fundamentally	  ignorant	  of,	  and	  will	  always	  be	  unable	  to	  ever	  fully	  comprehend	  the	  workings	  of	  the	  market	  (Mirowski,	  2013).	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Second,	  trust	  in	  the	  market,	  even	  though	  its	  workings	  can	  never	  be	  understood,	  must	  be	  absolute	  (Jones,	  2012).	  It	  has	  been	  noted	  that	  this	  construct	  approximates	  a	  religious	  commitment	  to	  the	  essentially	  god-­‐like	  powers	  of	  the	  market	  (Mirowski,	  2013;	  Jones,	  2012).	  It	  is	  faith	  in	  the	  market	  above	  all	  else	  that	  characterizes	  neoliberal	  logic.	  It	  is	  also	  this	  blind	  faith,	  even	  in	  the	  face	  of	  overwhelming	  contradictory	  evidence	  that	  keeps	  the	  neoliberal	  agenda	  moving	  forward.	  	   How	  did	  an	  ideology	  promoting	  markets	  as	  the	  ultimate	  social	  good	  become	  so	  compelling?	  David	  Blacker	  (2013)	  asserts	  that	  neoliberalism	  is	  “a	  story	  that	  is	  advanced	  –	  explicitly	  and	  also,	  more	  powerfully,	  implicitly	  as	  ‘common	  sense’	  ”	  (p.	  25,	  italics	  in	  original).	  Blacker	  here	  emphasizes	  that	  the	  power	  of	  neoliberal	  ideology	  stems	  from	  the	  way	  that	  it	  has	  come	  to	  be	  accepted	  as	  everyday	  common	  sense.	  Mirowski	  (2013)	  echoes	  this	  thought	  in	  noting	  that	  “neoliberalism	  as	  worldview	  has	  sunk	  its	  roots	  deep	  into	  everyday	  life,	  almost	  to	  the	  point	  of	  passing	  as	  the	  ‘ideology	  of	  no	  ideology’	  ”	  (p.	  28).	  If	  neoliberal	  faith	  in	  markets	  is	  not	  even	  recognized	  as	  an	  ideological	  construct,	  but	  simply	  taken	  as	  common	  sense,	  it	  becomes	  harder	  to	  refute	  its	  logic.	  Dardot	  &	  Laval	  (2013)	  assert	  that	  neoliberalism	  is	  “firstly	  and	  fundamentally	  a	  rationality,	  and	  as	  such	  tends	  to	  structure	  and	  organize	  not	  only	  the	  action	  of	  rulers,	  but	  also	  the	  conduct	  of	  the	  ruled.	  The	  principal	  characteristic	  of	  neoliberal	  rationality	  is	  the	  generalization	  of	  competition	  as	  a	  behavioral	  norm	  and	  of	  the	  enterprise	  as	  a	  model	  of	  subjectivation.”	  (p.	  4).	  When	  a	  theory	  or	  ideology	  becomes	  a	  rationality,	  it	  becomes	  irrational	  to	  behave	  in	  ways	  that	  run	  counter	  to	  its	  dictates.	  When	  neoliberal	  rationality	  reaches	  a	  certain	  social	  consensus,	  Dardot	  and	  Laval	  assert,	  people	  come	  to	  see	  themselves	  as	  competitive	  market	  actors	  in	  all	  phases	  of	  their	  lives.	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Neoliberal	  Logic	  and	  Equity	  What	  is	  the	  impact	  on	  equity	  when	  norms	  of	  competition	  become	  universalized?	  Brown	  (2015)	  discusses	  how	  the	  overriding	  neoliberal	  faith	  in	  markets	  impacts	  the	  very	  nature	  of	  human	  relationships,	  so	  that	  “when	  the	  political	  rationality	  of	  neoliberalism	  is	  fully	  realized,	  when	  market	  principles	  are	  extended	  to	  every	  sphere,	  inequality	  becomes	  legitimate,	  even	  normative,	  in	  every	  sphere”	  (p.	  64).	  Brown	  sees	  neoliberalism	  as	  a	  dominant	  ideology	  that	  transforms	  people	  into	  “homo	  economicus”,	  humans	  who	  are	  taught	  to	  think	  of	  all	  activity	  as	  economic,	  as	  opposed	  to	  political.	  Inasmuch	  as	  neoliberalism	  totalizes	  market	  rationality	  to	  all	  human	  activity,	  it	  inevitably	  alters	  the	  character	  of	  markets.	  When	  a	  market	  perspective	  takes	  over	  a	  new	  arena,	  such	  as	  public	  education,	  the	  ability	  to	  forge	  collective	  ideals	  or	  identities	  is	  lost.	  Without	  these	  collective	  identities,	  markets	  come	  to	  be	  based	  on	  competition	  instead	  of	  exchange,	  and	  competition	  is	  generalized.	  When	  competition	  is	  pervasive,	  it	  becomes	  harder	  to	  conceptualize	  public	  interventions	  to	  ameliorate	  inequity.	  In	  effect,	  everything	  becomes	  a	  zero-­‐sum	  game.	  One	  individual’s	  gain	  must	  come	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  the	  loss	  of	  another	  individual.	  In	  a	  competitive	  market	  scenario,	  any	  actor	  seeking	  to	  address	  equity	  is	  at	  a	  distinct	  competitive	  disadvantage.	  	  Equity	  becomes	  unthinkable	  because	  competition	  dictates	  that	  we	  must	  all	  seek	  to	  gain	  relative	  advantage	  over	  others	  at	  all	  times.	  In	  place	  of	  equity,	  efficiency	  through	  competition	  becomes	  the	  dominant	  social	  good.	  	  In	  an	  environment	  where	  some	  actors	  are	  neoliberal-­‐ized,	  i.e.	  driven	  by	  profit-­‐maximizing	  behavior,	  while	  others	  maintain	  the	  structural	  imperative	  to	  address	  equity	  concerns,	  significant	  market	  asymmetries	  are	  liable	  to	  rise.	  Pressure	  arises	  for	  non-­‐market	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actors	  to	  behave	  in	  market-­‐oriented	  ways.	  In	  this	  way,	  when	  formerly	  public	  sectors	  begin	  to	  privatize,	  competition	  becomes	  a	  dominant	  norm,	  compelling	  other	  actors	  to	  also	  engage	  in	  competitive	  market-­‐style	  behaviors.	  The	  more	  that	  a	  particular	  arena	  (e.g.	  a	  public	  school	  district)	  is	  suffused	  by	  neoliberal	  logic,	  the	  more	  that	  all	  actors	  within	  that	  arena	  are	  pressured	  to	  act	  in	  accordance	  with	  competitive	  pressures.	  Historical	  accounts	  of	  neoliberalism’s	  ascendancy	  place	  it	  within	  a	  framework	  of	  class	  struggle	  and	  crises	  of	  profitability	  (Dumenil	  &	  Levy,	  2011;	  Harvey,	  2005).	  Thus	  neoliberalism	  is	  seen	  as	  marking	  a	  new	  historical	  phase	  of	  capitalism,	  one	  marked	  by	  an	  aggressive	  retrenchment	  of	  capital,	  or	  “a	  second	  financial	  hegemony”	  (Dumenil	  &	  Levy,	  2011;	  17).	  In	  this	  way,	  neoliberalism	  is	  a	  response	  to	  post-­‐World	  War	  II	  economic	  practices,	  labeled	  Keynesianism,	  or	  the	  postwar	  compromise.	  “[T]he	  postwar	  compromise	  involved	  the	  increase	  in	  purchasing	  power,	  policies	  in	  favor	  of	  full	  employment,	  and	  the	  establishment	  of	  the	  so-­‐called	  welfare	  state,	  that	  is	  the	  gradual	  commitment	  of	  the	  state	  to	  provide	  for	  the	  health,	  retirement,	  and	  education	  of	  popular	  classes”	  (Dumenil	  &	  Levy,	  2011;	  16)	  These	  policies	  	  fostered	  an	  unprecedented	  growth	  of	  middle	  class	  wealth,	  and	  created	  a	  more	  economically	  equal	  society	  (Piketty,	  2014).	  Thus	  Keynesianism	  was	  rooted	  in	  the	  notion	  that	  the	  state	  could	  be	  leveraged	  to	  actively	  foster	  greater	  equity,	  while	  neoliberalism	  is	  in	  part	  organized	  around	  a	  rejection	  of	  that	  idea.	  Jones	  (2012)	  traces	  the	  growing	  power	  of	  neoliberalism,	  manifested	  in	  an	  increasingly	  influential	  network	  of	  intellectuals	  and	  think	  tanks	  in	  the	  postwar	  era	  as	  neoliberals	  came	  to	  define	  themselves	  in	  opposition	  to	  the	  Keynesian	  postwar	  consensus.	  Neoliberalism	  also	  grew	  out	  of	  a	  reaction	  to	  the	  social	  changes	  stemming	  from	  the	  popular	  movements	  of	  the	  1960s,	  including	  the	  Feminist,	  Civil	  Rights,	  and	  school	  desegregation	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movements	  (Jones,	  2012,	  Friedman,	  1955).	  School	  desegregation	  became	  a	  key	  arena	  of	  dispute	  because	  it	  combined	  social	  norms	  asserting	  the	  need	  to	  redress	  inequalities	  stemming	  from	  a	  racist	  American	  history	  with	  redistributive	  economic	  spending	  and	  an	  expanded	  role	  of	  government	  in	  education.	  In	  this	  way,	  neoliberalism	  was	  a	  reaction	  against	  policies	  designed	  to	  redress	  social	  and	  economic	  inequities,	  concerned	  with	  transforming	  common	  sense	  away	  from	  commitments	  to	  building	  a	  more	  egalitarian	  society.	  	  
The	  Emergence	  of	  Neoliberal	  School	  Reform	  &	  For-­Profit	  Charter	  Schools	  For	  the	  purposes	  of	  this	  dissertation,	  neoliberalism	  has	  been	  defined	  as	  an	  ideology.	  Neoliberalism	  as	  an	  abstract	  ideology	  is	  not	  something	  visible	  that	  materially	  manifests	  in	  the	  real	  world.	  Rather,	  different	  individuals,	  schools,	  school	  districts,	  and	  other	  educational	  actors	  and	  institutions	  are	  more	  or	  less	  influenced	  and	  guided	  by	  neoliberal	  ideology.	  Some	  theorists	  have	  broadly	  characterized	  the	  current	  era	  of	  school	  reform	  as	  neoliberal	  (Lipman,	  2011).	  This	  is	  accurate	  inasmuch	  as	  neoliberal	  discourse	  predominates	  in	  the	  school	  reform	  conversation.	  However,	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  neoliberal	  ideology	  informs	  the	  nature	  of	  actually	  existing	  public	  schools	  varies	  greatly.	  For	  example,	  many	  wealthy	  suburban	  districts	  are	  not	  substantially	  impacted	  by	  neoliberal	  ideology.	  These	  districts	  generally	  do	  not	  have	  charter	  schools	  or	  wide	  implementation	  of	  other	  school	  choice	  models.	  Meanwhile	  other	  districts,	  particularly	  low-­‐income	  urban	  districts,	  have	  experienced	  wholesale	  neoliberal	  reinvention.	  This	  is	  most	  systematically	  represented	  by	  the	  essentially	  complete	  replacement	  of	  traditional	  public	  schools	  with	  charter	  schools	  in	  New	  Orleans	  following	  Hurricane	  Katrina	  (Buras,	  2011;	  Klein,	  2007).	  Neoliberal	  school	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reform	  is	  thus	  spatially	  uneven	  in	  its	  application.	  Just	  as	  some	  areas	  have	  been	  more	  impacted	  by	  neoliberal	  reforms	  than	  others,	  some	  institutional	  forms	  represent	  more	  radically	  neoliberal	  reforms	  than	  others.	  Because	  of	  the	  incompatibility	  of	  neoliberal	  ideology	  to	  the	  promotion	  of	  equity,	  it	  may	  be	  useful	  to	  consider	  how	  certain	  of	  these	  forms	  exemplify	  neoliberalism	  to	  a	  greater	  or	  lesser	  extent.	  	  The	  historical	  emergence	  of	  for-­‐profit	  charter	  schools	  demonstrates	  how	  they	  developed	  as	  a	  particularly	  pure	  representation	  of	  a	  particular	  market-­‐oriented	  model	  of	  reform.	  For-­‐profit	  charters	  represent	  the	  apex	  in	  the	  development	  of	  incrementally	  more	  neoliberal	  forms	  over	  time.	  However,	  they	  also	  coexist	  with	  other,	  less	  fully	  neoliberal	  reforms.	  This	  distinction	  may	  lead	  to	  for-­‐profit	  charter	  schools	  exhibiting	  a	  distinct	  influence	  on	  educational	  equity	  via	  racial	  and	  socioeconomic	  segregation.	  	  	  
Desegregation	  and	  the	  Genesis	  of	  School	  Choice	  	   For	  two	  reasons,	  the	  story	  of	  neoliberal	  school	  reform	  begins	  with	  the	  school	  desegregation	  movement.	  First,	  the	  roots	  of	  neoliberal	  school	  reform	  emerged	  directly	  out	  of	  white	  opposition	  to	  the	  state-­‐based	  equity	  promoting	  measures	  of	  desegregation.	  Second,	  large-­‐scale	  public	  school	  choice	  measures	  were	  pioneered	  during	  the	  desegregation	  movement.	  Additionally,	  the	  desegregation	  movement	  emerged	  from	  the	  understanding	  that	  segregated	  schooling	  is	  necessarily	  inequitable:	  in	  short,	  that	  equity	  and	  segregation	  are	  fundamentally	  linked.	  In	  1954,	  the	  US	  Supreme	  Court	  unanimously	  ruled	  in	  Brown	  v.	  Board	  of	  Education	  that	  racially	  segregated	  public	  schools	  were	  unconstitutional.	  The	  court	  found	  that	  segregated	  schools	  “deprive	  the	  children	  of	  the	  minority	  group	  of	  equal	  educational	  opportunities”.	  (Chief	  Justice	  Earl	  Warren,	  Opinion	  of	  
	  	   29	  
the	  U.S.	  Supreme	  Court	  in	  Brown	  v.	  Board	  of	  Education	  (1954)	  347	  U.S.	  483,	  quoted	  in	  Martin,	  1998,	  p.	  173).	  Crucially,	  Brown	  represented	  a	  realization	  that	  how	  students	  are	  sorted	  into	  schools	  has	  implications	  for	  educational	  equity.	  In	  a	  direct	  rejection	  of	  Plessy	  v.	  
Ferguson	  (1896),	  Brown	  recognized	  that	  racially	  separate	  education	  could	  never	  be	  equal.	  When	  students	  of	  different	  races	  are	  sorted	  into	  separate	  schools,	  white	  students	  benefit	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  non-­‐white	  students.	  While	  Brown	  was	  rightfully	  hailed	  as	  a	  landmark	  decision	  for	  public	  education,	  for	  ten	  years	  after	  the	  ruling	  little	  substantive	  desegregation	  took	  place	  (Orfield	  &	  Lee,	  2004).	  This	  was	  largely	  attributable	  to	  massive	  white	  resistance	  to	  school	  desegregation.	  It	  took	  additional	  legislation	  and	  court	  cases	  (especially	  the	  1964	  Civil	  Rights	  Act	  and	  the	  Green	  v.	  New	  Kent	  County,	  Alexander	  v.	  Holmes,	  and	  Swann	  v.	  
Charlotte-­Mecklenburg	  cases)	  to	  spur	  meaningful	  school	  desegregation,	  but	  white	  resistance	  remained	  an	  obstacle	  to	  the	  implementation	  of	  desegregation.	  	  	   It	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  the	  geography	  of	  school	  desegregation	  has	  unfolded	  distinctly	  in	  different	  regions	  of	  the	  country.	  Prior	  to	  1954,	  in	  the	  Southern	  United	  States,	  school	  segregation	  often	  constituted	  the	  creation	  of	  artificial	  barriers	  to	  prevent	  Black	  students	  from	  accessing	  local	  neighborhood	  schools,	  instead	  maintaining	  parallel	  educational	  systems	  divided	  by	  race.	  This	  is	  often	  referred	  to	  as	  de	  jure	  segregation,	  because	  it	  was	  formally	  enshrined	  in	  law.	  In	  other	  regions	  of	  the	  country	  where	  residential	  segregation	  was	  more	  pronounced,	  the	  attendance	  of	  neighborhood	  schools	  (along	  with	  the	  intentional	  drawing	  of	  school	  catchment	  boundaries	  contiguous	  with	  residential	  segregation	  lines)	  was	  the	  primary	  source	  of	  school	  segregation.	  This	  is	  known	  as	  de	  facto	  segregation,	  reflecting	  its	  more	  informal	  nature.	  School	  desegregation	  outside	  of	  the	  South	  would	  require	  either	  massive	  residential	  relocation	  or	  the	  attendance	  of	  non-­‐neighborhood	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schools.	  In	  the	  face	  of	  violent	  white	  resistance	  to	  residential	  integration,	  desegregation	  in	  the	  Northern	  US	  came	  to	  be	  premised	  on	  student	  attendance	  of	  non-­‐neighborhood	  schools.	  All	  things	  being	  equal	  parents	  prefer	  their	  children	  to	  attend	  schools	  nearby	  and	  compelling	  students	  to	  attend	  non-­‐local	  schools	  is	  problematic.	  The	  solution	  to	  this	  dilemma	  came	  in	  the	  form	  of	  the	  first	  large-­‐scale	  school	  choice	  plans.	  The	  general	  form	  of	  these	  desegregating	  school	  choice	  plans	  consisted	  of	  1)	  allowing	  Black	  families	  to	  choose	  to	  send	  their	  child(ren)	  to	  their	  (generally	  highly	  segregated)	  neighborhood	  public	  school,	  or	  to	  have	  them	  bussed	  to	  a	  predominantly	  white	  school,	  or	  to	  an	  integrated	  magnet	  school	  and	  2)	  allowing	  white	  families	  to	  send	  their	  children	  to	  their	  (generally	  highly	  segregated)	  neighborhood	  public	  school,	  or	  to	  an	  integrated	  magnet	  school	  (notably	  white	  students	  were	  not	  bussed	  to	  predominantly	  Black	  neighborhood	  schools).	  While	  there	  were	  notable	  limitations	  to	  these	  voluntary	  desegregation	  plans,	  and	  white	  resistance	  never	  subsided,	  many	  were	  able	  to	  markedly	  decrease	  racial	  segregation	  in	  the	  cities	  where	  they	  were	  implemented	  (Wells	  &	  Crain,	  1997).	  These	  plans	  generally	  included	  racial	  integration	  targets,	  with	  applicable	  sanctions	  for	  falling	  short	  of	  these	  targets.	  Crucially,	  these	  desegregation	  plans	  had	  direct	  court	  oversight	  with	  explicit	  goals	  for	  addressing	  educational	  equity	  via	  racial	  desegregation.	  While	  in	  the	  North,	  school	  choice	  was	  the	  primary	  vehicle	  for	  desegregation,	  because	  of	  the	  distinct	  racial	  geography	  in	  the	  South,	  school	  choice	  was	  instead	  primarily	  a	  tool	  for	  avoiding	  desegregation.	  In	  1959,	  for	  example,	  in	  order	  to	  avoid	  the	  implementation	  of	  school	  desegregation,	  the	  Prince	  George’s	  County	  school	  district	  in	  Virginia	  closed	  all	  public	  schools	  and	  initiated	  a	  wholesale	  private	  school	  voucher	  system	  (Orfield	  and	  Frankenberg,	  2013).	  Under	  this	  system,	  government	  funding	  for	  education	  was	  available	  in	  
	  	   31	  
the	  form	  of	  a	  voucher	  that	  could	  be	  used	  to	  pay	  tuition	  at	  a	  private	  school.	  With	  the	  public	  schools	  closed,	  new	  private	  schools	  opened	  to	  hire	  the	  formerly	  public	  school	  teachers	  and	  take	  advantage	  of	  the	  vouchers.	  Notably,	  only	  whites	  had	  access	  to	  the	  resources	  necessary	  to	  open	  private	  schools,	  and	  the	  new	  white-­‐established	  private	  schools	  only	  enrolled	  white	  students.	  Because	  these	  schools	  were	  nominally	  private,	  they	  were	  able	  to	  select	  their	  enrollment.	  There	  were	  no	  Black-­‐operated	  schools,	  with	  the	  result	  that	  Black	  students	  in	  Prince	  George’s	  County	  were	  entirely	  unable	  to	  attend	  school	  for	  five	  years,	  until	  the	  courts	  intervened.	  Other,	  similar	  quasi-­‐private	  efforts	  to	  avoid	  desegregation	  arose	  in	  the	  form	  of	  so-­‐called	  segregation	  academies	  (Champagne,	  1973).	  These	  private	  schools	  opened	  up	  throughout	  the	  South	  with	  all-­‐white	  enrollment,	  oftentimes	  with	  direct	  government	  funding,	  making	  the	  avoidance	  of	  integrated	  public	  schools	  possible	  for	  larger	  numbers	  of	  white	  families.	  Due	  to	  increasing	  unpopularity,	  demographic	  changes	  (e.g.	  white	  flight),	  and	  court	  rulings	  limiting	  the	  scope	  of	  desegregation	  plans,	  the	  racial	  segregation	  of	  public	  schools	  has	  been	  on	  the	  rise	  for	  at	  least	  25	  years.	  For	  example,	  between	  1960	  and	  1990,	  the	  percentage	  of	  Black	  students	  in	  the	  South	  that	  attended	  majority	  white	  schools	  increased	  from	  0%	  to	  over	  40%	  (Orfield	  &	  Frankenberg,	  2014).	  However,	  by	  2010,	  less	  than	  25%	  of	  Black	  students	  in	  the	  South	  attended	  majority	  white	  schools.	  Most	  of	  the	  large-­‐scale	  voluntary	  desegregation	  plans	  that	  arose	  in	  the	  1960’s,	  70s	  and	  80s	  have	  either	  been	  substantially	  reduced	  in	  size	  or	  ceased	  operation	  altogether.	  Today	  they	  have	  been	  largely	  eclipsed	  by	  school	  choice	  plans	  that	  by	  and	  large	  do	  not	  have	  explicit	  equity	  objectives.	  Desegregation	  programs	  could	  be	  classified	  as	  neoliberal	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  they	  introduced	  the	  strategy	  of	  offering	  a	  range	  of	  public	  school	  choices	  for	  families	  to	  choose.	  However,	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they	  are	  very	  much	  not	  neoliberal	  in	  the	  respect	  that	  they	  entail	  close	  state	  oversight,	  local-­‐control	  of	  fully	  public	  schools,	  and	  explicit	  equity-­‐focused	  objectives.	  	  
	   	  
The	  Evolution	  of	  Charter	  Schools:	  Two	  Competing	  Visions	  Charter	  schools	  are	  sometimes	  presented	  as	  the	  quintessential	  neoliberal	  education	  reform.	  This	  is	  an	  oversimplification.	  It	  ignores	  how	  other	  forms	  of	  school	  choice,	  including	  open	  enrollment,	  private	  school	  vouchers,	  intra-­‐	  and	  inter-­‐district	  desegregation	  plans,	  and	  magnet	  schools	  are	  also	  neoliberal	  reforms.	  It	  also	  misunderstands	  the	  diverse,	  decentralized	  nature	  of	  charter	  schools.	  In	  one	  sense	  all	  charter	  schools	  do	  represent	  market-­‐based	  neoliberal	  reform;	  they	  transfer	  the	  operation	  of	  public	  schools	  to	  private	  hands.	  Charter	  schools	  are	  structurally	  distinct	  from	  district-­‐run	  public	  schools,	  representing	  new	  institutional	  actors	  where	  previously	  there	  were	  only	  government-­‐operated	  schools	  (outside	  of	  private	  education).	  However,	  charter	  schools	  differ	  in	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  they	  are	  conceived	  of	  and	  designed	  to	  be	  true	  market	  actors.	  A	  spectrum	  exists,	  with	  some	  charter	  schools	  hewing	  more	  closely	  to	  the	  neoliberal	  ideal	  than	  others.	  For-­‐profit	  charter	  schools	  exemplify	  the	  most	  neoliberal	  end	  of	  this	  spectrum.	  The	  operation	  of	  public	  schools	  by	  for-­‐profit	  corporations	  is	  the	  structural	  manifestation	  of	  neoliberal	  ideology.	  The	  first	  charter	  schools	  were	  designed	  “to	  encourage	  educators,	  parents,	  and	  community	  members	  to	  create	  innovative	  and	  independent	  schools”	  (Scott	  &	  DiMartino,	  2010,	  p.	  175).	  This	  “democratic	  control”	  vision,	  originated	  by	  Al	  Shanker	  and	  Ray	  Budde	  in	  1988,	  saw	  charter	  schools	  as	  a	  way	  to	  experiment	  with	  new	  educational	  practices	  in	  order	  both	  to	  broadly	  improve	  pedagogy	  and	  to	  devise	  educational	  environments	  suited	  to	  the	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needs	  of	  particular	  local	  student	  populations.	  Importantly,	  while	  these	  schools	  would	  be	  free	  of	  the	  day-­‐to-­‐day	  oversight	  of	  school	  districts,	  the	  charters	  were	  conceived	  of	  as	  originating	  within	  and	  ultimately	  fall	  under	  the	  purview	  of	  the	  local	  districts.	  Democratic	  control	  advocates	  saw	  charters	  as	  localized	  projects,	  integrated	  into	  local	  communities,	  and	  responsive	  to	  democratic	  processes	  and	  control.	  Democratic	  control	  advocates	  hold	  that	  the	  particularities	  of	  local	  communities	  mean	  that	  schools	  should	  be	  tailored	  to	  each	  community’s	  needs.	  Thus	  while	  charter	  schools	  might	  demonstrate	  new	  educational	  methodologies	  that	  prove	  successful,	  it	  should	  not	  be	  assumed	  that	  successful	  innovations	  can	  or	  should	  be	  blindly	  replicated	  elsewhere.	  	  The	  other,	  later-­‐emerging	  strand	  of	  charter	  thought,	  termed	  “market	  control”	  conceptualizes	  charter	  schools	  differently	  (Scott	  &	  DiMartino,	  2010).	  The	  market	  control	  model	  emphasizes	  the	  importance	  of	  charter	  schools	  operating	  independently	  from	  local	  districts.	  For	  market	  control	  advocates,	  local	  school	  boards,	  teachers	  unions,	  and	  other	  special	  interest	  groups	  stand	  in	  the	  way	  of	  quality	  education	  (Friedman,1955,	  1962	  ;	  Chubb	  &	  Moe,	  1997).	  They	  see	  government	  as	  inherently	  inefficient,	  often	  corrupt,	  and	  an	  obstacle	  to	  optimizing	  public	  education.	  In	  this	  way,	  market	  control	  advocates	  mirror	  the	  general	  neoliberal	  argument	  that	  government	  is	  inefficient	  and	  ought	  to	  be	  supplanted	  by	  the	  market	  wherever	  possible.	  Further,	  market	  control	  advocates	  look	  to	  market	  demand	  as	  the	  proper	  mechanism	  for	  administering	  charter	  schools.	  This	  image	  of	  charter	  schools	  envisions	  free-­‐market-­‐style	  competition	  between	  charter	  school	  providers	  producing	  winners	  and	  losers,	  with	  successful	  charter	  providers	  replicating	  at	  scale.	  	  For	  market	  control	  advocates,	  the	  mark	  of	  success	  is	  high	  “market	  demand”	  for	  a	  particular	  charter	  school	  or	  provider	  on	  the	  part	  of	  families,	  and	  popular	  schools	  should	  be	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replicated	  locally	  and	  nationally.	  Market	  control	  advocates	  see	  the	  ability	  of	  charter	  providers	  to	  capture	  and	  retain	  “market	  share”	  by	  enrolling	  ever-­‐larger	  quantities	  of	  students	  as	  the	  primary	  measure	  of	  a	  charter	  school	  provider’s	  success.	  They	  see	  charter	  schools	  opening	  up	  a	  new	  marketplace	  in	  public	  education,	  forcing	  inefficient	  traditional	  public	  schools	  to	  compete	  with	  market-­‐modeled	  schools	  for	  scarce	  student	  populations.	  Market	  control	  advocates	  promote	  economies	  of	  scale,	  and	  assert	  that	  successful	  charter	  schools	  ought	  to	  be	  replicated	  to	  the	  fullest	  extent	  possible.	  This	  reflects	  a	  belief	  that	  a	  school	  reform	  that	  works	  in	  one	  place	  should	  work	  anywhere,	  regardless	  of	  local	  particularities.	  Instead	  of	  advocating	  unique	  reforms	  for	  diverse	  communities,	  market	  control	  models	  posit	  a	  set	  of	  best	  practices	  that	  can	  and	  should	  be	  applied	  broadly	  to	  public	  education.	  For	  these	  reasons,	  market	  control	  is	  more	  closely	  aligned	  with	  neoliberal	  ideology	  than	  is	  democratic	  control.	  	  	   	  
Charter	  School	  Operators	  and	  Market	  /	  Democratic	  Control	  There	  are	  three	  types	  of	  charter	  school	  operators,	  independent,	  non-­‐profit	  and	  for-­‐profit.	  Independent	  charter	  schools	  are	  single	  free-­‐standing	  charters.	  Education	  management	  organizations	  (EMOs)	  are	  organized	  as	  either	  non-­‐profit	  or	  for-­‐profits	  and	  are	  of	  varying	  size,	  some	  operating	  as	  few	  as	  one	  school	  some	  operating	  over	  a	  hundred	  schools	  (Molnar,	  Miron	  &	  Urschel,	  2010).	  For	  purposes	  of	  this	  dissertation,	  charter	  schools	  operated	  by	  non-­‐profit	  or	  for-­‐profit	  EMOs	  are	  treated	  as	  distinct	  charter	  school	  types.	  Markets,	  in	  the	  most	  general	  sense,	  are	  comprised	  by	  competition	  between	  for-­‐profit	  firms.	  In	  this	  respect,	  for-­‐profit	  charter	  schools	  fundamentally	  represent	  the	  market	  model	  at	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work	  in	  public	  education.	  Independent	  and	  non-­‐profit	  charter	  schools	  are	  more	  likely	  than	  for-­‐profit	  charters	  to	  operate	  according	  to	  a	  democratic	  control	  model.	  	  It	  is	  possible	  that	  any	  given	  independent	  or	  non-­‐profit	  charter	  will	  operate	  in	  a	  market-­‐oriented,	  profit-­‐maximizing	  manner.	  Non-­‐profit	  organizations	  represent	  a	  diverse	  set	  of	  actors	  (DiMaggio	  &	  Anheier,	  1990).	  In	  fact	  it	  is	  undoubtedly	  the	  case	  that	  some	  non-­‐profit	  schools	  are	  what	  Burton	  Weisbrod	  (1988)	  termed	  “for-­‐profits	  in	  disguise”	  (p.	  11),	  disbursing	  “profits”	  in	  the	  form	  of	  outsize	  executive	  salaries	  to	  nominally	  non-­‐profit	  executives.	  However,	  the	  key	  distinction	  is	  that	  while	  independent	  charter	  schools	  and	  non-­‐profit	  EMOs	  individually	  may	  be	  more	  or	  less	  inclined	  towards	  a	  market-­‐model,	  for-­‐profit	  charter	  schools	  are	  structurally	  constrained	  to	  a	  neoliberal,	  profit-­‐maximizing	  model.	  Thus	  considered	  as	  discrete	  segments	  (all	  independent	  charter	  schools,	  all	  non-­‐profit	  charter	  schools,	  all	  for-­‐profit	  charter	  schools),	  independent	  and	  non-­‐profit	  schools	  would	  be	  expected	  to	  be	  a	  mix	  of	  democratic	  control	  and	  market	  control	  oriented	  schools,	  while	  for-­‐profit	  charters	  would	  be	  expected	  to	  be	  uniformly	  oriented	  towards	  a	  market	  control	  model.	  Desegregation	  represented	  the	  first	  large-­‐scale	  experiment	  with	  voluntary	  school	  choice	  plans.	  The	  winding	  down	  of	  voluntary	  desegregation	  has	  coincided	  with	  the	  rise	  of	  charter	  schools	  (Orfield	  &	  Frankenberg,	  2013).	  The	  push	  to	  scale	  up	  charter	  schools	  has	  led	  to	  the	  rapid	  growth	  of	  EMOs	  (Chi	  &	  Welner,	  2007).	  Market	  control	  neoliberals	  assert	  that	  profit-­‐oriented	  models	  are	  best	  suited	  to	  meeting	  the	  charter	  demand.	  However	  the	  proliferation	  of	  for-­‐profit	  charter	  schools	  raises	  an	  important	  question:	  how	  does	  a	  charter	  school	  maximize	  profit,	  and	  what	  are	  the	  impacts	  of	  these	  profit-­‐maximization	  efforts?	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How	  Can/Do	  Charter	  Schools	  Maximize	  Profit?	  Burton	  Weisbrod’s	  (1988)	  seminal	  analysis	  of	  the	  different	  behaviors	  of	  for-­‐profit	  and	  non-­‐profit	  firms	  in	  the	  provision	  of	  social	  services	  uncovered	  significant	  differences	  in	  the	  behavior	  of	  the	  two	  segments.	  Weisbrod	  characterizes	  for-­‐profit	  providers	  as	  being	  “profit-­‐driven”,	  while	  non-­‐profit	  providers	  are	  generally,	  although	  not	  always,	  “mission-­‐driven”.	  Profit-­‐driven	  social	  service	  providers	  seek	  to	  maximize	  return-­‐on-­‐investment,	  with	  all	  other	  concerns	  secondary.	  Mission-­‐driven	  social	  service	  providers	  arise	  with	  the	  express	  purpose	  of	  addressing	  some	  perceived	  need	  in	  a	  community.	  Weisbrod	  notes	  that	  only	  in	  efficient	  markets	  with	  well-­‐informed	  consumers	  would	  for-­‐profit	  providers	  be	  expected	  to	  provide	  high-­‐quality	  services.	  By	  contrast,	  in	  inefficient	  markets,	  for-­‐profit	  corporations	  have	  an	  incentive	  to	  exploit	  information	  asymmetries	  in	  order	  to	  maximize	  profit.	  When	  markets	  do	  not	  function	  properly,	  for-­‐profit	  operators	  can	  take	  advantage	  of	  under-­‐informed	  consumers	  by	  maximizing	  investment	  in	  superficial	  indicators	  of	  quality	  while	  simultaneously	  minimizing	  investments	  in	  more	  costly	  quality	  factors.	  They	  are	  also	  likely	  to	  seek	  to	  serve	  the	  population	  that	  is	  most	  likely	  to	  yield	  the	  greatest	  profit.	  Information	  asymmetries	  are	  endemic	  to	  public	  education,	  which	  gives	  profit-­‐seeking	  actors	  eminently	  exploitable	  opportunities	  to	  maximize	  return	  on	  investment	  (Brown,	  1992).	  There	  is	  substantial	  evidence	  that	  charter	  schools	  make	  efforts	  to	  minimize	  costs	  and	  maximize	  returns.	  There	  is	  additional	  evidence	  that	  for-­‐profit	  charter	  schools,	  as	  a	  segment,	  engage	  in	  these	  profit-­‐maximizing	  processes	  to	  a	  greater	  extent	  than	  other	  types	  of	  charter	  schools.	  This	  section	  reviews	  existing	  research	  on	  the	  methods	  that	  charter	  schools	  take	  to	  optimize	  their	  return	  on	  investment.	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A	  for-­‐profit	  charter	  school	  can	  seek	  to	  maximize	  profit	  by	  minimizing	  costs,	  and/or	  maximizing	  returns.	  Costs	  are	  relatively	  self-­‐explanatory,	  all	  of	  the	  money	  that	  is	  paid	  to	  operate	  a	  school.	  Returns	  can	  be	  conceived	  of	  in	  two	  very	  different	  ways.	  In	  the	  most	  straightforward	  sense,	  “return”	  is	  all	  of	  the	  money	  that	  a	  charter	  takes	  in	  from	  federal,	  state,	  district,	  and	  private	  funding	  sources.	  From	  this	  perspective	  cost	  and	  return	  are	  straightforward.	  Each	  school	  costs	  a	  certain	  amount	  to	  operate,	  a	  particular	  formula	  dictates	  the	  per-­‐pupil	  funding	  that	  flows	  to	  the	  school	  operator,	  multiplied	  by	  the	  number	  of	  students	  in	  the	  school.	  Subtract	  cost	  from	  return	  and	  the	  remainder	  is	  profit.	  However,	  in	  another	  sense,	  the	  “return”	  could	  be	  interpreted	  as	  the	  academic	  outcomes	  of	  the	  students	  in	  a	  school.	  The	  academic	  performance	  of	  students	  dictates:	  1)	  at	  the	  school	  level,	  whether	  that	  charter	  is	  likely	  to	  be	  able	  to	  continue	  to	  operate	  or	  at	  risk	  of	  having	  their	  charter	  revoked	  due	  to	  academic	  underperformance,	  and	  2)	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  an	  EMO	  is	  seen	  as	  successful	  and	  thus	  its	  ability	  to	  expand	  enrollment	  both	  within	  a	  given	  school	  and	  by	  opening	  new	  schools.	  In	  order	  to	  maximize	  profit	  in	  the	  long	  term,	  an	  EMO	  thus	  must	  pay	  attention	  to	  their	  academic	  return	  in	  addition	  to	  their	  economic	  return	  on	  investment.	  Essentially,	  they	  want	  to	  achieve	  a	  given	  level	  of	  academic	  return	  as	  cost-­‐effectively	  as	  possible.	  	  
Minimizing	  Costs:	  Staffing,	  Curricula,	  Pedagogy	  &	  Grade	  Structure	  Garcia,	  Barber	  and	  Molnar’s	  (2009)	  study	  of	  Arizona	  charter	  schools	  finds	  that	  for-­‐profit	  charter	  schools	  are	  particularly	  likely	  to	  employ	  rote	  curricula	  and	  constant	  drilling	  as	  pedagogical	  techniques.	  They	  cite	  two	  reasons	  for	  this.	  First,	  for-­‐profit	  schools	  can	  minimize	  their	  labor	  costs	  by	  hiring	  less	  experienced,	  less	  qualified	  teachers.	  These	  de-­‐
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skilled	  teachers	  necessitate	  tools	  like	  scripted	  curricula.	  Second,	  the	  ways	  that	  accountability	  is	  structured	  in	  US	  education	  generally	  incentivizes	  organizing	  education	  around	  the	  mastery	  of	  easily	  testable	  sorts	  of	  knowledge	  that	  are	  often	  amenable	  to	  rote	  instruction.	  This	  is	  particularly	  true	  in	  the	  early	  grades,	  and	  for-­‐profit	  EMOs	  are	  much	  more	  likely	  to	  operate	  elementary	  and	  middle	  schools	  than	  high	  schools	  (Henig,	  Holyoke,	  Brown	  &	  Lacireno-­‐Paquet,	  2005).	  Maximizing	  test	  scores	  can	  be	  efficiently	  accomplished	  by	  the	  use	  of	  test-­‐based	  curricula	  and	  scripted	  pedagogy.	  However,	  examinations	  measuring	  the	  higher	  order	  thinking	  of	  students	  in	  these	  schools	  demonstrates	  that	  performance	  in	  these	  areas	  lag	  behind,	  as	  would	  be	  expected	  from	  students	  educated	  by	  inexperienced,	  under-­‐qualified	  teachers	  and	  highly	  scripted	  curricula	  (Garcia,	  Barber	  &	  Molnar,	  2009).	  The	  use	  of	  lower-­‐cost	  employees	  by	  for-­‐profit	  EMOs	  thus	  reduces	  their	  costs	  while	  providing	  a	  superficial	  picture	  of	  good	  educational	  outcomes.	  Consistent	  with	  the	  logic	  of	  employing	  lower-­‐cost	  teachers,	  Miron	  &	  Urschel	  (2010)	  found	  that	  there	  are	  clear	  gaps	  in	  the	  proportion	  of	  Total	  Current	  Expenditures	  (TCE)	  spent	  on	  instruction	  (as	  opposed	  to	  operations,	  administration,	  and	  student	  support	  services)	  by	  traditional	  public	  schools,	  charter	  schools	  in	  general,	  and	  for-­‐profit	  charters.	  Nationally,	  traditional	  public	  school	  districts	  spent	  60.3%	  of	  TCE	  on	  instruction.	  Charter	  schools	  as	  a	  whole	  spent	  54.8%.	  For-­‐profit	  charters	  spent	  the	  lowest	  proportion	  of	  TCE	  on	  instruction,	  at	  48.9%.	  Whether	  these	  schools	  are	  reducing	  teaching	  costs	  by	  increasing	  the	  number	  of	  teachers	  per	  pupil,	  and/or	  paying	  instructors	  less	  by	  hiring	  less	  qualified	  and	  experienced	  teachers,	  or	  by	  some	  other	  method,	  the	  end	  results	  is	  that	  more	  money	  can	  be	  redirected	  to	  other	  sources,	  such	  as	  marketing	  and	  profit	  distribution.	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For-­‐profit	  providers	  have	  been	  found	  to	  be	  less	  likely	  than	  other	  charter	  operators	  to	  offer	  high	  school	  grades	  (Henig,	  Holyoke,	  Brown	  &	  Lacireno-­‐Paquet,	  2005).	  It	  is	  generally	  the	  case	  that	  the	  per-­‐pupil	  cost	  of	  educating	  high	  school	  students	  is	  higher	  than	  the	  per-­‐pupil	  cost	  of	  educating	  elementary	  school	  students.	  Despite	  this,	  per-­‐pupil	  funding	  in	  most	  states	  is	  the	  same	  for	  all	  grade	  levels.	  If	  a	  charter	  operator	  is	  focused	  on	  reducing	  costs,	  it	  makes	  sense	  that	  they	  would	  focus	  on	  operating	  elementary	  and	  middle	  schools,	  which	  generally	  cost	  less	  per-­‐student	  to	  operate	  while	  yielding	  per-­‐pupil	  funding	  equivalent	  to	  high	  schools.	  The	  lower	  costs	  for	  an	  equivalent	  return	  is	  an	  obvious	  advantage	  for	  profit-­‐maximizing	  charters.	  The	  dearth	  of	  for-­‐profit	  high	  schools	  indicates	  that	  for-­‐profit	  providers	  may	  see	  the	  operation	  of	  high	  schools	  as	  presenting	  less	  of	  an	  opportunity	  for	  profit.	  
	  
Maximizing	  Return:	  Larger	  and	  More	  Schools	  One	  of	  the	  simplest	  ways	  for	  a	  school	  to	  increase	  its	  return	  is	  by	  increasing	  enrollment.	  A	  profit-­‐maximizing	  school	  would	  be	  expected	  to	  have	  a	  higher	  enrollment	  than	  a	  mission-­‐oriented	  school.	  The	  average	  enrollment	  of	  for-­‐profit	  charters,	  484	  students	  per	  school,	  is	  66%	  higher	  than	  the	  average	  enrollment	  of	  non-­‐profit	  charters	  (292	  students	  per	  school)	  (Molnar,	  Miron	  &	  Urschel,	  2010,	  Miron	  &	  Urschel,	  2010).	  This	  trend	  to	  operate	  larger	  schools	  suggests	  that	  for-­‐profit	  charter	  schools	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  try	  to	  maximize	  profit	  by	  multiplying	  their	  per-­‐pupil	  income.	  In	  addition	  to	  bringing	  in	  greater	  return	  by	  educating	  more	  pupils,	  there	  may	  be	  additional	  economic	  efficiencies	  to	  operating	  larger	  schools	  that	  create	  further	  opportunities	  for	  profit.	  For-­‐profit	  EMOs	  are	  also	  more	  likely	  than	  non-­‐profit	  EMOs	  to	  operate	  larger	  numbers	  of	  schools.	  This	  is	  consistent	  with	  market-­‐
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control	  logic	  that	  holds	  that	  economies	  of	  scale	  should	  be	  brought	  to	  bear	  for	  cost	  savings	  in	  the	  public	  education	  realm.	  The	  market	  dictates	  economies	  of	  scale,	  which	  privileges	  more	  schools	  and	  larger	  schools.	  	  
	  
Engineering	  Student	  Enrollment	  	  	  One	  significant	  way	  that	  a	  school	  can	  simultaneously	  minimize	  costs	  and	  maximize	  academic	  returns	  is	  by	  cultivating	  a	  student	  population	  with	  particular	  demographic	  characteristics.	  There	  is	  evidence	  that	  charter	  schools	  generally,	  and	  for-­‐profit	  charters	  in	  particular,	  engage	  in	  a	  variety	  of	  behaviors	  designed	  to	  attract,	  enroll	  and	  retain	  certain	  types	  of	  students	  and	  to	  avoid	  other	  types	  of	  students.	  	  
	  
Special	  Education	  &	  English	  Language	  Learner	  Students	  	   Special	  education	  students	  and	  English	  language	  learners	  (ELL)	  are	  commonly	  recognized	  as	  being	  comparatively	  expensive	  to	  educate	  groups	  of	  students.	  Special	  education	  students	  require	  a	  range	  of	  special	  services,	  and	  often	  are	  placed	  in	  classrooms	  with	  lower	  student/teacher	  ratios.	  Thus	  the	  cost	  of	  educating	  a	  special	  education	  student	  tends	  to	  be	  significantly	  higher	  than	  a	  non	  special	  education	  student.	  Miron	  et	  al	  (2010)	  found	  that	  while	  13.6%	  of	  traditional	  public	  schools	  students	  have	  Individualized	  Education	  Plans	  (an	  indicator	  of	  special	  education	  status),	  that	  figure	  is	  7.9%	  for	  non-­‐profit	  charters	  and	  6.5%	  in	  for-­‐profit	  charters.	  For-­‐profit	  charters	  have	  the	  lowest	  rate	  of	  special	  education	  students,	  indicating	  that	  even	  relative	  to	  other	  charter	  schools,	  they	  are	  less	  likely	  to	  enroll	  special	  education	  students.	  Like	  special	  education	  students,	  ELL	  students	  require	  specialized	  instruction	  that	  may	  be	  costly	  for	  a	  school	  to	  provide.	  This	  incentivizes	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profit-­‐maximizing	  schools	  to	  avoid	  ELL	  students.	  	  Non-­‐profit	  and	  for-­‐profit	  charter	  schools	  have	  both	  been	  found	  to	  substantially	  under-­‐enroll	  ELL	  students	  (Miron	  et	  al,	  2010).	  By	  under-­‐enrolling	  special	  education	  and	  ELL	  students,	  for-­‐profit	  charter	  schools	  avoid	  having	  to	  provide	  costly	  services	  to	  educate	  these	  students,	  increasing	  potential	  profit.	  	  
	  
Racial	  and	  Socioeconomic	  Segregation	  	   A	  long	  history	  of	  racial	  segregation	  in	  the	  United	  States	  has	  led	  to	  persistent	  racial	  academic	  achievement	  gaps,	  particularly	  for	  Black	  and	  Latino	  students.	  As	  a	  result,	  profit-­‐maximizing	  charters	  may	  wish	  to	  avoid	  enrolling	  these	  students.	  In	  a	  relatively	  new	  development,	  achievement	  gaps	  by	  socioeconomic	  status	  have	  actually	  surpassed	  racial	  achievement	  gaps	  (Reardon,	  2011).	  Charter	  school	  operators	  are	  no	  doubt	  aware	  of	  this,	  and	  understand	  that	  attracting	  students	  from	  higher-­‐income	  families	  is	  likely	  to	  result	  in	  superior	  academic	  outcomes.	  On	  top	  of	  the	  impact	  of	  family	  socioeconomic	  status	  on	  student	  achievement,	  there	  is	  a	  strong	  concentration	  effect	  as	  well.	  Rumberger	  &	  Palardy	  (2005)	  found	  that	  the	  mean	  family	  socioeconomic	  status	  of	  a	  school’s	  students	  is	  an	  equally	  important	  predictor	  as	  an	  individual	  student’s	  family	  socioeconomic	  status	  in	  predicting	  that	  student’s	  academic	  outcomes.	  A	  student	  with	  a	  higher	  family	  SES	  would	  be	  expected	  to	  have	  higher	  achievement	  than	  a	  student	  from	  a	  lower	  SES	  family.	  Additionally,	  a	  student	  in	  a	  school	  with	  a	  higher	  average	  SES	  would	  be	  expected	  to	  have	  better	  academic	  achievement	  than	  if	  that	  same	  student	  was	  in	  a	  school	  with	  a	  lower	  average	  SES.	  If	  a	  school	  is	  able	  to	  recruit	  predominantly	  higher	  SES	  students,	  student	  outcomes	  would	  be	  expected	  to	  be	  higher	  based	  on	  individual	  characteristics,	  and	  additionally	  boosted	  by	  way	  of	  the	  concentration	  effects	  of	  those	  higher	  SES	  students.	  Recruitment	  of	  higher-­‐SES	  students	  and	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the	  converse,	  avoidance	  of	  lower-­‐SES	  students,	  may	  be	  a	  particularly	  efficient	  strategy	  for	  a	  charter	  school	  seeking	  to	  maximize	  return	  on	  investment.	  	   A	  substantial	  body	  of	  research	  has	  found	  that	  in	  general,	  the	  entry	  of	  charter	  schools	  into	  a	  district	  tends	  to	  intensify	  segregation	  by	  race	  and	  socioeconomic	  status.	  However,	  this	  segregation	  does	  not	  manifest	  in	  predictable	  ways.	  In	  some	  districts,	  charter	  schools	  over-­‐enroll	  white	  students	  and	  under-­‐enroll	  non-­‐white	  students.	  In	  other	  districts	  the	  pattern	  is	  reversed,	  with	  charters	  under-­‐enrolling	  white	  students	  and	  over-­‐enrolling	  non-­‐white	  students.	  Likewise,	  in	  some	  districts	  charter	  schools	  over-­‐enroll	  low-­‐income	  students	  compared	  to	  non-­‐charters,	  while	  in	  other	  districts	  charters	  under-­‐enroll	  low-­‐income	  students	  compared	  to	  non-­‐charters.	  Existing	  research	  does	  not	  provide	  a	  clear	  answer	  as	  to	  why	  these	  patterns	  vary.	  It	  may	  be	  that	  the	  presence	  of	  for-­‐profit	  charter	  schools	  is	  one	  factor	  influencing	  the	  nature	  of	  these	  patterns	  of	  segregation.	  	  Bifulco,	  Ladd	  and	  Ross	  (2009a)	  found	  that	  in	  Durham,	  North	  Carolina,	  charter	  schools	  were	  disproportionately	  used	  by	  relatively	  highly	  educated	  white	  families	  to	  exit	  from	  traditional	  public	  schools	  with	  large	  proportions	  of	  less	  educated	  and	  non-­‐white	  families,	  sorting	  black	  and	  white	  students	  to	  traditional	  public	  schools	  and	  charter	  schools	  respectively.	  Conversely,	  Gulsonio	  &	  D’Entremont	  (2011)	  found	  that	  in	  New	  Jersey,	  charter	  schools	  tended	  to	  encircle	  largely	  African-­‐American	  neighborhoods	  and	  enroll	  largely	  African-­‐American	  student	  populations.	  	  This	  pattern	  helped	  to	  ensure	  that	  traditional	  public	  schools	  in	  racially	  diverse	  neighborhoods	  were	  disproportionately	  white,	  while	  charter	  schools	  had	  predominantly	  African	  American	  student	  populations.	  	  In	  both	  cases,	  clear	  gaps	  in	  racial	  enrollment	  patterns	  in	  charters	  versus	  traditional	  public	  schools	  intensified	  between-­‐school	  segregation	  in	  districts	  and	  regions.	  These	  studies	  demonstrate	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that	  while	  charter	  schools	  may	  disproportionately	  enroll	  either	  more	  or	  less	  privileged	  students,	  both	  patterns	  can	  result	  in	  substantial	  increases	  in	  segregation.	  	  Garcia’s	  (2008)	  analysis	  of	  the	  impact	  of	  charter	  school	  choice	  on	  segregation	  in	  Arizona	  found	  that	  “[p]arents	  [of	  all	  races]	  choose	  to	  leave	  more	  racially	  integrated	  district	  schools	  to	  attend	  more	  racially	  segregated	  charter	  schools”	  (p.	  590).	  His	  analysis	  does	  not	  note	  whether	  a	  desire	  for	  racial	  homogeneity	  is	  driving	  parental	  choice,	  or	  whether	  the	  racial	  homogenization	  is	  a	  side	  effect	  of	  other	  choice	  criteria.	  Either	  way,	  this	  represents	  a	  third	  possible	  pattern,	  charter	  schools	  as	  an	  overall	  segment	  attracting	  all	  racial	  groups,	  but	  individual	  charters	  attracting	  disproportionately	  racially	  homogenous	  student	  populations.	  This	  pattern,	  like	  those	  in	  Durham	  and	  New	  Jersey,	  results	  in	  sharp	  increases	  in	  between-­‐school	  segregation.	  Booker,	  Zimmer	  &	  Buddin’s	  (2005)	  analysis	  of	  charter	  school	  segregation	  in	  Texas	  and	  California	  found	  similar	  homogenizing	  patterns	  in	  charter	  school	  attendance	  across	  all	  races,	  most	  notably	  with	  regards	  to	  Black	  students	  enrolling	  in	  charter	  schools	  that	  were	  more	  racially	  homogenous	  than	  the	  traditional	  public	  schools	  that	  they	  left.	  In	  these	  instances,	  the	  segregation	  patterns	  are	  not	  always	  clear	  between	  charters	  and	  non-­‐charters,	  but	  the	  growth	  of	  charters,	  largely	  due	  to	  heightened	  marketing	  and	  differentiation,	  results	  in	  increased	  overall	  between-­‐school	  racial	  segregation.	  Mickelson,	  Bottia	  &	  Southworth’s	  (2008)	  review	  of	  the	  research	  on	  school	  choice	  and	  segregation	  effects	  finds	  that	  “choice	  programs	  [primarily	  charter	  schools]	  formally	  and	  informally	  allow	  schools	  to	  select	  students,	  thereby	  including	  some	  youth	  while	  excluding	  others”	  (p.	  1).	  Further	  analyses	  have	  confirmed	  that	  the	  entry	  of	  charter	  schools	  into	  districts	  tends	  to	  segregate	  students	  by	  race	  and	  socioeconomic	  status	  (Frankenberg,	  Siegel-­‐Hawley	  and	  Wang,	  2011,	  Frankenberg	  and	  Lee,	  2003).	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There	  has	  been	  one	  large-­‐scale	  study	  specifically	  analyzing	  EMO-­‐operated	  charter	  schools	  and	  segregation	  (Miron	  et	  al	  2010).	  The	  authors	  found	  that	  EMO-­‐operated	  charters	  are	  “strongly	  racially	  segregative	  [and	  that]	  for	  economically	  challenged	  students,	  EMO-­‐operated	  charter	  schools	  more	  strongly	  segregate	  students	  than	  do	  their	  respective	  local	  districts”	  	  (p.	  3).	  	  They	  note	  that	  the	  patterns	  of	  segregation	  observed	  are	  not	  uniform.	  In	  some	  instances,	  EMO-­‐operated	  charters	  disproportionately	  enroll	  white	  students,	  while	  in	  other	  instances	  they	  disproportionately	  enroll	  non-­‐white	  families.	  This	  accords	  with	  the	  different	  local	  patterns	  observed	  by	  Bifulco,	  Ladd	  and	  Ross	  (2009a)	  Gulosino	  &	  D’Entremont	  (2011)	  and	  Garcia	  (2008).	  Miron	  et	  al	  (2010)	  additionally	  found	  dual	  patterns	  of	  high/low-­‐income	  segregation	  between	  EMO	  operated	  charters	  and	  traditional	  public	  schools.	  Thus,	  while	  an	  examination	  of	  overall	  student	  proportions	  might	  indicate	  that	  EMOs	  do	  not	  educate	  student	  populations	  substantially	  different	  from	  traditional	  public	  schools,	  when	  examining	  the	  demographics	  of	  student	  enrollment	  in	  EMO-­‐operated	  charters	  relative	  to	  the	  overall	  local	  district	  enrollment,	  socioeconomic	  segregation	  seems	  to	  be	  intensified	  by	  their	  existence.	  Notably,	  the	  authors	  found	  no	  significant	  differences	  in	  the	  student	  populations	  served	  by	  for-­‐profit	  and	  non-­‐profit	  EMOs.	  However,	  the	  methodology	  used	  was	  insufficient	  to	  conclude	  that	  there	  are	  not	  actual	  differences	  in	  the	  student	  population	  of	  these	  two	  types	  of	  schools.	  The	  study	  was	  not	  designed	  to	  systematically	  investigate	  distinct	  for-­‐profit	  charter	  school	  enrollment	  patterns.	  Use	  of	  either	  multilevel	  modeling	  to	  facilitate	  analysis	  across	  diverse	  state	  contexts,	  and/or	  closer	  analysis	  of	  local-­‐level	  patterns	  across	  a	  range	  of	  contexts	  would	  be	  necessary	  for	  a	  better	  understanding	  of	  whether	  for-­‐profit	  and	  non-­‐profit	  providers	  educate	  significantly	  distinct	  student	  populations.	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How	  Do	  Charter	  Schools	  Segregate?	  	   The	  research	  on	  charter	  schools	  and	  segregation	  make	  clear	  that	  charter	  growth	  often	  corresponds	  with	  increased	  racial	  and	  socioeconomic	  segregation.	  This	  raises	  questions	  about	  how	  these	  patterns	  of	  segregation	  develop.	  It	  is	  likely	  that	  some	  charter	  schools	  do	  not	  intend	  to	  disproportionately	  enroll	  students	  of	  difference	  races	  or	  socioeconomic	  statuses.	  It	  is	  also	  true	  that	  the	  rise	  of	  charter	  schools	  has	  in	  some	  areas	  coincided	  with	  the	  curtailing	  of	  existing	  desegregation	  programs,	  meaning	  the	  rise	  in	  segregation	  is	  likely	  in	  part	  a	  result	  of	  other	  concurrent	  changes.	  However,	  there	  is	  evidence	  that	  charter	  schools	  can,	  and	  in	  some	  cases	  do,	  undertake	  intentional	  strategies	  to	  either	  attract	  or	  avoid	  students	  of	  particular	  races	  or	  income	  levels.	  The	  primary	  mechanisms	  detailed	  by	  existing	  research	  are	  marketing	  and	  school	  location	  strategies.	  	   	  
Marketing	  	   One	  significant	  impact	  that	  increased	  school	  choice	  has	  had	  on	  public	  education	  is	  a	  substantial	  increase	  in	  the	  marketing	  of	  public	  schools.	  In	  districts	  where	  traditional	  public	  schools	  are	  the	  only	  public	  school	  option,	  there	  is	  little	  need	  for	  marketing.	  The	  district	  is	  divided	  into	  school	  catchment	  zones	  and	  students	  attend	  the	  school	  for	  which	  they	  are	  zoned	  by	  residence.	  The	  introduction	  of	  choice	  brings	  increased	  pressure	  to	  influence	  family	  school	  choices	  in	  order	  to	  maintain	  or	  grow	  enrollment.	  If	  a	  school	  cannot	  attract	  a	  sufficient	  number	  of	  students	  it	  will	  not	  be	  able	  to	  remain	  open.	  Additionally,	  schools	  may	  seek	  to	  enroll	  particular	  types	  of	  students.	  Christopher	  Lubienski	  (2007)	  analyzed	  the	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marketing	  materials	  published	  by	  charter	  schools	  in	  a	  competitive	  educational	  market.	  His	  analysis	  found	  that:	  	  “The	  information	  made	  available	  to	  families	  through	  commercial-­‐style	  materials	  challenges	  the	  notion	  of	  parents	  making	  reasoned	  choices	  based	  on	  institutional	  effectiveness.	  Instead,	  more	  emotional	  themes	  and	  images	  dominate	  school	  marketing	  strategies,	  with	  implications	  for	  ethnic	  and	  socioeconomic	  sorting	  within	  diverse	  but	  competitive	  climates.	  Promotional	  strategies	  suggest	  that	  competition	  is	  creating	  an	  environment	  in	  which,	  rather	  than	  responding	  to	  incentives	  intended	  to	  improve	  education	  for	  more	  disadvantaged	  students,	  schools	  are	  instead	  attracting	  better	  performing	  students	  through	  their	  marketing	  campaigns.”	  (p.	  118)	  	  The	  introduction	  of	  marketing	  materials,	  instead	  of	  promoting	  market	  efficiency,	  may	  be	  being	  utilized	  instead	  as	  an	  explicit	  sorting	  tool.	  When	  school	  districts	  become	  more	  like	  markets	  and	  marketing	  becomes	  ubiquitous,	  investing	  in	  marketing	  may	  be	  more	  cost	  effective	  than	  investing	  in	  educational	  quality,	  in	  the	  high-­‐stakes	  competition	  to	  attract	  better-­‐performing	  students	  (Lubienski,	  2005;	  Weisbrod,	  1988).	  As	  Lubienski	  (2005)	  notes	  “schools	  might	  recognize	  that	  marketing	  can	  ‘increase’	  achievement	  by	  appealing	  to	  families	  of	  higher-­‐achieving	  students,”	  (p.	  480).	  This	  creates	  clear	  incentives	  to	  exploit	  information	  asymmetries,	  and	  there	  is	  evidence	  that	  some	  charter	  operators	  do	  so.	  	  In	  addition	  to	  sometimes	  deliberately	  misleading	  marketing,	  charter	  schools	  also	  may	  appeal	  differentially	  to	  particular	  populations	  by	  virtue	  of	  their	  mission	  or	  focus.	  Many	  charter	  schools	  are	  organized	  around	  either	  a	  curricular	  (e.g.	  science	  focused,	  dual	  language),	  pedagogical	  (e.g.	  Montessori,	  back-­‐to-­‐basics),	  or	  cultural/religious	  (e.g.	  Afrocentric,	  Christian-­‐oriented)	  focus	  that	  may	  inherently	  appeal	  differently	  to	  students	  from	  different	  racial	  and	  socioeconomic	  backgrounds.	  Compared	  to	  most	  public	  schools,	  which	  usually	  have	  a	  more	  generalist	  focus,	  more	  specialized	  schools	  of	  this	  sort	  may,	  intentionally	  or	  unintentionally,	  exacerbate	  racial	  and	  socioeconomic	  segregation.	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School	  Location	  Strategies	  	   The	  neighborhood	  racial	  and	  socioeconomic	  demography	  of	  a	  school’s	  location	  has	  a	  significant	  impact	  on	  the	  racial	  and	  socioeconomic	  student	  enrollment	  of	  that	  school.	  All	  things	  being	  equal,	  parents	  prefer	  to	  send	  their	  children	  to	  schools	  that	  are	  nearby	  to	  those	  that	  are	  distant	  (Ball,	  Bowe,	  &	  Gerwitz,	  1995).	  This	  makes	  the	  children	  that	  are	  proximally	  closest	  to	  a	  school	  the	  likeliest	  to	  attend.	  Parents	  may	  also	  be	  resistant	  to	  enroll	  their	  child(ren)	  in	  schools	  located	  in	  neighborhoods	  that	  are	  demographically	  different	  from	  the	  neighborhood	  where	  they	  reside.	  This	  is	  particularly	  the	  case	  for	  white	  families	  and	  higher-­‐income	  families.	  Because	  of	  these	  factors,	  the	  racial	  and	  socioeconomic	  composition	  of	  the	  neighborhoods	  where	  a	  school	  is	  located	  will	  undoubtedly	  play	  a	  role	  in	  the	  racial	  and	  socioeconomic	  status	  of	  families	  who	  are	  likely	  to	  seek	  to	  enroll	  their	  child(ren)	  is	  that	  school.	  This	  also	  suggests	  that	  a	  charter	  school	  operator	  seeking	  to	  avoid	  particular	  student	  populations	  may	  also	  avoid	  locating	  schools	  in	  areas	  where	  those	  populations	  are	  concentrated.	  Lubienski,	  Gulosino	  &	  Weitzel	  (2009)	  tested	  this	  theory	  by	  analyzing	  the	  geo-­‐demographic	  location	  patterns	  of	  charter	  schools	  in	  three	  cities	  with	  high	  proportions	  of	  charter	  schools:	  Detroit,	  New	  Orleans	  and	  Washington	  DC.	  	  They	  found	  that	  in	  each	  city	  charters	  “showed	  patterns	  of	  exclusionary	  strategies	  that	  schools	  embraced	  to	  enhance	  market	  position”	  (p.	  601).	  	  These	  strategies	  served	  to	  increase	  racial	  and	  socioeconomic	  segregation	  in	  each	  district.	  The	  authors	  found	  that	  charter	  schools	  seemed	  to	  be	  intentionally	  cultivating	  particular	  student	  populations	  by	  careful	  choice	  of	  school	  location.	  In	  a	  further	  analysis	  focusing	  solely	  on	  Detroit,	  Gulosino	  and	  Lubienski	  (2011)	  again	  confirm	  this	  pattern	  of	  charters	  locating	  in	  order	  to	  access	  “the	  opportunity	  to	  target	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students	  with	  less-­‐risky	  socioeconomic	  and	  demographic	  backgrounds”	  (p.	  20).	  These	  studies	  did	  not	  examine	  for-­‐profit	  charters	  in	  particular,	  and	  to	  date	  there	  have	  not	  been	  any	  geo-­‐demographic	  analyses	  that	  specifically	  analyze	  for-­‐profit	  charter	  schools.	  Given	  their	  predisposition	  to	  profit-­‐maximization,	  it	  is	  possible	  that	  they	  may	  be	  more	  likely	  than	  other	  types	  of	  charters	  to	  pursue	  locational	  strategies	  designed	  to	  target	  students	  from	  particular	  demographic	  backgrounds.	  	  
Market	  Effects	  	   In	  a	  charter	  school	  market,	  charter	  schools	  exist	  alongside	  traditional	  public	  schools.	  When	  students	  exit	  traditional	  public	  schools	  for	  charters,	  it	  impacts	  the	  students	  that	  remain	  in	  public	  schools	  as	  well.	  If	  the	  population	  of	  students	  that	  select	  charter	  schools	  is	  demographically	  different	  from	  the	  population	  that	  does	  not	  choose	  charters,	  these	  patterns	  can	  have	  deleterious	  impacts	  on	  equity.	  Bifulco,	  Ladd	  &	  Ross	  (2009b)	  found	  that	  in	  Durham,	  North	  Carolina,	  systematic	  patterns	  of	  wealthy	  white	  students	  accessing	  charter	  schools	  resulted	  in	  the	  increasing	  concentration	  of	  low-­‐income	  Black	  students	  in	  fewer	  existing	  traditional	  public	  schools.	  Whether	  the	  pattern	  is	  an	  intentional	  creation	  of	  charter	  school	  providers	  or	  not,	  the	  entry	  of	  charter	  schools	  into	  a	  district	  has	  often	  increased	  between-­‐school	  racial	  and	  socioeconomic	  segregation.	  Renzulli	  &	  Evans	  (2005)	  found	  that	  “relatively	  even	  distributions	  of	  white	  and	  nonwhite	  students	  within	  districts	  and	  corresponding	  competitive	  pressures	  spur	  white	  charter	  school	  enrollment.”	  (p.	  398).	  Essentially,	  white	  parents	  may	  be	  systematically	  utilizing	  charter	  schools	  to	  avoid	  sending	  their	  children	  to	  integrated	  public	  schools,	  thus	  using	  charters	  as	  a	  tool	  to	  circumvent	  desegregation.	  The	  risk	  of	  the	  entry	  of	  charters	  into	  a	  district	  increasing	  racial	  and	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socioeocnomic	  segregation	  seems	  to	  be	  particularly	  high	  in	  the	  most	  racially	  diverse	  districts.	  	   If	  charter	  schools	  enter	  a	  district	  with	  a	  focus	  on	  marketing	  themselves,	  they	  apply	  pressure	  on	  existing	  traditional	  public	  schools	  in	  that	  district	  to	  similarly	  engage	  in	  marketing	  in	  a	  newly	  competitive	  market	  for	  students	  (Lubienski,	  2007).	  For-­‐profit	  charter	  schools,	  operated	  as	  market	  actors	  by	  corporations	  are	  likely	  to	  bring	  sophisticated	  marketing	  strategies	  and	  opportunistic	  locational	  tactics	  to	  bear.	  These	  strategies	  may	  be	  disproportionately	  likely	  to	  be	  geared	  towards	  targeting	  “less	  risky”	  student	  populations.	  This	  means	  that	  charter	  school	  marketing	  may	  be	  different	  in	  districts	  where	  for-­‐profit	  charter	  schools	  proliferate	  compared	  to	  districts	  where	  they	  are	  not	  present.	  This	  may	  result	  in	  a	  market-­effect.	  In	  this	  way,	  the	  presence	  of	  for-­‐profit	  charter	  schools	  may	  fundamentally	  change	  student-­‐sorting	  patterns	  in	  a	  district.	  No	  analysis	  to	  date	  has	  analyzed	  whether	  for-­‐profit	  charter	  schools	  are	  associated	  with	  a	  unique	  market-­effect	  of	  this	  sort.	  This	  is	  a	  crucially	  important	  question,	  especially	  in	  light	  of	  Brown’s	  (2015)	  thesis	  that	  the	  generalization	  of	  neoliberal	  market-­‐style	  competition	  can	  systematically	  foreclose	  broader	  possibilities	  for	  the	  pursuit	  of	  equity.	  	   Evidence	  from	  existing	  research	  indicates	  that	  the	  growth	  of	  charter	  schools	  tends	  to	  exacerbate	  racial	  and	  socioeconomic	  segregation.	  However,	  this	  segregation	  manifests	  in	  diverse	  ways.	  In	  some	  areas	  charter	  schools	  enroll	  disproportionately	  disadvantaged	  populations,	  while	  in	  other	  areas	  they	  enroll	  disproportionately	  advantaged	  populations.	  There	  is	  no	  existing	  theory	  of	  why	  these	  dissimilar	  patterns	  manifest.	  This	  chapter	  presents	  the	  case	  that	  for-­‐profit	  charter	  schools	  are	  ideologically	  and	  structurally	  distinct	  from	  other	  types	  of	  charter	  schools	  in	  ways	  that	  may	  foster	  specific	  patterns	  of	  segregation.	  If	  for-­‐
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profit	  charter	  schools	  are	  disproportionately	  likely	  to	  engage	  in	  competitive	  strategies	  to	  enroll	  “more	  desirable”	  student	  populations	  in	  order	  to	  fulfill	  their	  structural	  imperative	  to	  maximize	  profit,	  we	  might	  expect	  for-­‐profit	  charter	  schools	  to	  have	  a	  distinct	  impact	  on	  student	  segregation.	  In	  this	  respect,	  the	  existence	  of	  for-­‐profit	  charter	  schools	  may	  help	  to	  explain	  why	  and	  how	  diverse	  patterns	  of	  segregation	  unfold	  based	  on	  the	  types	  of	  charter	  schools	  that	  arise	  in	  a	  district.	  	  In	  schools	  where	  higher-­‐income	  students	  are	  concentrated,	  benefit	  accrues	  to	  both	  the	  schools	  and	  students	  of	  the	  school	  in	  the	  form	  of	  beneficial	  concentration	  effects.	  High-­‐income	  students	  would	  be	  expected	  to	  exhibit	  higher	  academic	  performance	  when	  attending	  school	  with	  similarly	  high-­‐income	  students	  (Rumberger	  &	  Palardy,	  2005).	  Thus	  parents	  have	  an	  incentive	  to	  seek	  out	  schools	  with	  high	  concentrations	  of	  high-­‐income	  students	  in	  a	  struggle	  for	  competitive	  advantage	  (Hochschild	  &	  Scorovnick,	  2003).	  A	  for-­‐profit	  charter	  school	  operator	  may	  seek	  to	  leverage	  this	  tendency	  to	  increasingly	  concentrate	  students	  from	  higher-­‐income	  families	  in	  the	  schools	  they	  operate.	  If	  higher-­‐income	  students	  increasingly	  concentrate	  in	  for-­‐profit	  charter	  schools,	  that	  leaves	  the	  remaining	  schools	  to	  educate	  increasing	  proportions	  of	  lower-­‐income	  students,	  further	  intensifying	  socioeconomic	  achievement	  disparities.	  	  	  
Towards	  Research	  Questions	  	   This	  chapter	  began	  by	  emphasizing	  the	  ongoing	  struggle	  between	  collective	  and	  individual	  interests	  within	  public	  education.	  While	  the	  institution	  of	  public	  education	  is	  intended	  to	  promote	  equity,	  individual	  families	  struggle	  to	  position	  their	  children	  in	  positions	  of	  competitive	  advantage.	  This	  rubric	  posits	  that	  public	  schools	  make	  positive	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efforts	  to	  promote	  equity.	  What	  if	  some	  public	  schools	  are	  not	  concerned	  with	  equity	  outcomes?	  	  The	  emergence	  of	  for-­‐profit	  charter	  schools,	  the	  manifestation	  of	  an	  anti-­‐equity,	  competition-­‐focused	  neoliberal	  ideology,	  presents	  the	  possibility	  that	  some	  public	  schools	  may	  in	  fact	  systematically	  undermine	  educational	  equity.	  For-­‐profit	  charter	  schools	  are	  ideologically	  and	  structurally	  predisposed	  instead	  to	  compete	  for	  desirable	  students	  in	  an	  effort	  to	  maximize	  their	  (financial	  and	  academic)	  return	  on	  investment.	  The	  review	  of	  relevant	  research	  demonstrated	  that	  for-­‐profit	  charter	  schools	  are	  particularly	  likely	  to	  engage	  in	  certain	  profit	  maximization	  strategies,	  including	  enrolling	  more	  students	  per	  school,	  operating	  fewer	  high	  schools,	  and	  enrolling	  a	  particularly	  low	  rate	  of	  special	  education	  students	  compared	  to	  other	  charters.	  The	  review	  also	  provided	  evidence	  that	  the	  entry	  of	  charter	  schools	  into	  districts	  generally	  increases	  between-­‐school	  racial	  and	  socioeconomic	  segregation,	  but	  that	  these	  sorting	  patterns	  were	  unpredictable.	  Three	  notable	  gaps	  exist	  in	  the	  research	  pertaining	  to	  the	  impact	  of	  for-­‐profit	  charter	  schools	  on	  racial	  and	  socioeconomic	  segregation:	  	  1) There	  have	  been	  no	  systematic	  population-­‐level	  analyses	  of	  differences	  in	  the	  racial	  and	  socioeconomic	  composition	  of	  for-­‐profit	  charter	  schools	  versus	  other	  types	  of	  charter	  schools.	  2) There	  have	  been	  no	  analyses	  comparing	  the	  racial	  and	  socioeconomic	  demographics	  of	  the	  areas	  where	  for-­‐profit	  charter	  schools	  locate	  to	  the	  demographics	  where	  other	  charter	  schools	  locate.	  3) There	  have	  been	  no	  analyses	  that	  examine	  whether	  charter/non-­‐charter	  student	  sorting	  patterns	  are	  influenced	  by	  the	  relative	  proliferation	  of	  for-­‐profit	  charter	  schools,	  i.e.	  whether	  for-­‐profit	  charter	  schools	  foster	  a	  market-­effect.	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The	  ideological	  and	  structural	  particularities	  of	  for-­‐profit	  charter	  schools	  warrant	  further	  examination	  into	  these	  neglected	  areas	  of	  research.	  The	  theoretical	  framework	  presented	  here	  suggests	  that	  for-­‐profit	  charter	  schools	  may	  pursue	  distinct	  student	  recruitment	  strategies	  to	  avoid	  low-­‐income	  and	  non-­‐white	  students.	  These	  strategies	  may	  manifest	  as	  distinct	  spatial	  (school	  location)	  and/or	  non-­‐spatial	  (marketing)	  strategies.	  And	  the	  entry	  of	  for-­‐profit	  charter	  schools	  into	  a	  district	  may	  have	  a	  distinct	  effect	  on	  the	  overall	  charter/non-­‐charter	  sorting	  patterns	  in	  ways	  that	  may	  help	  to	  explain	  inconsistencies	  in	  charter	  school	  segregation	  patterns.	  The	  next	  chapter	  will	  describe	  the	  research	  strategy	  for	  exploring	  these	  gaps	  in	  the	  existing	  research.
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Chapter 3: Research Methodology 
	  
Introduction1	  	   Chapter	  2	  demonstrated	  how	  for-­‐profit	  charter	  schools	  are	  ideologically	  and	  structurally	  distinct	  from	  other	  types	  of	  schools.	  For-­‐profit	  charters	  were	  shown	  to	  have	  a	  unique	  affinity	  to	  neoliberal	  ideology,	  and	  a	  structural	  form	  binding	  them	  to	  a	  profit-­‐maximization	  imperative	  (Conn,	  2002).	  Other	  charters,	  those	  that	  are	  independently	  or	  non-­‐profit	  operated,	  are	  likely	  heterogeneously	  mission-­‐oriented/equity-­‐focused,	  and	  profit-­‐oriented/competition-­‐focused.	  As	  a	  segment,	  independent	  and	  non-­‐profit	  charters	  would	  be	  expected	  to	  be	  composed	  of	  schools	  alternatively	  pursuing	  both	  paths.	  However,	  for-­‐profit	  charters	  are	  constrained	  to	  a	  profit-­‐orientation.	  Thus,	  as	  a	  segment	  of	  schools,	  compared	  with	  other	  types	  of	  schools,	  we	  might	  expect	  for-­‐profit	  charters	  to	  exhibit	  unique	  profit-­‐maximizing	  behaviors.	  	  While	  mission-­‐oriented	  schools	  by	  definition	  seek	  to	  educate	  the	  highest-­‐need	  students,	  profit-­‐oriented	  schools	  may	  be	  likely	  to	  pursue	  the	  opposite	  strategy,	  to	  seek	  to	  educate	  the	  lowest-­‐need	  students	  (Lubienski,	  2005,	  2007,	  Weisbrod,	  1988).	  A	  profit-­‐maximizing	  strategy	  for	  public	  charter	  schools	  incentivizes	  avoiding	  the	  most	  difficult,	  or	  expensive,	  to	  educate	  student	  populations	  (Bifulco,	  Ladd	  &	  Ross,	  2009b).	  This	  strategy	  might	  consist	  of	  efforts	  to	  maximize	  the	  number	  of	  students	  from	  certain	  demographic	  groups	  (higher-­‐income,	  white)	  and	  minimizing	  the	  number	  of	  students	  from	  other	  demographic	  groups	  (lower-­‐income,	  non-­‐white).	  This	  chapter	  describes	  the	  methodology	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Unless	  otherwise	  noted,	  all	  descriptive	  statistics	  in	  this	  chapter	  are	  from	  school	  year	  2009-­‐10	  or	  calendar	  year	  2010.	  
	  	   54	  
used	  to	  test	  hypotheses	  developed	  from	  the	  framework	  presented	  in	  Chapter	  2.	  The	  analyses	  explore	  whether	  for-­‐profit	  charter	  schools	  exhibit	  unique	  student	  enrollment	  patterns,	  and	  investigate	  what	  effect	  any	  differences	  might	  have	  on	  between-­‐school	  racial	  and	  socioeconomic	  segregation.	  In	  racially	  and	  socioeconomically	  segregated	  urban	  areas,	  the	  demographic	  composition	  of	  a	  school’s	  student	  population	  is	  highly	  predictive	  of	  the	  student	  outcomes	  at	  that	  school	  (Rumberger	  &	  Palardy,	  2005).	  This	  means	  that	  all	  else	  being	  equal,	  a	  school	  with	  a	  lower	  proportion	  of	  disadvantaged	  students	  is	  likely	  to	  exhibit	  better	  academic	  outcomes,	  or	  in	  market	  terms	  a	  greater	  return	  on	  investment,	  than	  a	  school	  educating	  higher	  proportions	  of	  disadvantaged	  students.	  Charter	  schools	  are	  expected	  to	  meet	  certain	  academic	  performance	  benchmarks	  in	  order	  to	  have	  their	  charters	  renewed	  and	  continue	  operation.	  Further,	  those	  EMOs	  seeking	  to	  expand	  can	  bolster	  their	  reputation	  and	  improve	  their	  visibility	  by	  producing	  superior	  academic	  outcomes.	  A	  school	  is	  more	  likely	  to	  both	  meet	  minimum	  benchmarks	  and	  produce	  higher	  overall	  levels	  of	  student	  performance	  with	  lower	  expenditures	  if	  it	  minimizes	  the	  proportion	  of	  disadvantaged	  students	  they	  enroll.	  In	  short,	  avoiding	  high-­‐need	  students	  may	  permit	  both	  lower	  per-­‐pupil	  expenditures	  on	  instruction	  and	  potentially	  open	  up	  greater	  opportunities	  for	  the	  EMO	  to	  expand.	  	  	  	  
Limited	  existing	  research	  on	  for-­profit	  charter	  schools	  and	  segregation	  	   There	  is	  a	  limited	  body	  of	  existing	  research	  examining	  the	  particular	  impact	  of	  for-­‐profit	  charter	  schools	  on	  racial	  and	  socioeconomic	  segregation.	  Garcia,	  Barber	  &	  Molnar	  (2009)	  found	  that	  for-­‐profit	  charter	  schools	  in	  Arizona	  were	  able	  to	  reduce	  their	  costs	  by	  hiring	  inexperienced,	  under-­‐qualified	  teachers.	  Part	  of	  the	  reason	  this	  strategy	  was	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successful	  for	  the	  for-­‐profit	  charters	  is	  that	  these	  schools	  sought	  to	  avoid	  low-­‐income	  students	  and	  English	  language	  learners.	  These	  schools	  could	  be	  reasonably	  confident	  that	  test-­‐focused	  education	  that	  purposely	  excluded	  the	  highest-­‐need	  students,	  would	  allow	  for	  cheaper	  instruction	  to	  attain	  similar	  results.	  	   Two	  local-­‐level	  studies	  have	  focused	  on	  for-­‐profit	  charter	  schools	  and	  racial	  and	  socioeconomic	  segregation	  in	  Michigan.	  Miron	  &	  Nelson	  (2002)	  found	  evidence	  that	  for-­‐profit	  providers	  were	  less	  likely	  than	  non-­‐profit	  providers	  to	  serve	  low-­‐income	  student	  populations.	  However,	  this	  study	  dates	  from	  when	  the	  EMO	  movement	  was	  in	  its	  infancy.	  Ertas	  &	  Roch’s	  (2014)	  later	  study	  of	  Michigan	  found	  that	  for-­‐profit	  charters	  were	  still	  less	  likely	  than	  non-­‐profit	  charters	  to	  enroll	  lower-­‐income	  students.	  Michigan	  has	  undoubtedly	  been	  studied	  multiple	  times	  because	  it	  is	  the	  state	  that	  has	  most	  enthusiastically	  embraced	  for-­‐profit	  charter	  schools,	  with	  28%	  of	  all	  for-­‐profit	  charter	  schools	  in	  the	  US	  located	  in	  Michigan.	  These	  analyses	  provide	  evidence	  that	  for-­‐profit	  charters	  do	  indeed	  seek	  to	  avoid	  low-­‐income	  students.	  However,	  an	  analysis	  examining	  a	  single	  state	  is	  necessarily	  limited	  in	  its	  generalizability.	  	   Miron,	  Urschel,	  Mathis	  &	  Tornquist,	  (2010)	  authored	  the	  most	  relevant	  comprehensive	  study	  of	  charter	  schools	  and	  segregation	  to	  include	  for-­‐profit	  charters	  as	  a	  separate	  analytical	  category.	  Their	  analysis	  did	  not	  find	  systematic	  evidence	  that	  for-­‐profit	  charter	  schools	  enrolled	  racially	  or	  socioeconomically	  distinct	  student	  populations	  compared	  to	  other	  types	  of	  charter	  schools.	  However,	  their	  study	  was	  largely	  descriptive	  in	  nature,	  and	  was	  not	  designed	  specifically	  to	  examine	  the	  distinct	  impact	  of	  for-­‐profit	  charter	  schools	  on	  segregation.	  Their	  analysis	  compared	  the	  student	  demographic	  composition	  of	  EMO-­‐operated	  charter	  schools	  with	  the	  overall	  student	  demographics	  in	  the	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district.	  While	  useful	  for	  comparing	  how	  for-­‐profit	  charter	  school	  enrollment	  compares	  with	  other	  schools	  in	  the	  district,	  this	  methodology	  cannot	  assess	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  for-­‐profit	  charter	  schools	  are	  unevenly	  distributed	  across	  districts.	  It	  also	  does	  not	  take	  into	  account	  the	  variance	  that	  can	  and	  often	  does	  exist	  across	  highly	  segregated	  school	  districts.	  An	  approach	  using	  the	  district	  as	  the	  comparison	  group	  can	  determine	  whether	  certain	  types	  of	  schools	  are	  more	  or	  less	  likely	  to	  enroll	  students	  from	  different	  racial	  and	  socioeconomic	  categories.	  However,	  it	  cannot	  disaggregate	  whether	  these	  differences	  are	  due	  to	  geography	  (systematic	  differences	  in	  the	  geo-­‐demography	  of	  school	  location)	  or	  to	  other	  factors	  (e.g.	  marketing	  strategies).	  Their	  analysis	  uses	  OLS	  regression	  for	  the	  population	  study,	  which	  while	  useful	  for	  a	  general	  picture	  of	  enrollment	  patterns,	  fails	  to	  account	  for	  different	  state	  contexts.	  A	  more	  nuanced	  strategy	  would	  allow	  for	  a	  better	  understanding	  of	  how	  patterns	  vary	  across	  states.	  	   The	  limited	  set	  of	  existing	  studies	  on	  the	  impact	  of	  for-­‐profit	  charter	  schools	  on	  racial	  and	  socioeconomic	  segregation	  do	  provide	  some	  evidence	  that	  for-­‐profit	  charter	  schools	  may	  have	  a	  tendency	  to	  avoid	  low-­‐income	  students.	  However,	  no	  systematic	  analyses	  have	  detailed	  socioeconomic	  or	  racial	  segregation	  trends	  between	  for-­‐profit	  charters	  and	  other	  charter	  school	  segments.	  Further,	  there	  have	  been	  no	  analyses	  that	  consider	  the	  impact	  on	  broader	  student-­‐sorting	  patterns	  in	  a	  given	  school	  district	  when	  for-­‐profit	  charter	  schools	  proliferate	  in	  that	  district.	  The	  hypothesized	  market-­effect	  associated	  with	  for-­‐profit	  charter	  schools	  may	  lead	  to	  the	  entry	  of	  for-­‐profit	  charter	  schools	  precipitating	  the	  development	  of	  a	  newly	  market-­‐ized	  environment	  that	  alters	  or	  intensifies	  segregation	  patterns.	  The	  analyses	  described	  in	  this	  chapter	  seek	  to	  remedy	  
	  	   57	  
these	  gaps	  in	  the	  existing	  research.	  The	  analyses	  are	  based	  on	  four	  hypotheses	  derived	  from	  the	  theoretical	  framework	  and	  untested	  by	  existing	  research.	  	  	  
	  
Figure	  3.1:	  Research	  Hypotheses:	  
(H1):	  For-­‐profit	  charter	  schools	  are	  less	  likely	  than	  other	  types	  of	  charter	  schools	  to	  enroll	  low-­‐income	  students.	  
(H2):	  For-­‐profit	  charter	  schools	  are	  likely	  to	  enroll	  higher	  proportions	  of	  white	  students	  than	  other	  types	  of	  charter	  schools.	  
(H3):	  For-­‐profit	  charter	  schools	  use	  both	  geo-­‐demographic	  (school	  location)	  and	  non-­‐geo-­‐demographic	  strategies	  to	  cultivate	  student	  enrollment	  patterns	  consistent	  with	  H1	  and	  H2.	  
(H4):	  In	  districts	  where	  for-­‐profit	  charter	  schools	  proliferate,	  charter	  schools	  as	  a	  whole	  are	  less	  likely	  than	  non-­‐charter	  schools	  to	  enroll	  non-­‐white	  and	  low-­‐income	  students	  compared	  to	  districts	  without	  for-­‐profit	  charters.	  	  	  H1	  and	  H2	  propose	  that	  for-­‐profit	  charter	  schools	  enroll	  fewer	  low-­‐income	  and	  fewer	  non-­‐white	  students	  than	  other	  types	  of	  schools.	  H3	  proposes	  that	  for-­‐profit	  charters	  utilize	  two	  strategies	  in	  their	  effort	  to	  under-­‐enroll	  low-­‐income	  and	  non-­‐white	  students.	  The	  first	  strategy	  is	  geographic.	  Even	  though	  charter	  schools	  generally	  draw	  students	  from	  a	  somewhat	  larger	  radius	  than	  traditional	  public	  schools,	  proximity	  remains	  a	  major	  factor	  in	  school	  choice.	  Parents	  want	  their	  children	  to	  attend	  geographically	  proximate	  schools,	  and	  to	  attend	  schools	  in	  demographically	  similar	  neighborhoods	  to	  those	  where	  they	  reside	  (Ball,	  Bowe,	  &	  Gerwitz,	  1995).	  Thus	  a	  charter	  operator	  seeking	  to	  avoid	  low-­‐income	  and	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non-­‐white	  student	  populations	  may	  choose	  to	  locate	  schools	  in	  areas	  with	  indicators	  of	  higher	  socioeconomic	  status	  and	  with	  a	  relatively	  high	  white	  population	  proportion.	  Locating	  in	  areas	  with	  low	  concentrations	  of	  low-­‐income	  families,	  and	  without	  significant	  proportions	  of	  traditionally	  under-­‐served	  racial	  minority	  populations	  makes	  a	  school	  less	  likely	  to	  enroll	  proportions	  of	  low-­‐income	  and	  non-­‐white	  students.	  	  In	  addition	  to	  geographic	  strategies,	  there	  is	  a	  range	  of	  non-­‐geographic	  approaches	  a	  charter	  operator	  might	  take	  to	  avoid	  disadvantaged	  student	  populations.	  These	  include	  marketing	  and	  screening	  processes	  that	  a	  charter	  may	  engage	  in	  to	  attract	  and	  retain	  students	  with	  certain	  demographic	  characteristics,	  as	  well	  as	  sets	  of	  rules,	  regulations	  and	  retention	  strategies	  designed	  to	  avoid	  and	  weed	  out	  underperforming	  students	  (Lubienski,	  2007;	  Jennings,	  2010;	  Miron,	  Urschel	  &	  Saxton,	  2011).	  A	  charter	  school	  operator	  seeking	  to	  avoid	  disadvantaged	  student	  populations	  might	  thus	  pursue	  spatial,	  and/or	  non-­‐spatial	  strategies.	  The	  proposed	  analyses	  will	  be	  designed	  to	  disaggregate	  the	  impact	  of	  spatial	  and	  non-­‐spatial	  sources	  of	  segregation.	  	   A	  two-­‐part	  analysis	  will	  be	  described.	  Analysis	  1	  (A1)	  is	  designed	  to	  test	  the	  first	  three	  hypotheses,	  H1,	  H2,	  and	  H3,	  utilizing	  the	  entire	  population	  of	  for-­‐profit	  charter	  schools	  compared	  with	  the	  population	  of	  non-­‐profit	  charters.	  The	  second	  analysis	  (A2)	  tests	  H1,	  H2,	  and	  H3	  in	  six	  diverse	  local	  contexts,	  in	  order	  to	  test	  H4.	  This	  analysis	  explores	  whether	  the	  presence	  of	  for-­‐profit	  charters	  is	  associated	  with	  particular	  charter/non-­‐charter	  racial	  and/or	  socioeconomic	  student	  sorting	  patterns.	  In	  short	  A1	  measures	  the	  particular	  racial	  and	  socioeconomic	  composition	  of	  for-­‐profit	  charter	  schools	  to	  test	  H1,	  H2	  and	  H3,	  while	  A2	  tests	  H1,	  H2,	  and	  H3	  in	  six	  diverse	  local	  contexts	  in	  order	  to	  assess	  H4	  and	  begin	  to	  explore	  what	  effect	  the	  entry	  of	  uniquely	  market-­‐oriented	  for-­‐profit	  charter	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schools	  may	  have	  on	  student	  sorting	  patterns	  within	  school	  “markets”.	  Each	  analysis	  will	  now	  be	  described	  in	  detail.	  	  
Analysis	  1:	  Comparative	  for-­profit/non-­profit	  analysis2	  
Figure	  3.2:	  Analysis	  1	  Research	  Questions	  1.1. Does	  the	  racial	  composition	  of	  the	  census	  block	  group	  where	  an	  EMO-­‐operated	  charter	  school	  is	  located	  predict	  the	  likelihood	  that	  the	  school	  is	  operated	  by	  a	  for-­‐profit	  corporation	  or	  a	  non-­‐profit	  organization?	  	  1.2. Does	  the	  racial	  composition	  of	  the	  student	  population	  of	  an	  EMO-­‐operated	  charter	  school	  predict	  the	  likelihood	  that	  the	  school	  is	  operated	  by	  a	  for-­‐profit	  or	  non-­‐profit	  organization?	  1.3. Do	  the	  rates	  of	  homeownership	  in	  a	  census	  block	  group	  where	  an	  EMO-­‐operated	  charter	  school	  is	  located	  predict	  the	  likelihood	  that	  the	  school	  is	  operated	  by	  a	  for-­‐profit	  corporation	  or	  a	  non-­‐profit	  organization?	  	  1.4. Does	  the	  Title-­‐I	  eligibility	  of	  an	  EMO-­‐operated	  charter	  school	  predict	  the	  likelihood	  that	  it	  is	  operated	  by	  a	  for-­‐profit	  corporation	  or	  a	  non-­‐profit	  organization?	  	  
	  
Database	  Construction	  Analysis	  1	  explores	  what	  is	  distinct	  about	  the	  racial	  and	  socioeconomic	  student	  enrollment	  of	  for-­‐profit	  charter	  schools.	  In	  order	  to	  provide	  perspective	  on	  the	  unique	  impact	  of	  a	  charter	  being	  operated	  by	  a	  for-­‐profit	  corporation,	  a	  comparison	  group	  is	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  The	  racial	  categories	  utilized	  (Black,	  white,	  Hispanic)	  are	  based	  on	  the	  categorization	  schema	  of	  the	  US	  Census	  and	  US	  Department	  of	  Education.	  For	  school	  enrollment	  numbers,	  “white”	  indicates	  white/non-­‐Hispanic.	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utilized.	  It	  would	  be	  possible	  to	  compare	  for-­‐profit	  charters	  with	  the	  set	  of	  all	  other	  public	  schools.	  However,	  this	  would	  obscure	  differences	  between	  non-­‐charter	  schools	  and	  charter	  schools	  that	  are	  not	  for-­‐profit.	  Likewise,	  for-­‐profit	  charters	  could	  be	  compared	  with	  all	  other	  charter	  schools.	  However,	  independent	  charters	  are	  distinct	  from	  EMO-­‐operated	  schools.	  They	  are	  freestanding,	  uniquely	  idiosyncratic	  schools.	  Non-­‐profit	  EMO-­‐operated	  charters	  are	  chosen	  as	  the	  comparison	  group	  because	  of	  their	  similarity	  to	  for-­‐profit	  charters.	  They	  have	  a	  comparable	  organizational	  structure,	  with	  groups	  (of	  varying	  sizes)	  of	  schools	  operated	  by	  management	  organizations.	  Both	  groups	  are	  more	  likely	  than	  non-­‐charters	  or	  independent	  charters	  to	  seek	  to	  systematically	  develop	  strategies	  to	  serve	  certain	  student	  populations,	  whether	  these	  are	  mission-­‐oriented	  or	  profit-­‐oriented	  strategies.	  Further,	  the	  two	  segments	  are	  approximately	  equal	  in	  size,	  with	  729	  for-­‐profit	  charters	  and	  813	  non-­‐profit	  charters.	  For	  these	  reasons,	  it	  was	  determined	  that	  the	  best	  way	  to	  isolate	  the	  particular	  ways	  that	  operating	  as	  a	  for-­‐profit	  charter	  impacts	  student-­‐sorting	  is	  by	  comparison	  to	  the	  subset	  of	  schools	  most	  like	  them,	  non-­‐profit	  EMO-­‐operated	  charter	  schools.	  The	  National	  Education	  Policy	  Center	  (NEPC)	  has	  produced	  a	  series	  of	  annual	  reports	  profiling	  for-­‐profit	  and	  non-­‐profit	  educational	  management	  organizations	  and	  the	  schools	  they	  operate.	  	  The	  NEPC	  reports	  profiling	  EMOs	  operating	  in	  the	  2009-­‐10	  school	  year	  were	  used	  for	  the	  analysis	  (Miron	  &	  Urschel,	  2010,	  Molnar,	  Miron	  &	  Urschel,	  2010).	  	  These	  reports	  profiled	  1,542	  EMO	  run	  schools.	  	  Of	  these,	  813	  schools,	  educating	  approximately	  237,591	  students	  were	  run	  by	  non-­‐profit	  EMOs.	  	  Another	  729	  schools,	  educating	  353,070	  students	  were	  run	  by	  for-­‐profit	  organizations.	  	  These	  reports	  reflect	  the	  authors’	  efforts	  to	  identify	  all	  EMO	  run	  schools,	  and	  they	  note	  that	  “while	  it	  is	  still	  possible	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that	  we	  have	  not	  identified	  all	  EMOs	  operating	  nationally,	  we	  are	  confident	  that	  we	  have	  now	  identified	  and	  profiled	  the	  great	  majority	  of	  all	  EMOs	  in	  this	  report”	  (Molnar,	  Miron	  &	  Urschel,	  2010,	  p.	  3).	  	  The	  NEPC	  reports	  enabled	  the	  identification	  of	  EMO-­‐operated	  charter	  schools	  and	  identified	  whether	  schools	  were	  operated	  by	  for-­‐profit	  or	  non-­‐profit	  EMOs.	  	  	   The	  NEPC	  reports	  provide	  the	  most	  comprehensive	  available	  data	  on	  which	  schools	  are	  operated	  by	  EMOs,	  and	  whether	  they	  are	  operated	  by	  for-­‐profit	  or	  non-­‐profit	  EMOs.	  However,	  they	  do	  not	  provide	  detailed	  information	  about	  school	  racial	  and	  socioeconomic	  demographics	  or	  location	  data.	  In	  order	  to	  create	  a	  database	  that	  provides	  information	  on	  the	  student	  demographics	  and	  geographic	  location	  of	  these	  schools,	  the	  list	  of	  EMO-­‐operated	  charters	  from	  the	  NEPC	  reports	  was	  joined	  with	  information	  from	  the	  Common	  Core	  of	  Data	  (CCD).	  The	  CCD	  was	  downloaded	  from	  the	  National	  Center	  for	  Education	  Statistics	  (Common	  Core	  of	  Data	  website).	  The	  CCD	  is	  the	  core	  dataset	  describing	  all	  public	  K-­‐12	  schools	  in	  the	  United	  States.	  It	  provides	  essential	  basic	  information	  about	  each	  school.	  	  Of	  the	  1,542	  schools	  in	  the	  NEPC	  reports,	  1,455,	  (94%)	  of	  the	  schools	  were	  successfully	  matched	  with	  the	  Common	  Core	  of	  Data.	  Another	  69	  schools	  were	  eliminated	  because	  they	  were	  district	  (non-­‐charter)	  schools	  operated	  by	  EMOs,	  bringing	  the	  total	  number	  of	  schools	  in	  the	  analysis	  to	  1,386.	  The	  CCD	  includes	  latitude	  and	  longitude	  data	  for	  each	  school,	  allowing	  for	  the	  geo-­‐location	  of	  schools.	  It	  also	  provides	  detailed	  statistics	  on	  the	  racial	  composition	  of	  the	  school’s	  student	  population.	  This	  is	  used	  both	  to	  compare	  the	  racial	  composition	  of	  various	  school	  types	  and	  compared	  with	  the	  racial	  composition	  of	  the	  CBGs	  where	  schools	  are	  located	  to	  determine	  how	  closely	  schools	  reflect	  the	  racial	  composition	  of	  the	  neighborhoods	  where	  they	  are	  located.	  The	  CCD	  also	  provides	  free	  and	  reduced	  lunch	  eligibility	  rates	  (FRL).	  FRL	  is	  the	  most	  commonly	  used	  proxy	  variable	  for	  the	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socioeconomic	  status	  of	  a	  school’s	  student	  population.	  If	  a	  student’s	  family	  income	  is	  below	  given	  threshold	  levels	  ($40,793	  for	  a	  family	  of	  four	  in	  the	  2009-­‐10	  school	  year)	  that	  student	  is	  eligible	  for	  free	  or	  reduced	  price	  lunch.	  Therefore	  the	  proportion	  of	  eligible	  students	  expresses	  the	  proportion	  of	  students	  that	  come	  from	  families	  below	  that	  threshold.	  Another	  proxy	  measure	  for	  socioeconomic	  status	  is	  Title-­‐I	  eligibility.	  Title	  I	  is	  a	  federal	  program	  that	  provides	  supplementary	  funding	  to	  schools	  that	  educate	  large	  proportions	  or	  numbers	  of	  students	  from	  low-­‐income	  families.	  Specifically,	  “Schools	  in	  which	  children	  from	  low-­‐income	  families	  make	  up	  at	  least	  40	  percent	  of	  enrollment	  are	  eligible	  to	  use	  Title	  I	  funds	  for	  schoolwide	  programs	  that	  serve	  all	  children	  in	  the	  school.”	  (US	  DOE	  Title-­‐I	  Program	  Description).	  In	  this	  way,	  a	  Title-­‐I	  eligible	  school	  is	  a	  school	  that	  educates	  a	  significant	  proportion	  of	  low-­‐income	  students.	  This	  variable	  is	  used	  to	  compare	  the	  rate	  of	  Title-­‐I	  eligibility	  across	  different	  school	  types,	  and	  by	  extension	  the	  likelihood	  that	  different	  operators	  run	  schools	  that	  enroll	  high	  rates	  of	  low-­‐income	  students.	  	  
Geographic	  Information	  Systems	  	   Geographic	  Information	  Systems	  (GIS)	  is	  a	  broad	  term	  referring	  to	  software	  and	  technology	  that	  permits	  the	  representation	  and	  analysis	  of	  spatially	  categorized	  data.	  The	  use	  of	  GIS	  allows	  for	  analyses	  that	  are	  sensitive	  to	  the	  broad	  spatial	  continuities	  and	  differences	  that	  exist	  in	  the	  real	  world.	  Lubienski	  &	  Dougherty	  (2009)	  note	  how	  “GIS	  has	  been	  notably	  underexploited	  as	  a	  tool	  in	  education	  research,	  particularly	  in	  areas	  such	  as	  studies	  of	  school	  choice	  programs,	  where	  spatial	  patterns	  are	  critical	  to	  understanding	  the	  potential	  to	  leverage	  improvements	  in	  how	  we	  educate	  our	  children.”	  (p.	  487)	  The	  primary	  use	  of	  GIS	  for	  the	  current	  analyses	  is	  to	  facilitate	  the	  joining	  of	  different	  data	  sources	  based	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on	  geography.	  In	  this	  way,	  data	  representing	  the	  local	  demography	  of	  neighborhoods	  where	  schools	  are	  located	  is	  joined	  with	  data	  on	  the	  racial	  and	  socioeconomic	  composition	  of	  the	  school’s	  enrollment.	  Research	  on	  local	  school	  districts	  has	  demonstrated	  that	  charter	  schools	  may	  intentionally	  locate	  in	  areas	  that	  will	  allow	  them	  to	  access	  less-­‐risky	  student	  populations	  (Lubienski,	  Gulosino	  &	  Weitzel,	  2009;	  Gulosino	  &	  Lubienski,	  2011).	  In	  order	  to	  determine	  whether	  this	  strategy	  is	  widespread	  among	  for-­‐profit	  charter	  schools,	  geolocation	  is	  utilized	  to	  match	  each	  school	  to	  the	  racial	  and	  socioeconomic	  demography	  of	  the	  areas	  where	  they	  locate.	  In	  Geographic	  Information	  Systems,	  geography	  is	  represented	  by	  vector	  geometry.	  Essentially,	  real-­‐world	  geography	  is	  represented	  as	  points,	  lines	  and	  polygons.	  Schools	  are	  represented	  as	  points	  in	  the	  process	  of	  geolocation.	  The	  Common	  Core	  of	  Data	  includes	  detailed	  latitude	  and	  longitude	  data	  allowing	  for	  precise	  geolocation	  of	  schools.	  These	  x	  and	  y	  coordinates	  place	  a	  point	  within	  a	  set	  of	  polygons,	  representing	  the	  desired	  geographic	  unit,	  which	  sub-­‐divide	  the	  geography	  of	  the	  United	  States.	  All	  geo-­‐location	  and	  mapping	  was	  performed	  in	  ArcGIS	  10	  (Esri,	  2012),	  a	  proprietary	  geographic	  information	  system	  software.	  	  	  
	  
The	  2010	  United	  States	  Census	  	   Every	  ten	  years,	  the	  United	  States	  conducts	  a	  census	  of	  its	  population.	  This	  census,	  conducted	  by	  the	  US	  Census	  Bureau,	  is	  intended	  to	  provide	  an	  accurate	  representation	  of	  who	  lives	  where	  within	  the	  entire	  nation.	  In	  addition	  to	  recording	  a	  number	  of	  demographic	  and	  socioeconomic	  factors,	  each	  census	  also	  entails	  the	  partial	  redrawing	  of	  the	  population	  geography	  of	  the	  United	  States.	  Zip	  codes,	  census	  tracts,	  and	  census	  block	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groups	  are	  smaller	  census	  units	  that	  may	  be	  somewhat	  altered	  for	  each	  census	  due	  to	  population	  changes.	  The	  geography	  created	  for	  each	  decennial	  census	  is	  used	  over	  the	  following	  ten	  years	  to	  describe	  any	  further	  data	  collection	  by	  the	  census	  bureau.	  	  The	  polygons	  to	  which	  points	  are	  matched	  for	  this	  analysis	  are	  2010	  census	  block	  groups	  (CBGs).	  Census	  block	  groups	  are	  subdivisions	  of	  census	  tracts,	  with	  populations	  generally	  ranging	  between	  600	  –	  3,000	  people.	  They	  are	  also	  the	  smallest	  unit	  by	  population	  for	  which	  the	  census	  bureau	  provides	  publicly	  available	  data	  on	  race	  and	  socioeconomic	  demography.	  Because	  they	  represent	  the	  smallest	  level	  of	  population	  aggregation	  for	  which	  data	  is	  available,	  researchers	  have	  found	  CBGs	  to	  be	  the	  preferred	  unit	  of	  analysis	  for	  describing	  local	  geography	  (Kaplowitz,	  Perlstadt	  &	  Post,	  2010).	  This	  in	  turn	  follows	  from	  Tobler’s	  (1970)	  first	  law	  of	  geography,	  “everything	  is	  related	  to	  everything	  else,	  but	  near	  things	  are	  more	  related	  than	  distant	  things”.	  Gulosino	  &	  D’Entremont’s	  (2011)	  analysis	  of	  charter	  school	  location	  in	  New	  Jersey	  demonstrated	  how	  using	  CBGs	  as	  a	  geographic	  unit	  of	  analysis	  better	  reflects	  how	  charter	  location	  may	  impact	  racial	  and	  socioeconomic	  segregation	  compared	  to	  zip	  codes	  or	  census	  tracts.	  Utilizing	  smaller	  geographic	  units	  reduces	  the	  likelihood	  that	  CBG	  demographic	  data	  is	  substantially	  unrepresentative	  of	  the	  actual	  neighborhood	  where	  schools	  locate.	  Previous	  research	  utilizing	  the	  school	  district	  as	  the	  geo-­‐demographic	  unit	  of	  reference	  is	  not	  sensitive	  to	  the	  ways	  that	  in	  the	  large	  urban	  districts	  where	  charter	  schools	  proliferate,	  there	  can	  be	  a	  greatly	  uneven	  distribution	  of	  population	  by	  race	  and	  class	  (Miron,	  Urschel,	  Mathis	  &	  Tornquist,	  2010).	  It	  is	  true	  that	  CBG	  boundaries	  do	  not	  necessarily	  line	  up	  with	  what	  people	  indigenous	  to	  an	  area	  would	  recognize	  as	  neighborhood	  boundaries.	  However,	  they	  represent	  the	  best	  widely	  available	  “neighborhood”	  demographic	  estimates	  for	  schools.	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The	  census	  also	  includes	  data	  on	  the	  racial	  composition	  of	  CBGs.	  Cities	  in	  the	  United	  States	  are	  highly	  segregated,	  and	  there	  is	  a	  strong,	  self-­‐reinforcing	  relationship	  between	  residential	  and	  school	  segregation	  (Lareau	  &	  Goyette,	  2014).	  The	  racial	  composition	  of	  a	  CBG	  would	  thus	  be	  expected	  to	  be	  highly	  predictive	  of	  the	  racial	  composition	  of	  a	  school	  located	  in	  that	  CBG.	  The	  racial	  composition	  will	  be	  used	  both	  as	  a	  predictive	  variable	  of	  where	  different	  types	  of	  schools	  locate,	  and	  as	  a	  control	  variable	  for	  examining	  student	  population	  composition	  after	  controlling	  for	  CBG	  level	  racial	  composition.	  The	  census	  also	  includes	  data	  on	  rates	  of	  homeownership	  by	  census	  block	  group.	  Homeownership	  is	  an	  important	  socioeconomic	  indicator.	  The	  rate	  of	  homeownership	  in	  the	  CBG	  where	  a	  school	  is	  located	  is	  likely	  to	  be	  predictive	  of	  the	  proportion	  of	  low-­‐income	  students	  in	  the	  area	  (Zhan	  &	  Sherraden,	  2003).	  Homeownership	  is	  a	  measure	  of	  socioeconomic	  status	  known	  to	  be	  an	  important	  indicator	  of	  likely	  academic	  success.	  Family	  asset	  ownership	  is	  positively	  correlated	  with	  student	  academic	  success,	  and	  homes	  are	  generally	  the	  most	  valuable	  asset	  a	  family	  has.	  Higher	  homeownership	  in	  a	  CBG	  indicates	  that	  a	  higher	  proportion	  of	  families	  have	  significant	  assets.	  Dalton	  Conley	  (2001)	  has	  shown	  how	  wealth	  is	  able	  to	  explain	  educational	  inequalities	  that	  traditional	  measures	  of	  SES	  like	  income	  and	  parent’s	  education	  do	  not.	  All	  other	  factors	  being	  equal,	  we	  would	  expect	  a	  CBG	  with	  a	  higher	  percentage	  of	  owner-­‐occupied	  properties	  to	  in	  general	  be	  wealthier	  than	  a	  CBG	  with	  lower	  percentage	  of	  ownership.	  A	  charter	  school	  operator	  that	  was	  interested	  in	  avoiding	  enrolling	  high	  proportions	  of	  low-­‐income	  students	  would	  be	  likely	  to	  consider	  homeownership	  among	  other	  socioeconomic	  factors	  before	  deciding	  where	  to	  locate	  a	  new	  school.	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Analytical	  Strategy:	  Multilevel	  Logistic	  Regression	  	   Douglas	  Luke	  (2004)	  discusses	  the	  value	  of	  multilevel	  modeling	  by	  noting	  that	  “[w]hen	  one	  considers	  almost	  any	  phenomenon	  of	  interest	  to	  social	  and	  health	  scientists,	  it	  is	  hard	  to	  overestimate	  the	  importance	  of	  context”	  	  (p.1).	  Crucial	  social	  science	  questions	  are	  generally	  situated	  within	  complex	  social	  contexts,	  however	  analyses	  are	  not	  always	  sensitive	  to	  this.	  Education	  researchers	  have	  been	  at	  the	  forefront	  of	  developing	  more	  contextually	  sensitive	  measurement	  schemas,	  with	  multilevel	  modeling,	  also	  called	  hierarchical	  linear	  modeling	  (HLM)	  or	  mixed-­‐effects	  modeling,	  being	  an	  important	  development	  in	  placing	  the	  study	  of	  schools	  in	  proper	  social	  context	  (Raudenbush	  &	  Bryk,	  1986).	  This	  analysis	  explores	  school	  geography	  and	  demography	  across	  31	  different	  state	  contexts	  that	  vary	  widely	  in	  terms	  of	  policy	  contexts,	  demographic	  profiles	  and	  EMO	  concentration.	  This	  necessitates	  the	  use	  of	  a	  modeling	  strategy	  that	  is	  sensitive	  to	  whether	  trends	  are	  consistent	  across	  these	  diverse	  state	  contexts.	  	   Multilevel	  modeling	  is	  utilized	  because	  it	  allows	  for	  the	  disaggregation	  of	  variance	  to	  multiple	  levels.	  	  For	  this	  study	  the	  models	  separate	  within-­‐state,	  school-­‐to-­‐school	  variance	  from	  variance	  across	  states.	  	  Multilevel	  regression	  models	  nested	  phenomena	  and	  more	  accurately	  determines	  the	  significance	  of	  a	  relationship	  across	  widely	  differing	  contexts.	  	  The	  analyses	  utilize	  multilevel	  modeling	  with	  schools	  as	  the	  level-­‐1	  unit	  of	  analysis	  and	  states	  as	  the	  level-­‐2	  unit.	  	  This	  data	  structure	  is	  utilized	  because	  of	  the	  demonstrated	  importance	  of	  state-­‐level	  charter	  school	  policy	  in	  determining	  the	  degree	  to	  which	  charter	  schools	  proliferate,	  and	  the	  types	  of	  schools	  that	  proliferate	  in	  given	  states	  (Holyoke,	  Henig,	  Brown	  &	  Lacireno-­‐Paquet,	  2009,	  also	  see	  Appendices	  1	  and	  2	  for	  a	  detailed	  analysis	  of	  the	  impact	  of	  State	  contexts	  on	  for-­‐profit	  charter	  proliferation).	  All	  modeling	  was	  performed	  in	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Figure	  3.3	  Multilevel	  Logistic	  Regression	  Equation	  for	  Analysis	  1	  The	  multilevel	  equation	  can	  be	  expressed	  in	  two	  ways,	  either	  as	  a	  systems-­‐of-­‐equations	  model,	  or	  as	  a	  mixed-­‐effects	  model	  (Luke,	  2004).	  System	  of	  Equations	  Model:	  Level	  1:	  	   Yij	  =	  βoj	  +	  β1j	  Xij	  +	  …	  +	  rij	  Level	  2:	   βoj	  =	  γoo	  +	  uoj	  
β1j	  =	  γ1o	  Mixed	  Effects	  (Combined)	  Model:	  Yij	  =	  γoo	  +	  γ1oXij	  +	  uoj	  +	  rij	  Where:	  
 Yij	  =	  The	  probability	  that	  school	  “i”	  in	  state	  “j”	  is	  operated	  by	  a	  for-­‐profit	  EMO.	  
 Boj	  =	  The	  variable	  intercept	  for	  the	  given	  state	  “j”.	  
 B1j	  =	  The	  value	  representing	  the	  overall	  slope	  of	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  given	  explanatory	  variable	  Xij	  and	  the	  dependent	  variable	  Yij.	  
 Xij	  =	  The	  value	  of	  the	  given	  explanatory	  variable	  for	  school	  “i”	  in	  state	  “j”.	  	  
 rij	  =	  The	  error	  term	  (un-­‐modeled	  variability)	  for	  school	  “i”	  in	  state	  “j”.	  
 γoo	  =	  The	  mean	  value	  of	  the	  level-­‐1	  dependent	  variable,	  controlling	  for	  the	  level-­‐2	  
predictor.	  
 uoj	  =	  The	  error	  term	  (un-­‐modeled	  variability)	  for	  state	  “j”.	  
 γ1o	  =	  The	  mean	  value	  of	  the	  level-­‐1	  slope,	  controlling	  for	  the	  level-­‐2	  predictor.	  
	  
	  	   68	  
“R”,	  an	  open-­‐source	  statistical	  software	  package	  (The	  R	  Foundation	  for	  Statistical	  Computing).	  	  The	  supplementary	  packages	  lme4	  or	  “Linear	  Mixed-­‐Effects	  Models	  Using	  S4	  Classes”	  (Bates,	  Maechler	  &	  Bolker,	  2011)	  and	  nlme	  or	  “Linear	  and	  Nonlinear	  Mixed	  Effects	  Models”	  (Pinheiro	  et	  al.,	  2012)	  were	  utilized	  for	  the	  multilevel	  analyses.	  	  	   The	  equation	  form	  used	  is	  specified	  in	  detail	  in	  Figure	  3.3.	  Logistic	  regression	  is	  used,	  with	  the	  probability	  that	  a	  school	  is	  operated	  by	  a	  for-­‐profit,	  as	  opposed	  to	  non-­‐profit	  EMO	  as	  the	  outcome	  variable.	  In	  this	  way,	  a	  statistically	  significant	  result	  from	  a	  given	  predictor	  variable	  indicates	  a	  failure	  of	  the	  null	  hypothesis	  that	  for-­‐profit	  and	  non-­‐profit	  charter	  schools	  enroll	  statistically	  indistinguishable	  student	  populations	  and/or	  locate	  in	  demographically	  statistically	  indistinguishable	  areas.	  The	  predictive	  variables	  are	  based	  on	  CBG	  racial	  composition,	  CBG	  rates	  of	  homeownership,	  school	  racial	  composition,	  and	  school	  Title-­‐I	  eligibility.	  Testing	  whether	  the	  racial	  and/or	  socioeconomic	  composition	  of	  a	  school	  is	  predictive	  of	  whether	  a	  school	  is	  likely	  to	  be	  operated	  by	  a	  for-­‐profit	  will	  be	  utilized	  in	  considering	  whether	  to	  reject	  or	  fail	  to	  reject	  Hypotheses	  1	  and	  2.	  Testing	  whether	  the	  racial	  and/or	  socioeconomic	  composition	  of	  CBGs	  where	  schools	  locate	  is	  predictive	  of	  whether	  a	  school	  is	  likely	  to	  be	  operated	  by	  for-­‐profit,	  will	  test	  whether	  it	  is	  proper	  to	  reject	  or	  fail	  to	  reject	  Hypothesis	  3.	  
	  
Analysis	  2:	  Six-­district	  sample	  	   The	  results	  of	  Analysis	  1	  will	  demonstrate	  whether	  for-­‐profit	  charter	  schools,	  as	  a	  segment,	  have	  racially	  and/or	  socioeconomically	  different	  enrollment	  patterns	  than	  non-­‐profit	  schools.	  However,	  Analysis	  1	  cannot	  demonstrate	  how	  local	  patterns	  of	  racial	  and	  socioeconomic	  segregation	  are	  impacted	  by	  the	  existence	  of	  for-­‐profit	  charter	  schools.	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Analysis	  2	  is	  designed	  to	  analyze	  these	  local	  patterns	  by	  performing	  detailed	  investigations	  into	  six	  individual	  school	  districts.	  To	  that	  end,	  four	  research	  questions	  are	  considered	  for	  each	  of	  the	  six	  districts	  being	  studied.	  The	  analyses	  conducted	  to	  address	  these	  research	  questions,	  from	  districts	  with	  different	  levels	  of	  for-­‐profit	  school	  proliferation,	  will	  then	  address	  two	  market-­effect	  research	  questions	  that	  assess	  how	  the	  prevalence	  of	  for-­‐profit	  charter	  schools	  in	  a	  school	  district	  may	  influence	  student-­‐sorting	  patterns	  within	  that	  district.	  	  
Figure	  3.4:	  Analysis	  2	  Research	  Questions	  
Individual	  district	  research	  questions	  
2.1. Racial	  Enrollment	  By	  School	  Type:	  Do	  charter	  schools	  and	  non-­‐charter	  schools	  enroll	  statistically	  different	  proportions	  of	  students	  of	  three	  different	  racial	  groups	  (Black,	  white,	  Hispanic)?	  Do	  different	  types	  of	  charter	  schools	  (independent,	  non-­‐profit,	  for-­‐profit)	  enroll	  statistically	  different	  proportions	  of	  students	  of	  three	  different	  racial	  groups	  (Black,	  white,	  Hispanic)?	  	  
2.2. Racial	  Composition	  of	  Census	  Block	  Group	  By	  School	  Type:	  Do	  charter	  schools	  locate	  in	  CBGs	  with	  statistically	  different	  proportions	  of	  residents	  of	  three	  different	  racial	  groups	  (Black,	  white,	  Hispanic)?	  Do	  different	  types	  of	  charter	  schools	  (independent,	  non-­‐profit,	  for-­‐profit)	  locate	  in	  CBGs	  with	  statistically	  different	  proportions	  of	  residents	  of	  three	  different	  racial	  groups	  (Black,	  white,	  Hispanic)?	  	  
2.3. Socioeconomic	  Enrollment	  By	  School	  Type:	  Do	  charter	  schools	  and	  non-­‐charter	  schools	  enroll	  statistically	  different	  proportions	  of	  the	  students	  eligible	  for	  free	  or	  reduced	  price	  lunch?	  Do	  different	  types	  of	  charter	  schools	  (independent,	  non-­‐profit,	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for-­‐profit)	  enroll	  statistically	  different	  proportions	  of	  the	  students	  eligible	  for	  free	  or	  reduced	  price	  lunch?	  
2.4. Socioeconomic	  Composition	  of	  Census	  Block	  Group	  By	  School	  Type:	  Do	  charter	  schools	  and	  non-­‐charter	  schools	  locate	  in	  CBGs	  with	  statistically	  different	  median	  family	  incomes?	  Do	  different	  types	  of	  charter	  schools	  (independent,	  non-­‐profit,	  for-­‐profit)	  locate	  in	  CBGs	  with	  statistically	  different	  median	  family	  incomes?	  	  
Market-­effect	  research	  questions	  
2.5. Racial	  Market-­Effect:	  Do	  differences	  in	  student	  racial	  enrollment	  patterns	  and/or	  the	  racial	  composition	  of	  CBGs	  where	  schools	  locate	  vary	  between	  charters	  and	  non-­‐charters	  systematically	  according	  to	  the	  proportion	  of	  charter	  schools	  that	  are	  operated	  by	  for-­‐profit	  corporations	  in	  the	  districts?	  
2.6. Socioeconomic	  Market	  Effect:	  Do	  differences	  in	  student	  socioeconomic	  enrollment	  patterns	  and/or	  the	  socioeconomic	  composition	  of	  CBGs	  where	  schools	  locate	  vary	  between	  charters	  and	  non-­‐charters	  systematically	  according	  to	  the	  proportion	  of	  charter	  schools	  that	  are	  operated	  by	  for-­‐profit	  corporations	  in	  a	  given	  district?	  	  
How	  School	  Districts	  Were	  Selected	  	   EMO-­‐operated	  charter	  schools	  are	  highly	  concentrated	  in	  six	  states:	  Arizona,	  California,	  Florida,	  Michigan,	  Ohio,	  and	  Texas.	  These	  six	  states	  together	  account	  for	  82%	  (1,131	  out	  of	  1,386)	  of	  all	  EMO-­‐operated	  charter	  schools	  in	  school	  year	  2009-­‐10.	  The	  number	  of	  EMO-­‐operated	  charters	  in	  these	  states	  ranged	  from	  a	  high	  of	  290	  (Texas)	  to	  a	  low	  of	  124	  (California)	  EMO-­‐operated	  charters.	  The	  state	  with	  the	  next	  highest	  number	  of	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EMO-­‐operated	  charters	  after	  California	  is	  New	  York	  with	  41,	  indicating	  that	  there	  is	  a	  substantial	  gap	  between	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  EMOs	  have	  penetrated	  into	  those	  six	  states	  compared	  to	  all	  other	  states	  (Table	  1.1	  provides	  an	  overview	  of	  the	  distribution	  of	  EMO-­‐operated	  charters	  across	  states).	  Because	  EMOs	  are	  highly	  concentrated	  in	  these	  six	  states,	  they	  present	  the	  best	  opportunity	  for	  a	  further	  comparative	  analysis	  of	  how	  the	  relative	  proliferation	  of	  for-­‐profit	  versus	  non-­‐profit	  charters	  impacts	  student	  sorting	  at	  the	  district	  level.	  One	  district	  was	  selected	  for	  analysis	  from	  each	  state,	  so	  that	  student-­‐sorting	  patterns	  across	  six	  very	  different	  state	  contexts	  could	  be	  analyzed.	  In	  each	  state,	  the	  largest	  urban	  district	  with	  the	  highest	  number	  of	  EMO	  operated	  schools	  was	  chosen.	  These	  districts,	  by	  state,	  are:	  	  
 Michigan:	  Detroit	  Public	  Schools	  (Detroit)	  	  
 Florida:	  Miami-­‐Dade	  County	  Public	  Schools	  (Miami)	  	  
 California:	  Los	  Angeles	  Unified	  School	  District	  (Los	  Angeles)	  
 Texas:	  Houston	  Independent	  School	  District	  (Houston)	  	  
 Arizona:	  Tucson	  Unified	  School	  District	  (Tucson)	  	  
 Ohio:	  Cleveland	  Metropolitan	  School	  District	  (Cleveland).	  	  These	  six	  districts	  alone	  accounted	  for	  15%	  (206	  out	  of	  1,386)	  of	  all	  EMO-­‐operated	  charter	  schools	  in	  2009-­‐10.	  	  	   School	  districts	  are	  the	  chosen	  unit	  of	  analysis	  for	  a	  few	  reasons.	  The	  governance	  of	  schools	  in	  the	  United	  States	  has	  historically	  been	  highly	  localized	  (Tyack,	  1974).	  Local	  control	  of	  public	  schools	  takes	  place	  within	  school	  districts.	  School	  districts	  are	  generally	  overseen	  by	  a	  democratically	  elected	  school	  board	  that	  oversees	  all	  public	  schools.	  The	  school	  district	  has	  historically	  been	  the	  most	  significant	  discrete	  unit	  determining	  the	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operation	  of	  public	  education.	  Additionally,	  large	  city	  school	  districts	  have	  typically	  been	  the	  sites	  where	  each	  new	  wave	  of	  education	  reform	  is	  initiated	  (Mirel,	  1999;	  Tyack,	  1974).	  Large	  urban	  school	  districts	  are	  the	  location	  for	  a	  disproportionate	  share	  of	  all	  charter	  schools.	  In	  some	  states	  this	  happens	  in	  part	  because	  of	  formal	  restraints	  prohibiting	  the	  opening	  of	  charters	  outside	  of	  certain	  urban	  districts	  (e.g.	  Missouri).	  In	  many	  states,	  charter	  growth	  in	  cities	  is	  justified	  because	  these	  districts,	  typically	  with	  high	  concentrations	  of	  low-­‐income	  students,	  often	  demonstrate	  substandard	  academic	  outcomes.	  Finally,	  charter	  growth	  in	  city	  districts	  is	  often	  imposed	  by	  outside	  interests	  following	  the	  dissolution	  or	  disempowerment	  of	  local	  school	  boards	  and	  the	  removal	  of	  democratic	  control	  through	  mayoral	  or	  state	  takeovers	  (Reckhow,	  2013).	  Thus	  the	  relative	  lack	  of	  political	  and	  economic	  power	  is	  associated	  with	  the	  imposition	  and	  concentration	  of	  charter	  schools	  in	  large	  urban	  districts.	  	   The	  racial	  and	  socioeconomic	  demographics	  of	  each	  district	  are	  detailed	  in	  Table	  3.1.	  Figure	  3.5	  visualizes	  the	  socioeconomic	  distribution	  of	  each	  district.	  Table	  3.2	  provides	  a	  five-­‐number	  summary	  of	  the	  racial	  distribution	  of	  students	  across	  the	  districts.	  The	  distribution	  of	  school	  types	  across	  the	  districts	  is	  detailed	  in	  Table	  3.3,	  and	  visualized	  in	  Figure	  3.6.	  Each	  of	  the	  six	  districts	  in	  the	  analysis	  is	  either	  majority	  Black	  or	  majority	  Hispanic/Latino.	  Median	  household	  income	  ranges	  widely,	  from	  $24,941	  in	  Cleveland	  to	  $46,255	  in	  Miami.	  Two	  of	  the	  districts	  have	  only	  non-­‐profit	  EMO	  charter	  schools	  (Houston	  and	  Los	  Angeles),	  two	  have	  substantial	  proportions	  of	  both	  for-­‐profit	  and	  non-­‐profit	  charter	  schools	  (Cleveland	  and	  Tucson),	  and	  two	  have	  primarily	  for-­‐profit	  EMO	  charter	  schools	  (Detroit	  and	  Miami-­‐Dade).	  This	  provides	  a	  natural	  differentiation	  into	  three	  analytical	  categories	  (non-­‐profit	  only,	  mixed	  for-­‐profit/non-­‐profit,	  predominantly	  for-­‐
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profit).	  If	  student-­‐sorting	  patterns	  differ	  across	  categories,	  this	  would	  provide	  evidence	  of	  a	  possible	  market-­effect	  associated	  with	  the	  proliferation	  of	  for-­‐profit	  charters.	  Each	  district	  is	  now	  briefly	  described.	  	  
Table	  3.1:	  Socioeconomic	  and	  Racial	  Demographics	  of	  Selected	  Districts	  	  	   Cleveland,	  OH	   Detroit,	  MI	   Houston,	  TX	   Los	  Angeles,	  CA	   Miami-­‐Dade,	  FL	   Tucson,	  AZ	  #	  of	  Public	  School	  Enrolled	  Families	   33,075	   72,545	   113,810	   389,990	   209,375	   39,720	  Proportion	  By	  Household	  Income	  (in	  dollars)	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	  	  	  Under	  10,000	   21.5%	   18.7%	   7.9%	   6.1%	   6.8%	   6.8%	  	  	  	  10,000-­‐14,999	   9.8%	   10.5%	   7.2%	   6.1%	   5.4%	   5.5%	  	  	  	  15,000-­‐24,999	   18.8%	   18.3%	   16.4%	   13.8%	   12.6%	   12.0%	  	  	  	  25,000-­‐34,999	   13.8%	   13.2%	   14.3%	   13.2%	   12.7%	   14.4%	  	  	  	  35,000-­‐49,999	   14.4%	   14.4%	   15.8%	   15.9%	   15.8%	   14.8%	  	  	  	  50,000-­‐74,999	   12.9%	   12.4%	   15.5%	   17.9%	   18.3%	   19.6%	  	  	  	  75,000-­‐99,999	   5.1%	   6.1%	   8.8%	   10.3%	   11.2%	   12.6%	  	  	  	  100,000-­‐149,999	   3.2%	   5.2%	   7.7%	   9.7%	   11.0%	   10.0%	  	  	  	  150,000-­‐199,999	   0.3%	   1.1%	   2.7%	   3.5%	   3.4%	   2.9%	  	  	  	  Over	  200,000	   0.2%	   0.2%	   3.5%	   3.5%	   2.9%	   1.2%	  Median	  Household	  Income	   $24,941	   $26,577	   $38,606	   $44,644	   $46,255	   $45,790	  Percentage	  of	  Families	  Below	  the	  Poverty	  Line	   48.3%	   45.8%	   32.7%	   28.6%	   23.3%	   25.4%	  #	  of	  Public	  School	  Enrolled	  Students	   58,945	   141,955	   208,365	   688,795	   354,350	   69,620	  Proportion	  By	  Race/Ethnicity	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	  	  	  Hispanic/Latino	   14.5%	   9.8%	   61.2%	   73.0%	   60.6%	   57.9%	  	  	  	  Black	  Non-­‐Hisp.	   64.7%	   83.1%	   25.6%	   8.9%	   25.1%	   4.8%	  	  	  	  White	  Non-­‐Hisp.	   16.3%	   3.8%	   9.2%	   9.8%	   12.1%	   27.8%	  	  	  	  Asian	  Non-­‐Hisp.	   0.7%	   1.1%	   3.0%	   5.6%	   1.2%	   1.5%	  	  	  	  Other	   3.7%	   2.2%	   1.1%	   2.6%	   1.0%	   8.0%	  
	  Data	  Sources:	  American	  Community	  Survey	  2008-­‐2012,	  Common	  Core	  of	  Data	  2009-­‐10	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Table	  3.2:	  Five	  Number	  Summary	  of	  Dispersion	  of	  Students	  By	  Race	  and	  District	  
Across	  all	  Public	  Schools:	  *	  	  	  	   	   Minimum	   1st	  Quarter	   Median	   3rd	  Quarter	   Maximum	  Miami	   Black	   0%	   2.2%	   14.5%	   56.2%	   98.0%	  	   Hispanic	   2.0%	   35.9%	   66.0%	   88.7%	   100%	  	   White	   0%	   1.4%	   3.9%	   10.7%	   66.2%	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	  Detroit	   Black	   0%	   96.0%	   98.8%	   99.5%	   100%	  	   Hispanic	   0%	   0%	   0.2%	   0.9%	   100%	  	   White	   0%	   0%	   0.5%	   1.4%	   94.1%	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	  Tucson	   Black	   0%	   2.0%	   4.4%	   8.2%	   20.0%	  	   Hispanic	   3.2%	   40.3%	   55.0%	   78.5%	   97.0%	  	   White	   0%	   7.9%	   25.4%	   42.9%	   75.9%	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	  Cleveland	   Black	   0%	   43.5%	   88.5%	   97.6%	   100%	  	   Hispanic	   0%	   0.3%	   1.9%	   16.6%	   87.1%	  	   White	   0%	   0.8%	   4.7%	   25.0%	   81.1%	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	  Los	   Black	   0%	   1.2%	   4.5%	   13.1%	   99.7%	  Angeles	   Hispanic	   0.3%	   54.8%	   80.4%	   93.8%	   100%	  	   White	   0%	   0.2%	   1.1%	   8.9%	   96.7%	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	  Houston	   Black	   0%	   6.1%	   23.4%	   55.2%	   100%	  	   Hispanic	   0%	   31.8%	   63.1%	   87.5%	   100%	  	   White	   0%	   0.6%	   1.4%	   3.8%	   67.3%	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	  *HOW	  TO	  INTERPRET	  THIS	  TABLE:	  The	  analysis	  represents	  the	  distribution	  of	  students	  by	  race	  by	  district.	  For	  each	  race/district	  category,	  all	  schools	  are	  ordered	  from	  the	  school	  with	  the	  lowest	  proportion	  of	  students	  of	  that	  racial	  group	  in	  that	  district	  up	  to	  the	  highest	  proportion	  of	  students	  for	  that	  racial	  group.	  So,	  for	  example,	  for	  Black	  students	  in	  Miami,	  at	  least	  one	  school	  had	  0.0%	  (zero)	  Black	  students,	  one-­‐quarter	  of	  schools	  had	  2.2%	  or	  fewer	  Black	  students,	  an	  equal	  number	  of	  schools	  had	  more	  and	  less	  than	  14.5%	  Black	  students,	  one-­‐quarter	  of	  schools	  had	  a	  56.2%	  or	  higher	  proportion	  of	  Black	  students,	  and	  the	  highest	  proportion	  of	  Black	  students	  in	  any	  school	  in	  Miami	  was	  98.0%.	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Figure	  3.5:	  Proportion	  of	  Public	  School	  Enrolled	  Families	  By	  Income	  Level	  in	  $1,000s	  	  Cleveland,	  OH	  	   	   	   	   	  	  	  Detroit,	  MI	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Figure	  3.6:	  School	  Type	  Proportion	  By	  District	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Table	  3.3:	  Number	  and	  Proportion	  of	  Schools	  By	  District	  and	  Type	  	  	   	   Traditional	  Public	  Schools	   Independent	  Charters	   Non-­‐Profit	  Charters	   For-­‐Profit	  Charters	   TOTAL	  	  Detroit	  	   147	  (65.3%)	   20	  (8.9%)	   9	  (4.0%)	   49	  (21.8%)	   225	  	  Miami	  	  	   374	  (80.6%)	   35	  (7.5%)	   3	  (0.6%)	   52	  (11.2%)	   464	  	  Cleveland	  	   101	  (66.4%)	   22	  (14.5%)	   15	  (9.9%)	   14	  (9.2%)	   152	  	  Tucson	  	   95	  (65.5%)	   22	  (15.2%)	   19	  (13.1%)	   9	  (6.2%)	   145	  	  Los	  Angeles	  	   728	  (79.4%)	   135	  (14.7%)	   54	  (5.9%)	   0	  (0.0%)	   917	  	  Houston	  	   256	  (70.3%)	   68	  (18.7%)	   40	  (11.0%)	   0	  (0.0%)	   364	  	  TOTALS	  	   1,701	  (75.0%)	   302	  (13.3%)	   140	  (6.2%)	   124	  (5.5%)	   2,267	  	  
	  
Primarily	  For-­Profit	  Districts:	  Miami,	  Florida	  &	  Detroit,	  Michigan	  The	  two	  states	  to	  most	  enthusiastically	  adopt	  for-­‐profit	  charter	  schools	  are	  Michigan	  (with	  186	  for-­‐profit	  charters)	  and	  Florida	  (141).	  Combined,	  just	  over	  half	  of	  all	  for-­‐profit	  charters	  are	  located	  in	  these	  two	  states	  (327	  out	  of	  653).	  Both	  states	  also	  have	  low	  proportions	  of	  non-­‐profit	  charter	  schools,	  with	  for-­‐profits	  outnumbering	  non-­‐profits	  at	  least	  8	  to	  1.	  For	  Michigan,	  Detroit	  was	  the	  selected	  district,	  and	  for	  Florida	  it	  was	  Miami.	  These	  districts	  have	  a	  combined	  101	  for-­‐profit	  charter	  schools,	  15%	  of	  the	  total	  number	  of	  for-­‐profit	  charter	  schools	  nationally.	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Miami	  is	  the	  geographically	  largest	  district	  studied.	  As	  is	  common	  in	  many	  areas	  of	  the	  Southern	  United	  States,	  the	  school	  districts	  in	  Florida	  are	  coterminous	  with	  County	  boundaries.	  This	  often	  results	  in	  Southern	  states	  having	  geographically	  larger	  school	  districts.	  The	  Miami	  District	  is	  2,431	  square	  miles.	  The	  next	  largest	  district	  in	  the	  study	  is	  Los	  Angeles	  at	  704	  square	  miles,	  less	  than	  one-­‐third	  the	  size	  of	  Miami.	  However,	  the	  inhabited	  proportion	  of	  Dade	  County	  is	  significantly	  smaller.	  The	  large	  majority	  of	  the	  population	  in	  Miami-­‐Dade	  County	  is	  classified	  as	  city	  or	  suburban,	  with	  socioeconomic	  demographics	  similar	  to	  the	  unified	  districts	  in	  this	  study	  (Tucson	  and	  Los	  Angeles).	  Miami-­‐Dade	  has	  by	  a	  small	  margin	  the	  highest	  median	  family	  income	  of	  the	  six	  districts,	  at	  $46,255.	  It	  has	  the	  highest	  number	  of	  for-­‐profit	  charter	  schools	  (52),	  though	  a	  smaller	  proportion	  of	  all	  public	  schools	  are	  for-­‐profit	  charters	  (11.2%)	  than	  in	  Detroit.	  It	  also	  has	  the	  highest	  ratio	  of	  for-­‐profit	  to	  non-­‐profit	  charters	  (95%	  of	  EMO-­‐operated	  charters	  are	  for-­‐profit).	  	  Detroit	  has	  the	  highest	  proportion	  of	  public	  schools	  that	  are	  for-­‐profit	  charters	  of	  any	  of	  the	  districts	  under	  analysis	  (21.8%	  of	  all	  public	  schools).	  It	  also	  has	  the	  least	  racially	  diverse	  student	  population,	  with	  an	  83.1%	  Black	  student	  proportion.	  The	  large	  majority	  of	  public	  schools	  in	  Detroit	  enroll	  almost	  entirely	  Black	  students,	  with	  three-­‐quarters	  of	  Detroit	  schools	  enrolling	  at	  least	  96%	  Black	  students	  (Table	  3.2).	  Detroit	  has	  the	  second-­‐lowest	  median	  household	  income	  ($26,577)	  and	  the	  second	  highest	  percentage	  of	  families	  below	  the	  poverty	  line	  (45.8%)	  of	  the	  districts	  studied.	  84%	  of	  EMO	  operated	  charter	  schools	  in	  Detroit	  are	  for-­‐profit	  (49	  out	  of	  58).	  Detroit’s	  racial	  homogeneity	  suggests	  that	  it	  may	  be	  more	  difficult	  for	  an	  EMO	  to	  pursue	  a	  particular	  racial	  enrollment	  strategy.	  Because	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of	  this,	  Detroit	  presents	  an	  interesting	  counterpoint	  to	  the	  more	  racially	  diverse	  districts	  in	  the	  analysis.	  These	  two	  districts	  are	  similar	  in	  their	  embrace	  of	  for-­‐profit	  charter	  schools,	  but	  very	  different	  in	  other	  ways.	  One	  is	  in	  the	  South,	  the	  other	  in	  the	  North,	  one	  has	  a	  median	  household	  income	  74%	  higher	  than	  the	  other,	  one	  is	  majority	  Black,	  the	  other	  majority	  Hispanic.	  Because	  of	  the	  significant	  demographic	  differences,	  they	  provide	  a	  useful	  comparison	  for	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  demographic	  differences	  or	  the	  proliferation	  of	  for-­‐profit	  charter	  schools	  is	  more	  likely	  to	  predict	  student-­‐sorting	  patterns.	  
	  
Mixed	  Non-­Profit	  /	  For-­Profit	  Districts:	  Tucson,	  Arizona	  &	  Cleveland,	  Ohio	  	   Tucson	  has	  the	  fewest	  total	  schools	  of	  any	  of	  the	  six	  districts	  studied	  (145).	  It	  has	  the	  second	  highest	  median	  family	  income	  at	  $45,790.	  It	  also	  has	  the	  highest	  proportion	  of	  white,	  non-­‐Hispanic	  students	  (27.8%)	  of	  any	  of	  the	  six	  districts	  studied.	  A	  school	  operator	  attempting	  to	  cultivate	  a	  disproportionately	  white	  student	  enrollment	  may	  have	  more	  opportunity	  to	  do	  so	  in	  Tucson	  compared	  to	  the	  other	  districts	  studied.	  Arizona	  as	  a	  state	  has	  embraced	  the	  charter	  school	  movement	  to	  a	  greater	  extent	  than	  any	  other	  state,	  boasting	  the	  highest	  proportion	  of	  public	  charter	  schools	  of	  any	  state	  (not	  counting	  Washington	  D.C.).	  Tucson	  was	  selected	  instead	  of	  the	  more	  populous	  Phoenix	  area	  because	  the	  latter	  consists	  of	  a	  patchwork	  of	  several	  elementary	  school	  districts,	  high	  school	  districts,	  and	  unified	  districts.	  Because	  the	  analysis	  focuses	  on	  school	  districts	  as	  the	  unit	  of	  analysis,	  Phoenix	  was	  not	  as	  suitable	  for	  the	  analysis	  as	  Tucson,	  where	  one	  district	  represents	  the	  urban	  area.	  
	  	   80	  
Cleveland	  has	  the	  lowest	  median	  household	  income	  of	  the	  six	  school	  districts	  ($24,941),	  the	  highest	  proportion	  of	  public	  school	  enrolled	  families	  earning	  under	  $10,000	  per	  year	  (21.5%),	  and	  highest	  percentage	  of	  families	  under	  the	  poverty	  line	  (48.3%).	  It	  has	  a	  large	  and	  diverse	  charter	  school	  sector,	  and	  is	  the	  only	  district	  of	  the	  six	  to	  have	  at	  least	  a	  9%	  share	  of	  public	  schools	  in	  the	  independent	  (14.5%),	  non-­‐profit	  (9.9%)	  and	  for-­‐profit	  (9.2%)	  charter	  categories.	  Cleveland	  is	  also	  notable	  for	  having	  a	  substantial	  private	  school	  voucher	  program	  as	  an	  additional	  school	  choice	  option.	  Cleveland	  is	  in	  some	  ways	  the	  most	  racially	  diverse	  of	  the	  six	  districts.	  The	  overall	  student	  population	  is	  65%	  Black,	  but	  with	  substantial	  white-­‐non-­‐Hispanic	  (16%)	  and	  Hispanic	  (15%)	  student	  segments,	  it	  is	  the	  only	  district	  in	  the	  study	  with	  as	  much	  as	  13%	  of	  overall	  student	  population	  in	  three	  different	  racial	  groups.	  	  There	  is	  a	  $20,849	  difference	  in	  median	  household	  income	  between	  Tucson	  and	  Cleveland.	  Tucson	  is	  a	  predominantly	  Hispanic	  district	  while	  Cleveland	  is	  a	  predominantly	  Black	  district.	  Like	  the	  two	  predominantly	  for-­‐profit	  districts,	  these	  two	  districts	  provide	  substantially	  different	  racial	  and	  socioeconomic	  landscapes.	  	  	   	  
Non-­Profit	  Only	  Districts:	  Houston,	  Texas	  &	  Los	  Angeles,	  California	  	   The	  metropolitan	  area	  of	  Houston	  Texas	  is	  by	  some	  measures	  the	  most	  racially	  diverse	  in	  the	  nation	  (Emerson	  et	  al,	  undated).	  Houston	  has	  a	  median	  household	  income	  of	  $38,606,	  fourth	  highest	  of	  the	  six	  districts.	  Houston	  is	  a	  predominantly	  Hispanic	  district	  (61%)	  with	  a	  substantial	  Black	  minority	  (26%).	  Houston	  is	  notable	  as	  the	  city	  where	  the	  largest	  non-­‐profit	  EMO	  chain,	  the	  Knowledge	  Is	  Power	  Program	  (KIPP)	  schools,	  originated.	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   Los	  Angeles	  has	  the	  largest	  overall	  student	  enrollment	  of	  any	  of	  the	  school	  districts	  studied,	  and	  with	  917	  public	  schools,	  is	  the	  second	  largest	  school	  district	  nationally	  after	  New	  York	  City.	  It	  has	  the	  largest	  proportion	  of	  Hispanic	  students	  of	  the	  six	  districts,	  at	  73.0%.	  The	  median	  family	  income	  is	  the	  third	  highest	  of	  the	  six	  at	  $44,644.	  It	  has	  the	  largest	  number	  of	  any	  of	  the	  six	  districts	  of	  both	  independent	  charter	  schools	  (135,	  14.7%	  of	  public	  schools)	  and	  non-­‐profit	  charters	  (54,	  5.9%	  of	  public	  schools),	  and	  no	  for-­‐profit	  charter	  schools.	  	  	   In	  both	  districts	  a	  majority	  of	  students	  are	  Hispanic.	  Both	  districts	  also	  have	  fewer	  than	  a	  third	  of	  families	  living	  below	  the	  poverty	  line.	  Because	  of	  the	  greater	  socioeconomic	  diversity	  in	  Houston	  and	  Los	  Angeles,	  it	  may	  be	  easier	  to	  detect	  any	  efforts	  by	  different	  types	  of	  charter	  schools	  to	  enroll	  socioeconomically	  distinct	  populations,	  as	  compared	  to	  the	  comparatively	  more	  homogenous	  districts	  in	  the	  other	  two	  categories.	  	  
	   The	  six	  districts	  selected	  have	  some	  similarities	  and	  many	  important	  differences.	  They	  are	  all	  urban	  districts.	  They	  all	  have	  substantial	  numbers	  of	  EMO-­‐operated	  charter	  schools.	  They	  all	  are	  majority	  non-­‐white	  districts.	  	  They	  all	  have	  between	  19%	  and	  35%	  of	  public	  schools	  operating	  as	  charters.	  Among	  the	  important	  differences	  are	  overall	  district	  enrollment	  (11	  to	  1	  total	  enrollment	  difference	  between	  Los	  Angeles	  and	  Cleveland),	  the	  overall	  balance	  of	  independent,	  non-­‐profit,	  and	  for-­‐profit	  charter	  schools,	  and	  the	  overall	  socioeconomic	  and	  racial	  profiles	  of	  the	  districts.	  This	  range	  of	  characteristics	  provides	  a	  diverse	  sample	  for	  analysis.	  Because	  of	  the	  purposeful	  selection	  of	  districts	  with	  disproportionately	  high	  numbers	  of	  charters,	  the	  results	  may	  not	  be	  generalizable	  to	  districts	  with	  lower	  concentrations	  of	  charter	  schools.	  However,	  the	  results	  may	  provide	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evidence	  of	  what	  could	  happen	  in	  other	  districts	  that	  pursue	  charter	  growth	  strategies	  similar	  to	  these	  districts.	  
	  
Database	  Construction	  
	   In	  order	  to	  get	  information	  for	  all	  public	  schools	  in	  the	  six	  target	  districts,	  the	  CCD	  was	  downloaded	  for	  each	  of	  the	  states	  in	  which	  the	  target	  districts	  are	  located	  (Arizona,	  California,	  Florida,	  Michigan,	  Ohio,	  Texas).	  For	  each	  state,	  all	  public	  schools	  were	  geolocated	  into	  ArcGIS	  using	  the	  detailed	  latitude	  and	  longitude	  data	  contained	  within	  the	  CCD.	  Then	  school	  district	  shapefiles	  were	  downloaded	  from	  the	  2010	  US	  Census.	  Every	  public	  school	  that	  was	  located	  within	  the	  target	  school	  district	  boundaries	  was	  selected,	  and	  all	  schools	  located	  outside	  district	  boundaries	  were	  eliminated.	  This	  left	  the	  schools	  located	  in	  each	  of	  the	  six	  target	  districts,	  which	  formed	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  sample	  of	  schools	  for	  the	  database.	  	   The	  database	  from	  Analysis	  1	  was	  cross-­‐referenced	  against	  the	  new	  database	  to	  identify	  for-­‐profit	  and	  non-­‐profit	  charter	  schools.	  The	  CCD	  includes	  a	  variable	  indicating	  whether	  a	  school	  is	  a	  charter,	  so	  schools	  identified	  as	  charters	  by	  the	  CCD	  that	  were	  not	  identified	  in	  the	  NEPC	  reports	  as	  for-­‐profit	  or	  non-­‐profit	  were	  labeled	  as	  independent	  charters.	  The	  resulting	  database	  has	  four	  categories	  of	  schools:	  for-­‐profit	  charters,	  non-­‐profit	  charters,	  independent	  charters,	  and	  non-­‐charter	  public	  schools.	  	  
	  
The	  American	  Community	  Survey	  Five-­Year	  Estimates	  (2008-­2012)	  	   The	  American	  Community	  Survey	  represents	  the	  ongoing	  work	  of	  the	  US	  Census	  Bureau	  to	  provide	  updates	  to	  the	  decennial	  census.	  In	  addition	  to	  providing	  yearly	  updates	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to	  census	  data,	  the	  ACS	  provides	  some	  unique	  data	  that	  is	  not	  available	  in	  the	  decennial	  census.	  Census	  block	  group	  level	  data	  on	  median	  income	  is	  not	  available	  from	  the	  census,	  but	  is	  included	  in	  ACS	  five-­‐year	  estimates.	  These	  statistics	  are	  presented	  as	  five-­‐year	  estimates	  because	  unlike	  the	  census,	  the	  ACS	  samples	  the	  population	  instead	  of	  attempting	  to	  survey	  all	  residents.	  Over	  five	  years	  of	  sampling,	  the	  estimates	  are	  considered	  to	  be	  relatively	  stable.	  Because	  all	  of	  the	  other	  data	  sources	  for	  the	  analysis	  are	  for	  the	  year	  2010	  or	  the	  school	  year	  2009-­‐2010,	  the	  ACS	  estimates	  for	  2008-­‐2012	  are	  used	  because	  they	  are	  centered	  on	  the	  year	  2010.	  This	  2008-­‐2012	  ACS	  estimates	  were	  downloaded	  from	  the	  ACS	  website	  (American	  Community	  Survey	  website).	  	   One	  variable	  was	  taken	  from	  the	  ACS	  2008-­‐2012	  dataset	  for	  this	  analysis:	  median	  household	  income	  by	  census	  block	  group.	  This	  variable	  is	  important	  because	  median	  household	  income	  level	  is	  one	  of	  the	  best	  indicators	  of	  a	  given	  area’s	  socioeconomic	  status.	  This	  variable	  will	  be	  used	  both	  to	  determine	  whether	  there	  are	  differences	  between	  the	  socioeconomic	  status	  where	  different	  types	  of	  schools	  are	  located,	  as	  well	  as	  to	  control	  for	  neighborhood	  socioeconomic	  status	  when	  analyzing	  the	  socioeconomic	  status	  of	  student	  enrollment	  patterns	  across	  different	  school	  types.	  Analysis	  1	  was	  conducted	  prior	  to	  the	  relevant	  ACS	  data	  being	  made	  available,	  but	  it	  was	  available	  at	  the	  time	  of	  Analysis	  2.	  Median	  income	  provides	  a	  clearer	  SES	  proxy	  so	  it	  was	  used	  once	  it	  was	  available.	  The	  ACS	  median	  household	  income	  data	  was	  downloaded,	  as	  well	  as	  2010	  US	  census	  racial	  composition	  data	  and	  census	  block	  group	  geometry.	  	  	   Each	  school	  from	  the	  database	  was	  geolocated	  into	  the	  CBG	  in	  which	  they	  are	  located	  using	  CCD	  latitude/longitude	  data.	  This	  allowed	  the	  appropriate	  CBG	  data	  to	  be	  attributed	  to	  schools.	  The	  resulting	  dataset	  includes	  school	  demographic	  information	  from	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the	  CCD,	  EMO	  data	  from	  the	  NEPC	  reports,	  CBG	  racial	  composition	  data	  from	  the	  2010	  US	  census,	  and	  median	  income	  data	  from	  the	  2008-­‐2012	  ACS.	  	  	  
Analytical	  Strategy:	  Logistic	  Regression	  	   Analysis	  1	  utilized	  varying	  intercepts	  multilevel	  modeling	  in	  order	  to	  account	  for	  the	  wide	  variety	  of	  different	  state	  contexts	  in	  the	  analysis.	  Analysis	  2	  conducts	  separate	  analyses	  for	  individual	  districts,	  making	  multilevel	  modeling	  unnecessary.	  For	  each	  of	  the	  six	  districts,	  thirty	  single	  variable	  and	  combined	  analyses	  were	  conducted	  (180	  total,	  detailed	  in	  Figure	  3.7).	  The	  eight	  predictor	  variables	  are;	  the	  proportion	  of	  school	  enrollment	  that	  is	  (1)	  Hispanic,	  (2)	  Black,	  (3)	  white,	  the	  proportion	  of	  the	  CBG	  population	  where	  the	  school	  is	  located	  that	  is	  (4)	  Hispanic,	  (5)	  Black,	  (6)	  white,	  (7)	  the	  proportion	  of	  enrolled	  students	  eligible	  for	  free	  or	  reduced-­‐price	  lunch	  and,	  (8)	  median	  family	  income	  of	  the	  CBG	  where	  the	  school	  is	  located.	  The	  geo-­‐demographic	  and	  enrollment	  variables	  were	  also	  combined.	  For	  example,	  the	  proportion	  of	  school	  enrollment	  that	  is	  Hispanic,	  along	  with	  the	  proportion	  of	  CBG	  population	  that	  is	  Hispanic	  both	  as	  predictors	  of	  school	  type.	  The	  equation	  form	  used	  is	  illustrated	  in	  Figure	  3.8.	  	   Each	  demographic	  factor	  is	  analyzed	  separately	  in	  order	  to	  discern	  whether	  there	  are	  evident	  disparities	  between	  different	  types	  of	  schools	  based	  on	  the	  prevalence	  of	  any	  racial	  group	  or	  the	  distribution	  of	  socioeconomic	  factors.	  The	  first	  step	  of	  the	  analysis	  analyzes	  the	  probability	  that	  charter	  status	  predicts	  enrollment	  or	  geo-­‐demographic	  differences.	  In	  this	  way,	  any	  differences	  between	  charters	  and	  non-­‐charters	  will	  be	  demonstrated.	  This	  is	  similar	  to	  the	  analytical	  strategy	  utilized	  in	  Analysis	  1,	  conducted	  at	  a	  district	  instead	  of	  a	  national	  level.	  After	  this,	  student	  enrollment	  and	  corresponding	  geo-­‐	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Figure	  3.8:	  Analytical	  Steps	  for	  Analysis	  2	  	  1.	  Socioeconomic	  status	  	   1.1.	  Regress	  charter	  status	  on	  CBG	  median	  income.	  	   1.2.	  Regress	  charter	  status	  on	  FRL	  proportion.	  	   1.3.	  Regress	  CBG	  median	  income	  and	  charter	  status	  on	  FRL	  proportion.	  	   1.4.	  Regress	  EMO/non-­‐EMO	  charter	  status	  on	  CBG	  median	  income.	  	   1.5.	  Regress	  EMO/non-­‐EMO	  charter	  status	  on	  FRL	  proportion.	  	   1.6.	  Regress	  CBG	  median	  income	  and	  EMO/non-­‐EMO	  charter	  status	  on	  FRL	  prop.	  	   1.7.	  Regress	  for-­‐profit/non-­‐profit	  status	  on	  CBG	  median	  income.	  	   1.8.	  Regress	  for-­‐profit/non-­‐profit	  status	  on	  FRL	  proportion.	  	   1.9.	  Regress	  CBG	  median	  income	  and	  for-­‐profit/non-­‐profit	  status	  on	  FRL	  proportion.	  	  2.	  Racial	  composition	  	   2.1.	  Regress	  charter	  status	  on	  CBG	  white	  population	  proportion.	  2.2.	  Regress	  charter	  status	  on	  CBG	  Hispanic	  population	  proportion.	  2.3.	  Regress	  charter	  status	  on	  CBG	  Black	  population	  proportion.	  2.4.	  Regress	  charter	  status	  on	  white	  enrollment	  proportion.	  2.5.	  Regress	  charter	  status	  on	  Hispanic	  enrollment	  proportion.	  2.6.	  Regress	  charter	  status	  on	  Black	  enrollment	  proportion.	  2.7.	  Regress	  CBG	  white	  pop.	  prop.	  and	  charter	  status	  on	  white	  enrollment	  2.8.	  Regress	  CBG	  Hispanic	  pop.	  prop.	  and	  charter	  status	  on	  Hispanic	  enrollment	  2.9.	  Regress	  CBG	  Black	  pop.	  prop.	  and	  charter	  status	  on	  Black	  enrollment	  2.10.	  Regress	  EMO/non-­‐EMO	  charter	  status	  on	  CBG	  white	  pop.	  proportion.	  2.11.	  Regress	  EMO/non-­‐EMO	  charter	  status	  on	  CBG	  Hispanic	  pop.	  proportion.	  2.12.	  Regress	  EMO/non-­‐EMO	  charter	  status	  on	  CBG	  Black	  pop.	  proportion.	  2.13.	  Regress	  EMO/non-­‐EMO	  charter	  status	  on	  white	  enrollment.	  2.14.	  Regress	  EMO/non-­‐EMO	  charter	  status	  on	  Hispanic	  enrollment.	  2.15.	  Regress	  EMO/non-­‐EMO	  charter	  status	  on	  Black	  enrollment.	  2.16.	  Regress	  for-­‐profit/non-­‐profit	  charter	  status	  on	  CBG	  white	  pop.	  proportion.	  2.17.	  Regress	  for-­‐profit/non-­‐profit	  charter	  status	  on	  CBG	  Hispanic	  pop.	  proportion.	  2.18.	  Regress	  for-­‐profit/non-­‐profit	  charter	  status	  on	  CBG	  Black	  pop.	  proportion.	  2.19.	  Regress	  for-­‐profit/non-­‐profit	  charter	  status	  on	  white	  enrollment.	  2.20.	  Regress	  for-­‐profit/non-­‐profit	  charter	  status	  on	  Hispanic	  enrollment.	  2.21.	  Regress	  for-­‐profit/non-­‐profit	  charter	  status	  on	  Black	  enrollment.	  	  A	  total	  of	  nine	  socioeconomic	  and	  twenty-­‐one	  racial	  composition	  analyses	  were	  conducted	  in	  each	  of	  six	  districts,	  for	  180	  total	  analyses.	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Figure	  3.9:	  Logistic	  Regression	  Equation	  for	  Analysis	  2	  	  	  Eight	  separate	  analyses	  were	  conducted	  for	  each	  of	  the	  six	  districts,	  using	  three	  different	  outcome	  variables	  Yi	  (144	  total	  separate	  analyses).	  Each	  used	  the	  same	  equation	  form:	  General	  Equation	  Form:	  Yi	  =	  βo	  +	  β1	  Xi	  +	  ri	  Where:	  
 Yi	  	  =	  The	  probability	  that	  a	  given	  school	  “i”	  is	  either	  
o A	  charter	  school	  or	  a	  non-­‐charter	  school,	  or	  
o A	  charter	  operated	  by	  a	  for-­‐profit	  or	  non-­‐profit	  EMO	  or	  
o An	  EMO-­‐operated	  charter	  school	  or	  an	  independent	  charter.	  
 βo	  	  =	  The	  fixed	  intercept	  value	  for	  the	  given	  equation	  
 β1	  	  =	  The	  value	  representing	  the	  overall	  slope	  of	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  given	  explanatory	  variable	  Xi	  and	  the	  dependent	  variable	  Yi.	  
 Xi	  =	  The	  value	  of	  the	  given	  explanatory	  variable	  for	  school	  “i”.	  	  
 ri	  =	  The	  error	  term	  (unmodeled	  variability)	  for	  school	  “i”.	  Xi	  	  refers	  to	  different	  racial	  and	  socioeconomic	  explanatory	  variables.	  For	  each	  of	  the	  six	  districts,	  six	  racial	  composition	  analyses	  were	  conducted,	  where:	  
 Xi	  =	  proportion	  of	  school	  enrollment	  that	  is	  Hispanic.	  
 Xi	  =	  proportion	  of	  school	  enrollment	  that	  is	  Black.	  
 Xi	  =	  proportion	  of	  school	  enrollment	  that	  is	  white.	  
 Xi	  =	  proportion	  of	  CBG	  population	  that	  is	  Hispanic.	  
 Xi	  =	  proportion	  of	  CBG	  population	  that	  is	  Black.	  
 Xi	  =	  proportion	  of	  CBG	  population	  that	  is	  white.	  For	  each	  of	  the	  districts,	  two	  socioeconomic	  composition	  analyses	  were	  conducted,	  where:	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 Xi	  =	  proportion	  of	  enrolled	  students	  eligible	  for	  free	  or	  reduced-­‐price	  lunch.	  
 Xi	  =	  median	  family	  income	  of	  CBG	  where	  school	  is	  located.	  	  demographic	  statistics	  are	  combined	  in	  the	  analysis	  in	  order	  to	  explore	  whether	  school	  location	  and/or	  non-­‐locational	  factors	  are	  significantly	  associated	  with	  any	  observed	  differences	  in	  student	  enrollment	  between	  charters	  and	  non-­‐charters.	  Than,	  similar	  analyses	  are	  conducted	  comparing	  for-­‐profit	  charters	  with	  non-­‐profit	  charters,	  and	  EMO	  charters	  versus	  independent	  charters.	  	   While	  Analysis	  1	  attempts	  to	  construct	  a	  single	  equation	  to	  explain	  the	  distinctive	  student	  enrollment	  patterns	  of	  for-­‐profit	  charter	  schools,	  Analysis	  2	  aims	  for	  a	  more	  detailed	  and	  granular	  analysis.	  In	  this	  way	  it	  is	  more	  of	  an	  exploratory	  analysis	  (Tukey,	  1977).	  Because	  there	  have	  been	  no	  studies	  examining	  market-­effects	  associated	  with	  the	  proliferation	  of	  for-­‐profit	  charter	  schools,	  this	  exploratory	  approach	  is	  warranted	  in	  order	  to	  broadly	  identify	  what,	  if	  any,	  sort	  of	  market-­effects	  may	  exist.	  By	  going	  through	  three	  stages	  of	  analysis	  it	  will	  be	  possible	  to	  compare	  (1)	  charter/non-­‐charter	  schools,	  (2)	  EMO-­‐operated	  charter/independent	  charter	  schools	  and	  (3)	  for-­‐profit/non-­‐profit	  charter	  school	  sorting	  patterns.	  Also,	  by	  introducing	  each	  predictor	  variable	  separately,	  it	  may	  be	  easier	  to	  isolate	  exactly	  what,	  if	  any	  sorts	  of	  differences	  there	  may	  be	  between	  the	  enrollment	  and	  geo-­‐demography	  of	  different	  school	  types	  in	  each	  of	  these	  districts.	  	  With	  each	  of	  these	  analyses	  conducted	  in	  six	  districts	  with	  three	  different	  levels	  of	  concentration	  of	  for-­‐profit	  charters,	  some	  indication	  of	  the	  impact	  of	  for-­‐profit	  charter	  school	  proliferation	  on	  broader	  student	  sorting	  patterns	  may	  be	  discernible.	  In	  this	  way,	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  discrete	  analyses	  are	  conducted	  to	  determine	  whether	  there	  is	  an	  organic	  emergence	  of	  evidence	  for	  a	  for-­‐
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profit	  market-­effect.	  After	  conducting	  these	  analyses,	  it	  will	  be	  determined	  whether	  the	  evidence	  calls	  for	  rejecting	  or	  failing	  to	  reject	  the	  market-­effect	  hypotheses	  of	  H4.	  This	  hypothesis	  stated	  that:	  In	  districts	  where	  for-­‐profit	  charter	  schools	  proliferate,	  charter	  schools	  as	  a	  whole	  are	  less	  likely	  than	  non-­‐charter	  schools	  to	  enroll	  non-­‐white	  and	  low-­‐income	  students	  compared	  to	  districts	  without	  for-­‐profit	  charters.	  	  	  
Discussion	  	   The	  results	  of	  these	  analyses	  will	  greatly	  expand	  the	  knowledge	  base	  of	  research	  on	  for-­‐profit	  charter	  schools	  and	  racial	  and	  socioeconomic	  segregation.	  Analysis	  1	  tests	  whether	  for-­‐profit	  charter	  schools’	  racial	  and	  socioeconomic	  enrollment	  patterns	  demonstrate	  that	  they	  are	  systematically	  likely	  to	  enroll	  demographically	  different	  student	  populations.	  Analysis	  2	  tests	  whether	  the	  entry	  of	  explicitly	  market-­‐oriented	  for-­‐profit	  charters	  into	  a	  district	  have	  broader	  impacts	  on	  overall	  charter/non-­‐charter	  student-­‐sorting	  patterns.	  If	  for-­‐profit	  charter	  schools	  really	  are	  uniquely	  incented	  to	  behave	  in	  particular	  ways	  in	  order	  to	  maximize	  profit,	  there	  should	  be	  some	  evidence	  from	  school	  location	  and	  student	  enrollment	  patterns.	  Further	  if	  there	  is	  some	  market-­effect	  associated	  with	  the	  proliferation	  of	  for-­‐profit	  charter	  schools,	  than	  a	  comparison	  of	  districts	  with	  dissimilar	  patterns	  of	  for-­‐profit	  charter	  proliferation	  may	  illuminate	  evidence	  of	  these	  effects.	  The	  next	  chapter	  details	  the	  results	  of	  these	  analyses.
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Chapter 4: Findings 	  	   This	  chapter	  details	  the	  findings	  of	  the	  analyses	  described	  in	  Chapter	  3.	  First,	  the	  results	  of	  Analysis	  1,	  a	  population-­‐level	  comparison	  of	  for-­‐profit	  and	  non-­‐profit	  charter	  schools	  will	  be	  discussed.	  Then	  the	  results	  of	  Analysis	  2,	  the	  exploration	  of	  student-­‐sorting	  patterns	  between	  all	  public	  school	  types	  across	  six	  diverse	  school	  districts	  will	  be	  described.	  A	  brief	  summary	  of	  the	  findings	  of	  the	  two	  analyses	  will	  be	  presented.	  This	  will	  set	  the	  stage	  for	  the	  final	  chapter	  of	  the	  dissertation,	  which	  will	  discuss	  the	  implications	  of	  these	  findings	  in	  greater	  detail	  and	  specify	  promising	  directions	  for	  future	  research.	  	  
FINDINGS	  FROM	  ANALYSIS	  1:	  1	  
Population	  Level	  Comparison	  of	  For-­Profit	  and	  Non-­Profit	  Operated	  Charter	  Schools2	  
Race	  and	  Profit	  Status	  	  The	  two	  research	  questions	  for	  exploring	  the	  relationship	  between	  race	  and	  profit	  status	  are	  as	  follows:	  1.1.	  Does	  the	  racial	  composition	  of	  the	  census	  block	  group	  where	  an	  EMO-­‐operated	  charter	  school	  is	  located	  predict	  the	  likelihood	  that	  the	  school	  is	  operated	  by	  a	  for-­‐profit	  corporation	  or	  a	  non-­‐profit	  organization?	  1.2.	  Does	  the	  racial	  composition	  of	  the	  student	  population	  of	  an	  EMO-­‐operated	  charter	  school	  predict	  the	  likelihood	  that	  the	  school	  is	  run	  by	  a	  for-­‐profit	  or	  non-­‐profit	  organization?	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Unless	  otherwise	  noted,	  any	  differences	  reported	  in	  this	  Chapter	  are	  statistically	  significant	  at	  α	  =	  0.05.	  2	  The	  results	  of	  the	  analysis	  described	  in	  this	  section	  were	  previously	  published	  by	  the	  author	  in	  Mapping	  the	  Profit	  Motive:	  The	  Distinct	  Geography	  and	  Demography	  of	  For-­‐Profit	  Charter	  Schools	  (Robertson,	  2015).	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   In	  order	  to	  test	  these	  questions,	  two	  analyses	  were	  conducted.	  To	  address	  question	  Q	  1.1,	  the	  racial	  composition	  of	  Census	  Block	  Groups	  (CBGs)	  where	  EMO-­‐operated	  schools	  were	  located	  was	  regressed	  on	  the	  for-­‐profit	  status	  of	  each	  school	  (Table	  4.1).	  Racial	  composition	  analyses	  were	  performed	  separately	  for	  three	  racial	  groups,	  using	  the	  proportion	  of	  (1)	  white,	  (2)	  Hispanic,	  and	  (3)	  Black	  population	  in	  a	  CBG.	  White	  student	  enrollment	  is	  of	  particular	  interest	  as	  H2	  hypothesizes	  that	  for-­‐profit	  charters	  may	  seek	  to	  over-­‐enroll	  white	  students.	  For	  these	  multilevel	  analyses,	  schools	  (level-­‐1)	  were	  nested	  in	  states	  (level-­‐2).	  There	  were	  no	  statistically	  significant	  relationships	  between	  any	  of	  the	  racial	  composition	  variables	  of	  the	  CBG	  where	  a	  school	  is	  located	  and	  the	  likelihood	  that	  it	  is	  for-­‐profit	  or	  non-­‐profit.	  To	  address	  question	  Q	  1.2	  the	  racial	  composition	  of	  the	  student	  population	  of	  EMO-­‐operated	  was	  regressed	  on	  the	  for-­‐profit	  status	  of	  each	  school.	  Again,	  three	  separate	  racial	  composition	  analyses	  were	  conducted	  for	  (1)	  white,	  (2)	  Hispanic,	  and	  (3)	  Black	  student	  population	  proportions.	  As	  with	  the	  CBG	  analysis,	  there	  were	  no	  statistically	  significant	  relationships	  between	  enrollment	  of	  any	  racial	  group	  and	  profit	  status	  (Table	  4.2).	  	  No	  evidence	  was	  found	  that	  charter	  schools	  operated	  by	  for-­‐profit	  versus	  non-­‐profit	  providers	  demonstrate	  statistically	  significantly	  different	  racial	  compositions,	  or	  that	  there	  were	  systematic	  differences	  in	  the	  racial	  demographics	  of	  the	  CBGs	  in	  which	  the	  schools	  are	  located.	  	  While	  there	  are	  no	  statistically	  significant	  relationships	  between	  racial	  composition	  and	  profit	  status	  nationally,	  this	  could	  be	  the	  result	  of	  state-­‐by	  state	  patterns	  that	  alternatively	  segregate	  (1)	  white	  students	  into	  for-­‐profit	  EMOCS	  and	  non-­‐white	  students	  into	  non-­‐profit	  EMOCS	  and	  (2)	  non-­‐white	  students	  into	  for-­‐profit	  EMOCS	  and	  white	  students	  into	  non-­‐profit	  EMOCS.	  	  As	  the	  literature	  on	  charter	  schools	  and	  racial	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Table	  4.1:	  Multilevel	  Log	  Regression	  of	  %	  White	  in	  CBG	  On	  For-­Profit	  Status	  FIXED	  EFFECTS	   Estimate	   Stand.	  Error	   z	  value	   pr>z	  	  	  	  	  	  Intercept	   -­‐0.161	   0.376	   	  -­‐0.428	   0.669	  	  	  	  	  	  %	  White	  in	  CBG	   	  0.503	   0.287	   	  	  1.753	   0.080	  	   	   	   	   	  RANDOM	  EFFECTS	   	   Variance	   Std.	  Deviation	   	  	  	  	  	  	  State	   Intercept	   2.853	   1.689	   	  AIC	  =	  1,251	  
	  
	  
Table	  4.2:	  Multilevel	  Log	  Regression	  of	  %	  White	  in	  Student	  Pop.	  On	  For-­Profit	  Status	  FIXED	  EFFECTS	   Estimate	   Stand.	  Error	   z	  value	   pr>z	  	  	  	  	  	  Intercept	   0.047	   0.358	   0.131	   0.896	  	  	  	  	  	  %	  White	  Studs.	   0.180	   0.263	   0.684	   0.494	  	   	   	   	   	  RANDOM	  EFFECTS	   	   Variance	   Std.	  Deviation	   	  	  	  	  	  	  State	   Intercept	   2.928	   1.711	   	  AIC	  =	  1,320	  	  segregation	  makes	  clear,	  the	  patterns	  associated	  with	  charter	  school	  growth	  are	  not	  necessarily	  consistent.	  Local	  dynamics	  can	  lead	  to	  charter	  schools	  being	  used	  alternatively	  by	  white	  families	  to	  avoid	  racially	  diverse	  traditional	  public	  schools,	  or	  as	  a	  mechanism	  to	  draw	  non-­‐white	  families	  away	  from	  racially	  diverse	  traditional	  public	  schools	  (Bifulco,	  Ladd	  &	  Ross,	  2009;	  Gulosino	  &	  D’Entremont,	  2011).	  Either	  pattern	  results	  in	  greater	  between-­‐school	  segregation.	  	  Figure	  4.1	  illustrates	  the	  state-­‐by-­‐state	  regressions	  of	  the	  relationship	  between	  white	  student	  percentage	  and	  for-­‐profit	  status.	  This	  Figure	  illustrates	  the	  wide	  variance	  in	  patterns	  across	  states.	  There	  are	  more	  states	  with	  a	  positive	  slope	  than	  a	  negative	  slope,	  indicating	  that	  the	  more	  common	  state	  pattern	  is	  for	  charter	  schools	  with	  higher	  proportions	  of	  white	  students	  to	  be	  more	  likely	  to	  be	  operated	  by	  for-­‐profit	  corporations	  than	  non-­‐profit	  organizations.	  However,	  this	  pattern	  is	  not	  universal,	  in	  some	  states	  there	  is	  little	  relationship	  between	  the	  two,	  and	  in	  a	  few,	  the	  pattern	  in	  reversed.	  The	  multilevel	  models	  confirm	  that	  there	  is	  no	  statistically	  consistent	  pattern	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Figure	  4.1:	  White	  Student	  Proportion	  By	  For/Non-­Profit	  Status	  By	  State*	  
	  
	  	  *	  Each	  state	  with	  at	  least	  one	  EMO-­‐operated	  non-­‐profit	  school.	  	  across	  all	  states	  in	  terms	  of	  racial	  composition	  and	  profit	  status.	  Thus,	  the	  analysis	  finds	  that	  neither	  the	  racial	  composition	  of	  the	  CBG	  where	  an	  EMO-­‐operated	  charter	  is	  located,	  nor	  the	  racial	  composition	  of	  the	  student	  population	  of	  an	  EMO-­‐operated	  charter	  predict	  the	  likelihood	  that	  the	  school	  is	  run	  by	  a	  for-­‐profit	  or	  non-­‐profit	  EMO.	  The	  answer	  to	  research	  questions	  1.1	  and	  1.2	  are	  that	  both	  the	  racial	  composition	  of	  a	  CBG	  where	  a	  school	  is	  located,	  and	  the	  racial	  composition	  of	  a	  school’s	  enrollment	  are	  not	  predictive	  of	  a	  school’s	  for-­‐profit/non-­‐profit	  status.	  It	  is	  thus	  possible,	  at	  the	  population	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level,	  to	  reject	  Hypothesis	  2,	  that	  for-­‐profit	  charter	  schools	  enroll	  white	  students	  at	  higher	  rates	  than	  other	  charter	  schools.	  	  
Socio-­Economic	  Indicators	  and	  Profit	  Status	  The	  research	  questions	  for	  testing	  the	  relationship	  between	  socio-­‐economic	  indicators	  and	  profit	  status	  were	  as	  follows:	  Q	  1.3.	  Do	  the	  rates	  of	  homeownership	  in	  a	  census	  block	  group	  where	  an	  EMO-­‐operated	  charter	  school	  is	  located	  predict	  the	  likelihood	  that	  the	  school	  is	  operated	  by	  a	  for-­‐profit	  corporation	  or	  a	  non-­‐profit	  organization?	  Q	  1.4.	  Does	  the	  Title-­‐I	  eligibility	  of	  an	  EMO-­‐operated	  charter	  school	  predict	  the	  likelihood	  that	  it	  is	  operated	  by	  a	  for-­‐profit	  corporation	  or	  a	  non-­‐profit	  organization?	  	  	   Median	  CBG	  rate	  of	  homeownership	  was	  found	  to	  be	  a	  significant	  predictor	  of	  whether	  an	  EMO-­‐operated	  charter	  school	  was	  likely	  to	  be	  operated	  by	  a	  for-­‐profit	  or	  non-­‐profit	  (Table	  4.3).	  Figure	  4.2	  provides	  a	  visual	  representation	  of	  the	  overall	  relationship	  between	  rates	  of	  homeownership	  and	  the	  predicted	  probability	  of	  a	  school’s	  for-­‐profit	  status.	  The	  model	  demonstrates	  a	  non-­‐significant	  intercept	  value,	  likely	  due	  to	  widely	  divergent	  property	  ownership	  rates	  in	  the	  different	  state	  contexts	  studied.	  This	  is	  why	  varying-­‐intercepts	  multilevel	  modeling	  was	  utilized	  for	  this	  analysis.	  Because	  of	  this,	  	  
	  
Table	  4.3:	  Multilevel	  Log	  Regression	  of	  %	  Homeownership	  On	  For-­Profit	  Status	  FIXED	  EFFECTS	   Estimate	   Stand.	  Error	   z	  value	   pr>z	  	  	  	  	  	  Intercept	   	  -­‐0.539	   0.375	   	  -­‐1.437	   0.151	  	  	  	  	  	  %	  Homeowner.	   1.493	   0.328	   4.561	   5	  x	  10-­‐06***	  	   	   	   	   	  RANDOM	  EFFECTS	   	   Variance	   Std.	  Deviation	   	  	  	  	  	  	  State	   Intercept	   2.871	   1.694	   	  AIC	  =	  1,232	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Figure	  4.2:	  Multilevel	  Log	  Regression	  of	  Homeownership	  On	  For-­Profit	  Status	  
	  the	  intercept	  value	  cannot	  be	  interpreted	  directly.	  However,	  there	  is	  a	  significant	  relationship	  between	  higher	  levels	  of	  property	  ownership	  in	  a	  CBG	  and	  higher	  probability	  that	  an	  EMOCS	  located	  in	  that	  CBG	  is	  for	  profit.	  Specifically,	  as	  CBG	  homeownership	  rates	  increase	  from	  0%	  to	  100%,	  the	  likelihood	  that	  a	  charter	  school	  located	  in	  that	  CBG	  is	  operated	  by	  a	  for-­‐profit	  corporation	  as	  opposed	  to	  a	  non-­‐profit	  organization	  increases	  32.8%.	  In	  other	  words,	  moving	  from	  CBGs	  with	  lower	  to	  higher	  rates	  of	  homeownership,	  there	  is	  a	  steadily	  increasing	  probability	  that	  a	  school	  located	  in	  that	  CBG	  would	  be	  a	  for-­‐profit	  charter	  (represented	  by	  the	  slope	  of	  Figure	  4.2).	  In	  short,	  for-­‐profit	  charter	  schools	  are	  less	  likely	  than	  non-­‐profits	  to	  locate	  in	  more	  socioeconomically	  distressed	  areas.	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  Title	  I	  eligible	  schools	  serve	  substantial	  proportions	  of	  low-­‐income	  students,	  making	  it	  is	  a	  useful	  proxy	  measure	  for	  determining	  the	  likelihood	  that	  a	  particular	  school	  serves	  predominantly	  lower-­‐income	  students.	  This	  study	  examines	  Title	  I	  eligibility	  rates	  because	  they	  approximate	  the	  rate	  at	  which	  for-­‐profit	  and	  non-­‐profit	  EMOs	  in	  practice	  proportionally	  educate	  a	  certain	  proportion	  of	  low-­‐income	  students.	  The	  majority	  of	  both	  for-­‐profit	  and	  non-­‐profit	  charter	  schools	  are	  Title	  I	  eligible,	  indicating	  that	  both	  types	  of	  schools	  educate	  lower	  socioeconomic	  status	  students,	  but	  there	  is	  a	  significant	  gap.	  It	  is	  more	  likely	  that	  an	  EMO-­‐operated	  charter	  school	  that	  is	  not	  a	  Title-­‐I	  school	  is	  operated	  by	  a	  for-­‐profit	  than	  a	  non-­‐profit	  provider.	  The	  Title	  I	  eligibility	  of	  a	  school	  is	  a	  significant	  predictor	  of	  whether	  that	  school	  is	  operated	  by	  a	  for-­‐profit	  or	  non-­‐profit	  EMO	  (Table	  4.4).	  Knowing	  that	  an	  EMO-­‐operated	  charter	  is	  Title-­‐I	  eligible	  greatly	  increases	  the	  probability	  that	  the	  school	  is	  non-­‐profit	  instead	  of	  for-­‐profit.	  Likewise,	  a	  school	  that	  is	  non	  Title-­‐I	  eligible	  is	  more	  likely	  to	  be	  operated	  by	  a	  for-­‐profit	  instead	  of	  a	  non-­‐profit	  EMO.	  As	  in	  the	  previous	  analysis,	  a	  non-­‐significant	  intercept	  value	  precludes	  a	  more	  direct	  interpretation	  of	  the	  values.	  For-­‐profit	  charter	  schools	  have	  a	  77%	  higher	  proportion	  of	  non	  Title-­‐I	  eligible	  schools	  compared	  to	  non-­‐profit	  charters,	  reflected	  in	  a	  non	  Title-­‐I	  eligibility	  rates	  of	  13%	  (96	  out	  of	  726)	  for	  non-­‐profit	  schools,	  while	  the	  figure	  for	  for-­‐profit	  charters	  is	  23%	  (144	  out	  of	  631)	  (Figure	  4.3).	  	   These	  findings	  suggest	  that	  at	  the	  population	  level,	  for-­‐profit	  and	  non-­‐profit	  EMO-­‐operated	  charter	  schools	  educate	  low-­‐income	  populations	  at	  different	  rates.	  This	  finding	  corresponds	  to	  the	  hypothesized	  relationship	  between	  schools	  operated	  by	  profit	  seeking	  enterprises	  and	  student	  population	  characteristics.	  The	  hypothesis	  held	  that	  in	  seeking	  to	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maximize	  profit,	  for-­‐profit	  charter	  operators	  have	  a	  clear	  incentive	  to	  avoid	  high-­‐risk	  student	  populations.	  Research	  shows	  that	  family	  socioeconomic	  status	  is	  one	  of	  the	  most	  important	  predictors	  of	  student	  performance	  (Rumberger	  &	  Palardy,	  2005;	  Borman	  &	  Dowling,	  2010).	  For-­‐profit	  schools	  are	  less	  likely	  to	  be	  Title-­‐I	  eligible,	  and	  more	  likely	  to	  locate	  in	  CBGs	  with	  higher	  rates	  of	  homeownership.	  This	  suggests	  that	  as	  a	  segment,	  they	  enroll	  a	  socioeconomically	  easier	  to	  educate	  student	  population.	  This	  may	  better	  position	  for-­‐profit	  EMOs	  to	  maximize	  their	  return	  on	  investment.	  The	  findings	  of	  this	  analysis	  are	  not	  sufficient	  to	  conclude	  that	  enrollment	  differences	  are	  the	  direct	  results	  of	  profit-­‐maximizing	  behaviors,	  but	  they	  do	  suggest	  that	  further	  analysis	  in	  this	  area	  is	  warranted.	  	  
	  










For-­‐Prozit	   Non-­‐Prozit	  
Non	  Title	  I	  Eligible	  Title	  I	  Eligible	  
	  	   97	  
Table	  4.4:	  Multilevel	  Log	  Regression	  of	  Title	  I	  Eligibility	  On	  For-­Profit	  Status	  FIXED	  EFFECTS	   Estimate	   Stand.	  Error	   z	  value	   pr>z	  	  	  	  	  	  Intercept	   	  -­‐0.072	   0.356	   	  -­‐0.201	   0.841	  	  	  	  	  	  TITLE	  I	  Eligible	   	  	  0.689	   0.214	   	  	  3.215	   0.001**	  	   	   	   	   	  RANDOM	  EFFECTS	   	   Variance	   Std.	  Deviation	   	  	  	  	  	  	  State	   Intercept	   3.329	   1.825	   	  AIC	  =	  1,301	  	  
Reviewing	  Hypotheses	  H1,	  H2,	  &	  H3	  
(H1):	  For-­‐profit	  charter	  schools	  are	  less	  likely	  than	  other	  types	  of	  charter	  schools	  to	  enroll	  low-­‐income	  students.	  	  	   There	  is	  evidence	  that	  for-­‐profit	  charter	  schools	  are	  less	  likely	  than	  non-­‐profit	  charter	  schools	  to	  enroll	  high	  proportions	  of	  low-­‐income	  students.	  The	  significance	  of	  Title-­‐I	  eligibility	  as	  a	  predictor	  of	  for-­‐profit/non-­‐profit	  status	  indicates	  that	  for-­‐profit	  charter	  schools	  are	  less	  likely	  than	  non-­‐profits	  to	  educate	  high	  proportions	  of	  low-­‐income	  students.	  Based	  on	  the	  findings	  of	  Analysis	  1,	  we	  must	  fail	  to	  reject	  Hypothesis	  1.	  	  
(H2):	  For-­‐profit	  charter	  schools	  are	  likely	  to	  enroll	  higher	  proportions	  of	  white	  students	  than	  other	  charter	  schools.	  	  	   Analysis	  1	  does	  not	  provide	  evidence	  to	  support	  the	  hypothesis	  that	  for-­‐profit	  charter	  schools	  enroll	  higher	  proportions	  of	  white	  students	  than	  non-­‐profit	  charter	  schools.	  There	  were	  no	  statistically	  significant	  differences	  in	  the	  racial	  composition	  of	  for-­‐profit	  charters	  as	  compared	  to	  non-­‐profit	  charters.	  There	  is	  no	  evidence	  to	  support	  a	  hypothesis	  of	  systematic	  racial	  sorting	  between	  for-­‐profit	  and	  non-­‐profit	  EMO-­‐operated	  charter	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schools.	  Thus	  at	  the	  population	  level,	  we	  can	  reject	  Hypothesis	  2.	  Analysis	  2	  may	  provide	  more	  detail	  on	  any	  disproportional	  racial	  enrollment	  patterns	  at	  the	  local	  level.	  	  	  
(H3):	  For-­‐profit	  charter	  schools	  use	  both	  geo-­‐demographic	  (school	  location)	  and	  non-­‐geo-­‐demographic	  strategies	  to	  cultivate	  student	  enrollment	  patterns	  consistent	  with	  H1	  and	  H2.	   	  The	  analysis	  provides	  evidence	  that	  for-­‐profit	  charter	  schools	  do	  locate	  in	  geo-­‐demographically	  different	  areas	  than	  non-­‐profit	  charters	  (locating	  in	  higher-­‐home-­‐ownership	  CBGs)	  and	  enroll	  fewer	  low-­‐income	  students	  (lower	  rates	  of	  Title-­‐I	  eligibility).	  Rates	  of	  homeownership	  in	  a	  CBG	  was	  shown	  to	  be	  a	  significant	  predictor	  of	  whether	  an	  EMO-­‐operated	  charter	  in	  that	  CBG	  was	  likely	  to	  be	  operated	  by	  a	  for-­‐profit	  or	  non-­‐profit.	  When	  controlling	  for	  homeownership	  rates,	  there	  is	  not	  a	  significant	  independent	  effect	  of	  Title-­‐I	  eligibility	  on	  for-­‐profit	  status.	  For	  this	  analysis,	  there	  is	  evidence	  that	  differences	  between	  for-­‐profit	  and	  non-­‐profit	  charters	  seem	  to	  be	  primarily	  driven	  by	  school	  location.	  Based	  on	  the	  available	  data,	  there	  is	  greater	  evidence	  of	  geo-­‐locational	  difference	  driving	  enrollment	  differences	  instead	  of	  non-­‐geo-­‐locational	  difference.	  Analysis	  2	  may	  provide	  more	  detail	  on	  how	  geo-­‐locational	  and	  other	  factors	  interact	  at	  the	  local	  level.	  	  	  
What	  Analysis	  #1	  Does	  and	  Does	  Not	  Reveal	  The	  results	  of	  Analysis	  #1	  provide	  evidence	  that	  there	  are	  differences	  in	  both	  the	  school	  location	  demographics	  and	  student	  enrollment	  demographics	  between	  for-­‐profit	  and	  non-­‐profit	  EMO-­‐operated	  charter	  schools	  with	  respect	  to	  socioeconomic	  status.	  There	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is	  no	  evidence	  that	  for-­‐profit	  and	  non-­‐profit	  charters	  are	  similarly	  systematically	  differentiated	  by	  racial	  enrollment	  or	  location	  patterns.	  The	  findings	  of	  Analysis	  #1	  provide	  evidence	  that	  for-­‐profit	  charters	  draw	  a	  student	  population	  that	  is	  socioeconomically	  dissimilar	  from	  non-­‐profit	  charters.	  This	  is	  the	  first	  national-­‐level	  analysis	  to	  demonstrate	  clear	  differences	  between	  the	  demographic	  student	  enrollments	  of	  for-­‐profit	  versus	  non-­‐profit	  charter	  schools.	  However,	  the	  analysis	  is	  limited	  in	  terms	  of	  revealing	  the	  impact	  of	  this	  dissimilarity	  relative	  to	  broader	  student-­‐sorting	  patterns	  across	  all	  school	  types	  in	  particular	  districts.	  	  When	  charter	  schools	  open	  in	  a	  district,	  there	  are	  many	  possible	  impacts	  on	  student	  sorting	  patterns.	  Most	  obviously,	  if	  overall	  district	  enrollment	  numbers	  remain	  stable,	  traditional	  public	  schools	  will	  see	  reduced	  overall	  enrollment	  when	  charters	  enter	  a	  district.	  This	  is	  likely	  to	  result	  in	  the	  closing	  of	  traditional	  public	  schools.	  In	  addition	  to	  the	  opening	  and	  closing	  of	  individual	  schools,	  there	  is	  likely	  to	  be	  a	  qualitative	  transformation	  in	  how	  schools	  attract	  students.	  The	  traditional	  public	  school	  model	  sub-­‐divides	  school	  districts	  into	  catchment	  zones.	  Residency	  determines	  a	  student’s	  zoned	  school,	  and	  the	  population	  of	  the	  catchment	  zone	  largely	  determines	  the	  population	  of	  the	  students	  in	  the	  school.	  In	  this	  scenario,	  marketing	  is	  largely	  irrelevant	  to	  public	  schools.	  The	  growth	  of	  charter	  schools	  is	  largely	  premised	  on	  the	  appeal	  of	  maximizing	  freedom	  of	  choice.	  This	  means	  that	  charters	  are	  encouraged	  to	  differentiate	  themselves	  through	  marketing	  (Lubienski,	  2005).	  When	  schools	  market	  themselves	  it	  is	  possible	  that	  students	  with	  similar	  characteristics	  may	  become	  more	  concentrated	  in	  schools	  that	  are	  marketed	  towards	  them.	  They	  alter	  student-­‐sorting	  patterns	  in	  ways	  that	  may	  exacerbate	  between-­‐school	  racial	  and/or	  socioeconomic	  segregation.	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Analysis	  1	  provides	  evidence	  that	  socioeconomic	  sorting	  processes	  lead	  to	  under-­‐representation	  of	  low-­‐income	  students	  in	  for-­‐profit	  charter	  schools.	  These	  sorting	  processes	  are	  likely	  to	  impact	  traditional	  public	  schools	  and	  independent	  charter	  schools	  as	  well.	  In	  order	  to	  determine	  how	  the	  entry	  of	  for-­‐profit	  charter	  schools	  effects	  student	  sorting	  patterns	  in	  school	  districts,	  Analysis	  2	  includes	  all	  public	  school	  types	  in	  six	  districts	  to	  determine	  if	  there	  is	  any	  market-­effect	  associated	  with	  the	  degree	  to	  which	  for-­‐profit	  charters	  proliferate.	  This	  dissertation	  hypothesizes	  that	  the	  marketing	  and	  school	  location	  strategies	  of	  individual	  for-­‐profit	  charter	  schools	  is	  likely	  to	  have	  a	  broader	  impact	  on	  student	  sorting	  patterns	  at	  the	  district	  level	  in	  the	  districts	  where	  they	  are	  present.	  Analysis	  2	  is	  designed	  to	  explore	  whether	  there	  is	  evidence	  that	  broader	  sorting	  patterns	  provide	  evidence	  of	  a	  for-­‐profit	  market-­effect.	  	  	  
Findings	  From	  Analysis	  2:	  Targeted	  Six	  District	  Sample	  	  Analysis	  2	  explores	  socioeconomic	  and	  racial	  differences	  in	  student	  enrollment	  and	  geo-­‐demographic	  location	  between	  four	  types	  of	  schools	  (non-­‐charters,	  independently	  operated	  charter	  schools,	  charters	  operated	  by	  non-­‐profit	  organizations,	  and	  charters	  operated	  by	  for-­‐profit	  corporations)	  in	  six	  different	  school	  districts.	  The	  first	  four	  research	  questions	  parallel	  the	  questions	  from	  Analysis	  1,	  while	  including	  all	  public	  school	  types.	  The	  questions	  are:	  Q	  2.1	  Do	  charter	  schools	  and	  non-­‐charter	  schools	  enroll	  statistically	  different	  proportions	  of	  students	  of	  three	  different	  racial	  groups	  (Black,	  white,	  Hispanic)?	  Do	  different	  types	  of	  charter	  schools	  (independent,	  non-­‐profit,	  for-­‐profit)	  enroll	  statistically	  different	  proportions	  of	  students	  of	  three	  different	  racial	  groups	  (Black,	  white,	  Hispanic)?	  	  Q	  2.2	  Do	  charter	  schools	  locate	  in	  CBGs	  with	  statistically	  different	  proportions	  
	  	   101	  
of	  residents	  of	  three	  different	  racial	  groups	  (Black,	  white,	  Hispanic)?	  Do	  different	  types	  of	  charter	  schools	  (independent,	  non-­‐profit,	  for-­‐profit)	  locate	  in	  CBGs	  with	  statistically	  different	  proportions	  of	  residents	  of	  three	  different	  racial	  groups	  (Black,	  white,	  Hispanic)?	  	  Q	  2.3.	  Do	  charter	  schools	  and	  non-­‐charter	  schools	  enroll	  statistically	  different	  proportions	  of	  the	  students	  eligible	  for	  free	  or	  reduced	  price	  lunch?	  Do	  different	  types	  of	  charter	  schools	  (independent,	  non-­‐profit,	  for-­‐profit)	  enroll	  statistically	  different	  proportions	  of	  the	  students	  eligible	  for	  free	  or	  reduced	  price	  lunch?	  Q	  2.4.	  Do	  charter	  schools	  and	  non-­‐charter	  schools	  locate	  in	  CBGs	  with	  statistically	  different	  median	  family	  incomes?	  Do	  different	  types	  of	  charter	  schools	  (independent,	  non-­‐profit,	  for-­‐profit)	  locate	  in	  CBGs	  with	  statistically	  different	  median	  family	  incomes?	  	  The	  first	  four	  research	  questions	  for	  Analysis	  2	  explore	  differences	  between	  enrollment	  patterns	  of	  different	  school	  types	  in	  three	  different	  types	  of	  districts,	  1)	  districts	  that	  have	  non-­‐profit	  but	  not	  for-­‐profit	  charters,	  2)	  districts	  with	  a	  mix	  of	  non-­‐profit	  and	  for-­‐profit	  charters,	  and	  3)	  districts	  with	  primarily	  for-­‐profit	  charters,	  in	  order	  to	  determine	  whether	  student	  sorting	  patterns	  differ	  according	  to	  the	  level	  of	  for-­‐profit	  charter	  proliferation.	  By	  addressing	  these	  four	  questions	  across	  six	  diverse	  districts,	  the	  results	  are	  intended	  to	  provide	  insight	  into	  the	  final	  two	  research	  questions:	  Q	  2.5.	  Do	  differences	  in	  student	  racial	  enrollment	  patterns	  between	  charters	  and	  non-­‐charters	  vary	  systematically	  according	  to	  the	  proportion	  of	  charter	  schools	  that	  are	  operated	  by	  for-­‐profit	  corporations	  in	  the	  districts?	  Q	  2.6.	  Do	  differences	  in	  student	  socioeconomic	  enrollment	  patterns	  between	  charters	  and	  non-­‐charters	  vary	  systematically	  according	  to	  the	  proportion	  of	  charter	  schools	  that	  are	  operated	  by	  for-­‐profit	  corporations	  in	  a	  given	  district?	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There	  were	  nine	  different	  socioeconomic	  analyses	  and	  twenty-­‐one	  different	  racial	  analyses	  conducted	  for	  each	  of	  the	  six	  districts	  (180	  total,	  see	  Figure	  3.8).	  Because	  of	  the	  large	  number	  of	  analyses,	  the	  complete	  results	  will	  not	  be	  reported	  in	  the	  text	  of	  this	  Chapter.	  Appendix	  3	  contains	  complete	  results.	  For	  each	  district,	  key	  findings	  will	  be	  discussed,	  accompanied	  by	  a	  summary	  table	  of	  racial	  and	  socioeconomic	  analyses.	  For	  each	  district,	  the	  proportion	  of	  enrolled	  students	  of	  different	  racial	  groups	  (Black,	  white,	  Hispanic),	  and	  socioeconomic	  statuses	  (based	  on	  free	  or	  reduced	  lunch	  eligibility	  rates)	  are	  compared	  across	  the	  four	  school	  types	  to	  determine	  if	  significant	  differences	  exist.	  The	  racial	  and	  socioeconomic	  demography	  of	  the	  CBGs	  where	  schools	  are	  located	  is	  also	  compared.	  Then	  the	  enrollment	  and	  demographic	  variables	  are	  combined.	  The	  purpose	  of	  this	  strategy	  is	  to	  determine	  how	  location	  and	  non-­‐location-­‐based	  factors	  play	  into	  how	  charter/non-­‐charter	  student-­‐sorting	  patterns	  unfold	  in	  the	  districts.	  In	  this	  way,	  the	  analysis	  also	  explores	  whether	  patterns	  of	  racial	  and	  socioeconomic	  difference	  between	  charter	  schools	  and	  non-­‐charters	  varies	  across	  districts	  based	  on	  the	  proliferation	  of	  for-­‐profit	  charter	  schools	  in	  the	  district.	  The	  key	  purpose	  of	  Analysis	  2	  is	  to	  better	  understand	  whether	  there	  may	  be	  a	  racial	  and/or	  socioeconomic	  market-­effect	  associated	  with	  for-­‐profit	  charter	  schools	  that	  more	  broadly	  influences	  student-­‐sorting	  patterns	  in	  ways	  that	  may	  impact	  racial	  and	  socioeconomic	  segregation.	  	  The	  six	  districts	  (Houston	  Independent	  School	  District	  (Houston),	  TX,	  Los	  Angeles	  Unified	  School	  District	  (Los	  Angeles),	  CA,	  Cleveland	  Metropolitan	  School	  District	  (Cleveland),	  OH,	  Tucson	  Unified	  School	  District	  (Tucson),	  AZ,	  Miami-­‐Dade	  County	  Public	  Schools	  (Miami),	  FL	  and	  Detroit	  Public	  Schools	  (Detroit),	  MI)	  were	  selected	  because	  they	  represent	  the	  six	  states	  where	  the	  large	  majority	  of	  EMO-­‐operated	  (non-­‐profit	  and	  for-­‐
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profit)	  charter	  schools	  are	  located,	  and	  because	  each	  is	  the	  largest,	  highly	  chartered	  (indicating	  either	  at	  least	  one-­‐third	  of	  all	  schools	  in	  the	  district	  are	  charters	  and/or	  at	  least	  90	  total	  charter	  schools	  in	  the	  district),	  urban	  district	  in	  the	  State.	  Two	  of	  the	  districts	  had	  no	  for-­‐profit	  charters	  (Houston	  and	  Los	  Angeles),	  two	  had	  a	  relatively	  equal	  mix	  of	  for-­‐profit	  and	  non-­‐profit	  charters	  (Cleveland	  and	  Tucson),	  and	  two	  had	  predominantly	  for-­‐profit	  charter	  schools	  (Miami	  and	  Detroit).	  By	  including	  districts	  with	  three	  different	  levels	  of	  for-­‐profit	  charters,	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  compare	  how	  students	  are	  sorted	  in	  highly	  chartered	  school	  districts	  with	  varying	  concentrations	  of	  for-­‐profit	  charters.	  This	  should	  provide	  evidence	  about	  whether	  the	  proliferation	  of	  for-­‐profit	  charter	  schools	  in	  a	  district	  impacts	  racial	  and/or	  socioeconomic	  student	  sorting	  patterns	  in	  that	  district.	  	  Because	  for-­‐profit	  charter	  schools	  were	  found	  to	  enroll	  fewer	  low-­‐income	  students	  in	  Analysis	  1,	  this	  analysis	  will	  provide	  insight	  into	  whether	  and	  how	  this	  translates	  into	  broader	  district	  sorting	  patterns.	  This	  serves	  as	  a	  test	  of	  Hypothesis	  4,	  which	  states	  that:	  in	  districts	  where	  for-­‐profit	  charter	  schools	  proliferate,	  charter	  schools	  as	  a	  whole	  are	  less	  likely	  than	  non-­‐charter	  schools	  to	  enroll	  non-­‐white	  and	  low-­‐income	  students	  compared	  to	  districts	  without	  for-­‐profit	  charters.	  	  	  
Districts	  With	  No	  For-­Profit	  Charter	  Schools	  
Houston	  Independent	  School	  District,	  Texas	  	   In	  Houston,	  29.7%	  of	  public	  schools	  are	  charters	  (18.7%	  independent,	  11.0%	  non-­‐profit,	  108	  total	  charter	  schools).	  Houston	  charters	  locate	  in	  CBGs	  where	  the	  median	  income	  is	  $6,736	  lower	  than	  the	  median	  income	  where	  non-­‐charters	  locate	  (Table	  4.5).	  Houston	  is	  the	  only	  district	  of	  the	  six	  where	  charter	  schools	  locate	  in	  CBGs	  with	  statistically	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different	  median	  income	  levels	  than	  non-­‐charter	  schools.	  Charter	  status	  was	  also	  predictive	  of	  free/reduced	  lunch	  eligibility	  rates,	  with	  charter	  schools	  enrolling	  21.4%	  higher	  proportions	  of	  free/reduced	  lunch	  eligible	  students	  than	  non-­‐charters.	  After	  controlling	  for	  the	  median	  family	  income	  in	  the	  CBG	  where	  a	  school	  is	  located,	  charter	  schools	  average	  a	  20.4%	  higher	  percentage	  of	  free-­‐and-­‐reduced	  lunch	  eligible	  students	  than	  non-­‐charter	  schools.	  Non-­‐profit	  charters	  have	  a	  free/reduced	  lunch	  enrollment	  rate	  significantly	  higher	  than	  independent	  charter	  schools,	  although	  both	  groups	  enroll	  substantially	  more	  than	  non-­‐charters.	  Disaggregating	  by	  school	  type,	  non-­‐charters	  in	  Houston	  average	  50.3%	  free	  or	  reduced	  lunch	  students,	  independent	  charters	  average	  63.1%,	  and	  non-­‐profit	  charters	  average	  86.1%.	  There	  is	  a	  clear	  gap	  in	  free/reduced	  lunch	  eligibility	  rates	  between	  charters	  and	  non-­‐charters	  in	  Houston,	  and	  the	  gap	  grows	  when	  comparing	  non-­‐profit	  charters	  to	  non-­‐charter	  schools.	  The	  socioeconomic	  pattern	  in	  Houston	  is	  clear.	  Charter	  schools	  of	  all	  types	  tend	  to	  locate	  in	  poorer	  neighborhoods	  than	  non-­‐charter	  schools.	  Even	  after	  accounting	  for	  this	  difference,	  charter	  schools	  disproportionately	  over-­‐enroll	  low-­‐income	  students.	  This	  indicates	  that	  charter	  schools	  locate	  in	  lower-­‐income	  neighborhoods	  than	  non-­‐charters,	  and	  enroll	  even	  higher	  proportions	  of	  low-­‐income	  students	  than	  would	  be	  expected	  by	  their	  location.	  This	  is	  evidence	  that	  Houston	  charter	  schools,	  by	  and	  large,	  appear	  to	  be	  operating	  in	  a	  mission-­‐oriented	  fashion,	  and	  providing	  education	  to	  the	  most	  socioeconomically	  underprivileged	  students	  both	  by	  locating	  in	  poorer	  neighborhoods	  and	  disproportionately	  enrolling	  low-­‐income	  students.	  	   Charter	  schools	  locate	  in	  neighborhoods	  that	  on	  average	  have	  a	  9.0%	  lower	  proportion	  of	  white	  population	  and	  a	  corresponding	  9.0%	  higher	  Black	  population	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Table	  4.5:	  Houston	  Results	  Summary	  	  
	  Outcome	  Var.	   Predictor	  Var.	   Parameter	  Est.	   Std.	  Error	   t-­‐value	  	   	   	   	   	  CBG	  Median	   Intercept	   41,126	   1,535	   26.80	  *	  Income	   Charter	   -­‐6,736	   2,818	   -­‐2.39	  *	  	   	   	   	   	  Free/Reduced	   Intercept	   0.503	   0.012	   43.35	  *	  Lunch	  Elig.	   Charter	   0.214	   0.021	   10.06	  *	  	   	   	   	   	  Free/Reduced	   Intercept	   0.568	   0.038	   25.451	  *	  Lunch	  Elig.	   Med.	  Income	   -­‐0.000002	   0.0000004	   -­‐4.065	  *	  w/	  Income	  Cont.	   Charter	   0.203	   0.021	   9.69	  *	  	   	   	   	   	  White	  Stud.	   Intercept	   0.068	   0.007	   9.878	  *	  Enrollment	  %	   Charter	   -­‐0.035	   0.013	   -­‐2.738	  *	  	   	   	   	   	  Hispanic	  Stud.	  	   Intercept	   0.598	   0.019	   31.44	  *	  Enrollment	  %	   Charter	   -­‐0.050	   0.035	   -­‐1.44	  	   	   	   	   	  Black	  Stud.	  	   Intercept	   0.296	   0.019	   15.965	  *	  Enrollment	  %	   Charter	   0.098	   0.034	   2.892	  *	  	   	   	   	   	  White	  Prop.	  	   Intercept	   0.498	   0.016	   31.283	  In	  CBG	  Pop.	   Charter	   -­‐0.090	   0.029	   -­‐3.084	  *	  	   	   	   	   	  Hispanic	  Prop.	   Intercept	   0.471	   0.019	   24.643	  *	  In	  CBG	  Pop.	   Charter	   -­‐0.024	   0.0349	   -­‐0.681	  	   	   	   	   	  Black	  Prop.	   Intercept	   0.259	   0.019	   13.377	  *	  In	  CBG	  Pop.	   Charter	   0.090	   0.035	   2.533	  *	  	   	   	   	   	  White	  Stud.	  	   Intercept	   -­‐0.019	   0.012	   -­‐1.586	  Enrollment	  %	   White	  Pop.	  %	   0.176	   0.021	   8.406	  *	  w/	  race	  cont.	   Charter	   -­‐0.019	   0.012	   -­‐1.634	  	   	   	   	   	  Hispanic	  Stud.	   Intercept	   0.246	   0.020	   12.106	  Enrollment	  %	   Hisp.	  Pop.	  %	   0.757	   0.034	   22.148	  *	  w/	  race	  cont.	   Charter	   -­‐0.036	   0.023	   -­‐1.587	  	   	   	   	   	  Black	  Stud.	   Intercept	   0.101	   0.014	   7.002	  *	  Enrollment	  %	   Black	  Pop.	  %	   0.737	   0.032	   23.071	  *	  w/	  race	  cont.	   Charter	   0.037	   0.022	   1.691	  *	  significant	  at	  α	  =	  0.05	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compared	  to	  neighborhoods	  where	  non-­‐charters	  are	  located.	  Houston	  charters	  have	  9.8%	  higher	  rates	  of	  Black	  student	  enrollment	  and	  a	  3.5%	  lower	  rate	  of	  white	  enrollment	  than	  non-­‐charters.	  There	  are	  no	  statistically	  significant	  differences	  for	  Hispanic	  student	  or	  CBG	  proportions.	  After	  controlling	  for	  the	  racial	  composition	  of	  the	  CBG	  where	  schools	  are	  located,	  there	  were	  no	  statistically	  significant	  differences	  between	  charter	  schools	  and	  non-­‐charters	  in	  the	  proportion	  of	  Black,	  Hispanic	  or	  white	  students	  enrolled.	  This	  indicates	  that	  the	  racial	  enrollment	  differences	  in	  Houston	  are	  largely	  attributable	  to	  school	  location.	  There	  were	  no	  statistically	  significant	  differences	  found	  between	  the	  racial	  composition	  of	  non-­‐profit	  and	  independent	  charter	  schools.	  The	  proportional	  over-­‐enrollment	  of	  Black	  students	  and	  under-­‐enrollment	  of	  white	  students	  provides	  more	  evidence	  that	  Houston	  charter	  schools	  appear	  to	  follow	  a	  mission-­‐oriented	  approach,	  by	  locating	  in	  neighborhoods	  and	  disproportionately	  enrolling	  traditionally	  under-­‐served	  Black	  students.	  In	  summary,	  in	  Houston,	  both	  non-­‐profit	  and	  independent	  charter	  schools	  enroll	  more	  free/reduced	  lunch	  eligible	  students,	  fewer	  white	  students,	  and	  more	  Black	  students	  than	  non-­‐charters.	  	   	  
Los	  Angeles	  Unified	  School	  District,	  California	  	   In	  Los	  Angeles	  20.6%	  of	  public	  schools	  are	  charters	  (14.7%	  independent,	  5.9%	  non-­‐profit,	  189	  total	  charter	  schools).	  Charter	  schools	  do	  not	  locate	  in	  CBGs	  with	  statistically	  different	  levels	  of	  median	  income	  than	  non-­‐charters.	  Despite	  this,	  charter	  status	  was	  predictive	  of	  a	  school’s	  free/reduced	  lunch	  eligibility	  rate.	  Charter	  schools	  enroll	  an	  8.4%	  higher	  proportion	  of	  free	  and	  reduced	  lunch	  students	  than	  non-­‐charters.	  After	  controlling	  for	  the	  median	  family	  income	  in	  the	  CBG	  where	  a	  school	  is	  located,	  charter	  schools	  average	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7.6%	  higher	  proportion	  of	  free-­‐and-­‐reduced	  lunch	  eligible	  students	  than	  non-­‐charter	  schools.	  This	  indicates	  that	  charter/non-­‐charter	  differences	  in	  free/reduced	  lunch	  eligibility	  rates	  in	  Los	  Angeles	  seem	  to	  be	  driven	  by	  factors	  other	  than	  the	  socio-­‐demographic	  location	  of	  schools.	  Independent	  charters	  in	  Los	  Angeles	  have	  a	  9.9%	  higher	  percentage	  of	  free/reduced	  lunch	  students,	  while	  non-­‐profit	  charters	  have	  a	  4.3%	  higher	  percentage	  than	  non-­‐charter	  schools.	  In	  Los	  Angeles,	  independent	  charters	  are	  more	  likely	  than	  non-­‐profit	  charters	  to	  serve	  low-­‐income	  students,	  but	  both	  segments	  disproportionately	  serve	  low-­‐income	  students	  relative	  to	  non-­‐charter	  schools.	  	   Los	  Angeles	  charters	  locate	  in	  CBGs	  with	  a	  6.3%	  lower	  proportion	  of	  white	  students	  and	  a	  6.8%	  higher	  proportion	  of	  Black	  students.	  Charter	  schools	  do	  not	  enroll	  distinct	  proportions	  of	  white	  students.	  They	  under-­‐enroll	  Hispanic	  students	  by	  12.7%	  and	  over-­‐enroll	  Black	  students	  by	  8.8%	  relative	  to	  non-­‐charters.	  After	  controlling	  for	  the	  racial	  composition	  of	  the	  CBGs	  where	  schools	  are	  located,	  charter	  schools	  enroll	  statistically	  different	  proportions	  of	  all	  three	  racial	  groups.	  Charters	  enroll	  4.6%	  more	  white	  students	  than	  non-­‐charters,	  12.2%	  fewer	  Hispanic	  students	  than	  non-­‐charters,	  and	  3.1%	  more	  Black	  students	  than	  non-­‐charters	  (Table	  4.6).	  This	  indicates	  that,	  relative	  to	  the	  racial	  composition	  of	  CBGs	  where	  they	  are	  located,	  Black	  and	  white	  students	  are	  proportionally	  over-­‐represented,	  and	  Hispanic	  students	  are	  under-­‐represented	  in	  charters.	  Disaggregating	  charters	  by	  type,	  EMO-­‐operated	  charter	  schools	  enroll	  white	  students	  at	  a	  rate	  10.5%	  lower	  than	  non	  EMO-­‐operated	  charters.	  The	  charter/non-­‐charter	  difference	  in	  white	  enrollment	  is	  driven	  by	  independent	  charter	  schools	  over-­‐enrolling	  white	  students.	  Mean	  white	  student	  proportions	  in	  non-­‐charter	  schools	  are	  8.8%,	  for	  independent	  charters	  13.8%,	  and	  in	  non-­‐profit	  charter	  schools	  0.6%.	  The	  very	  low	  non-­‐profit	  charter	  school	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Table	  4.6:	  Los	  Angeles	  Results	  Summary	  
	  Outcome	  Var.	   Predictor	  Var.	   Parameter	  Est.	   Std.	  Error	   t-­‐value	  	   	   	   	   	  CBG	  Median	   Intercept	   46,571	   972	   47.924	  *	  Income	   Charter	   -­‐2,584	   2,138	   -­‐1.209	  	   	   	   	   	  Free/Reduced	   Intercept	   0.612	   0.009	   67.858	  *	  Lunch	  Elig.	   Charter	   0.084	   0.020	   4.241	  *	  	   	   	   	   	  Free/Reduced	   Intercept	   0.753	   0.037	   24.755	  *	  Lunch	  Elig.	   Med.	  Income	   -­‐0.000003	   0.0000003	   -­‐10.395	  *	  w/	  Income	  Cont.	   Charter	   0.076	   0.019	   4.045	  *	  	   	   	   	   	  White	  Stud.	   Intercept	   0.088	   0.006	   14.168	  *	  Enrollment	  %	   Charter	   0.012	   0.014	   0.873	  	   	   	   	   	  Hispanic	  Stud.	  	   Intercept	   0.734	   0.010	   72.978	  *	  Enrollment	  %	   Charter	   -­‐0.127	   0.022	   -­‐5.724	  *	  	   	   	   	   	  Black	  Stud.	  	   Intercept	   0.104	   0.007	   14.624	  *	  Enrollment	  %	   Charter	   0.088	   0.016	   5.645	  *	  	   	   	   	   	  White	  Prop.	  	   Intercept	   0.473	   0.007	   65.286	  *	  In	  CBG	  Pop.	   Charter	   -­‐0.063	   0.016	   -­‐3.935	  *	  	   	   	   	   	  Hispanic	  Prop.	   Intercept	   0.562	   0.011	   50.874	  *	  In	  CBG	  Pop.	   Charter	   -­‐0.007	   0.024	   -­‐0.298	  	   	   	   	   	  Black	  Prop.	   Intercept	   0.098	   0.007	   15.055	  *	  In	  CBG	  Pop.	   Charter	   0.068	   0.014	   4.739	  *	  	   	   	   	   	  White	  Stud.	  	   Intercept	   -­‐0.172	   0.0114	   -­‐15.126	  *	  Enrollment	  %	   White	  Pop.	  %	   0.549	   0.022	   25.204	  *	  w/	  race	  cont.	   Charter	   0.046	   0.011	   4.381	  *	  	   	   	   	   	  Hispanic	  Stud.	   Intercept	   0.353	   0.013	   26.838	  *	  Enrollment	  %	   Hisp.	  Pop	  %	   0.675	   0.020	   33.74	  *	  w/	  race	  cont.	   Charter	   -­‐0.122	   0.015	   -­‐8.244	  *	  	   	   	   	   	  Black	  Stud.	   Intercept	   0.021	   0.005	   4.211	  *	  Enrollment	  %	   Black	  Pop.	  %	   0.843	   0.023	   36.794	  *	  w/	  race	  cont.	   Charter	   0.031	   0.010	   3.084	  *	  *	  significant	  at	  α	  =	  0.05	  	  
	  	   109	  
white	  student	  proportion	  suggests	  that	  they	  may	  be	  explicitly	  targeting	  non-­‐white	  student	  populations	  in	  Los	  Angeles.	  It	  also	  suggests	  that	  there	  may	  be	  substantial	  differences	  between	  the	  racial	  enrollment	  strategies	  of	  non-­‐profit	  and	  independent	  charters.	  However,	  independent	  charters	  enroll	  the	  highest	  proportion	  of	  free/reduced	  lunch	  students	  of	  all	  school	  segments	  in	  Los	  Angeles,	  which	  would	  not	  likely	  be	  the	  case	  if	  these	  schools	  were	  systematically	  profit-­‐oriented.	  The	  socioeconomic	  enrollment	  patterns	  provide	  strong	  evidence	  that	  both	  non-­‐profit	  and	  independent	  charters	  operate	  in	  a	  mission-­‐oriented	  fashion	  in	  Los	  Angeles.	  	  
Districts	  With	  Substantial	  Numbers	  of	  Both	  Non-­Profit	  and	  For-­Profit	  Charters	  
Tucson	  Unified	  School	  District,	  Arizona	  	   In	  Tucson,	  34%	  of	  public	  schools	  are	  charters	  (15%	  independent,	  13%	  non-­‐profit,	  6%	  for-­‐profit,	  50	  total	  charters).	  Charter	  status	  was	  not	  predictive	  of	  CBG	  median	  income,	  but	  was	  predictive	  of	  free/reduced	  lunch	  eligibility	  rates.	  Charter	  schools	  educate	  an	  11.8%	  lower	  proportion	  of	  free/reduced	  lunch	  eligible	  students	  After	  controlling	  for	  the	  median	  family	  income	  in	  the	  CBG	  where	  a	  school	  is	  located,	  charter	  schools	  average	  a	  statistically	  significant	  12.3%	  lower	  percentage	  of	  free-­‐and-­‐reduced	  lunch	  eligible	  students	  than	  non-­‐charter	  schools	  located	  in	  CBGs	  with	  the	  same	  median	  income	  (Table	  4.7).	  In	  Tucson,	  all	  charter	  school	  types,	  independent,	  non-­‐profit,	  and	  for-­‐profit	  charter	  schools	  enroll	  lower	  proportions	  of	  low-­‐income	  students	  than	  non-­‐charter	  schools.	  This	  is	  a	  reversal	  of	  the	  pattern	  in	  Los	  Angeles	  and	  Houston	  where	  non-­‐profit	  and	  independent	  charters	  over-­‐enrolled	  free/reduced	  lunch	  eligible	  students	  relative	  to	  non-­‐charters.	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Table	  4.7:	  Tucson	  Results	  Summary	  
	  Outcome	  Var.	   Predictor	  Var.	   Parameter	  Est.	   Std.	  Error	   t-­‐value	  	   	   	   	   	  CBG	  Median	   Intercept	   39,137	   1,801	   21.734	  *	  Income	   Charter	   -­‐972	   3,067	   0.752	  	   	   	   	   	  Free/Reduced	   Intercept	   0.578	   0.027	   21.389	  *	  Lunch	  Elig.	   Charter	   -­‐0.118	   0.046	   -­‐2.563	  *	  	   	   	   	   	  Free/Reduced	   Intercept	   0.782	   0.087	   6.202	  *	  Lunch	  Elig.	   Med.	  Income	   -­‐0.000005	   0.000001	   -­‐4.420	  *	  w/	  Income	  Cont.	   Charter	   -­‐0.123	   0.043	   -­‐2.841	  *	  	   	   	   	   	  White	  Stud.	   Intercept	   0.240	   0.022	   11.17	  *	  Enrollment	  %	   Charter	   0.102	   0.037	   2.79	  *	  	   	   	   	   	  Hispanic	  Stud.	  	   Intercept	   0.607	   0.024	   25.228	  *	  Enrollment	  %	   Charter	   -­‐0.104	   0.041	   -­‐2.537	  *	  	   	   	   	   	  Black	  Stud.	  	   Intercept	   0.056	   0.004	   12.711	  *	  Enrollment	  %	   Charter	   -­‐0.007	   0.007	   -­‐0.886	  	   	   	   	   	  White	  Prop.	  	   Intercept	   0.712	   0.015	   49.09	  *	  In	  CBG	  Pop.	   Charter	   -­‐0.011	   0.025	   -­‐0.44	  	   	   	   	   	  Hispanic	  Prop.	   Intercept	   0.424	   0.025	   17.117	  *	  In	  CBG	  Pop.	   Charter	   -­‐0.064	   0.042	   -­‐1.528	  	   	   	   	   	  Black	  Prop.	   Intercept	   0.040	   0.003	   11.560	  *	  In	  CBG	  Pop.	   Charter	   0.014	   0.006	   2.443	  *	  	   	   	   	   	  White	  Stud.	  	   Intercept	   -­‐0.429	   0.070	   -­‐6.098	  *	  Enrollment	  %	   White	  Pop.	  %	   0.941	   0.096	   	  9.787	  *	  w/	  race	  cont.	   Charter	   0.112	   0.028	   3.955	  *	  	   	   	   	   	  Hispanic	  Stud.	   Intercept	   0.331	   0.031	   10.578	  *	  Enrollment	  %	   Hisp.	  Pop	  %	   0.651	   0.060	   10.784	  *	  w/	  race	  cont.	   Charter	   -­‐0.062	   0.031	   -­‐2.016	  *	  	   	   	   	   	  Black	  Stud.	   Intercept	   0.040	   0.005	   6.882	  *	  Enrollment	  %	   Black	  Pop.	  %	   0.397	   0.102	   3.878	  *	  w/	  race	  cont.	   Charter	   -­‐0.012	   0.007	   -­‐1.685	  	  *	  significant	  at	  α	  =	  0.05	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In	  Tucson,	  charter	  schools	  locate	  in	  CBGs	  with	  slightly	  higher	  proportions	  of	  Black	  population	  than	  non-­‐charters	  (1.4%),	  but	  enroll	  statistically	  indistinguishable	  proportions	  of	  Black	  students.	  Charter	  schools	  over-­‐enroll	  white	  students	  by	  10.2%	  and	  under-­‐enroll	  Hispanic	  students	  by	  10.4%	  compared	  to	  non-­‐charters.	  After	  controlling	  for	  the	  racial	  composition	  of	  CBGs	  where	  schools	  are	  located,	  charter	  schools	  enroll	  11.2%	  higher	  proportions	  of	  white	  students	  than	  non-­‐charters,	  and	  6.2%	  lower	  proportion	  of	  Hispanic	  students	  than	  non-­‐charters.	  These	  enrollment	  gaps	  exist	  despite	  no	  statistically	  significant	  gaps	  in	  the	  white	  or	  Hispanic	  racial	  composition	  of	  CBGs	  where	  charters	  and	  non-­‐charters	  are	  located.	  This	  suggests	  that	  the	  racial	  enrollment	  differences	  in	  Tucson	  are	  not	  the	  result	  of	  charter	  school	  location.	  It	  is	  possible	  that	  within	  CBG	  racial	  variation	  is	  a	  factor.	  Comparing	  the	  racial	  composition	  of	  EMO	  versus	  non-­‐EMO	  charter	  schools	  and	  for-­‐profit	  versus	  non-­‐profit	  charter	  schools	  demonstrated	  no	  statistically	  significant	  differences.	  The	  proportions	  of	  white	  student	  enrollment	  for	  non-­‐profit	  (38.3%)	  for-­‐profit	  (36.0%)	  and	  independent	  charters	  (30.1%),	  are	  all	  substantially	  higher	  than	  non-­‐charter	  white	  student	  enrollment	  (24.0%).	  There	  are	  no	  statistically	  significant	  differences	  in	  racial	  student	  enrollment	  rates	  between	  for-­‐profit	  and	  non-­‐profit	  charters.	  In	  Tucson,	  charter	  schools	  are	  less	  likely	  to	  enroll	  lower	  income	  students,	  less	  likely	  to	  enroll	  Hispanic	  students,	  and	  more	  likely	  to	  enroll	  white	  students	  than	  non-­‐charters.	  	  
Cleveland	  Metropolitan	  School	  District,	  Ohio	  	   Cleveland	  has	  33.6%	  charter	  schools	  (14.5%	  independent,	  9.9%	  non-­‐profit	  and	  9.2%	  for-­‐profit,	  51	  total	  charters).	  Charter	  status	  was	  not	  predictive	  of	  CBG	  median	  income,	  but	  was	  predictive	  of	  free/reduced	  lunch	  eligibility	  rates.	  Charter	  schools	  educate	  a	  19.4%	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lower	  proportion	  of	  free/reduced	  lunch	  eligible	  students	  than	  non-­‐charter	  schools.	  After	  controlling	  for	  the	  median	  family	  income	  in	  the	  CBG	  where	  a	  school	  is	  located,	  charter	  schools	  average	  a	  19.4%	  lower	  percentage	  of	  free-­‐and-­‐reduced	  lunch	  eligible	  students	  than	  non-­‐charter	  schools	  located	  in	  CBGs	  with	  the	  same	  median	  income	  (Table	  4.8).	  Like	  Tucson,	  differences	  in	  free/reduced	  lunch	  rates	  were	  not	  related	  to	  differences	  in	  CBG	  median	  income.	  This	  suggests	  that	  charters	  in	  Cleveland	  enroll	  fewer	  low-­‐income	  students	  for	  reasons	  outside	  of	  socioeconomic	  geo-­‐demographic	  difference.	  In	  Tucson	  there	  is	  a	  sizable	  gap	  between	  free/reduced	  lunch	  eligibility	  rates	  between	  charters	  and	  non-­‐charters.	  Non-­‐charters	  enroll	  80.6%	  free	  and	  reduced	  lunch	  eligible	  students,	  while	  each	  charter	  type	  enrolls	  around	  60%	  (58.7%	  independent	  charters,	  62.4%	  non-­‐profit	  charters,	  64.3%	  for-­‐profit	  charters,	  charter	  types	  statistically	  indistinguishable)	  free	  or	  reduced	  lunch	  eligible	  students.	  Each	  charter	  school	  segment	  enrolls	  significantly	  lower	  proportions	  of	  low-­‐income	  students	  than	  non-­‐charter	  schools.	  There	  are	  not	  significant	  differences	  between	  free/reduced	  lunch	  enrollment	  rates	  between	  the	  different	  charter	  segments.	  	   Charter	  schools	  locate	  in	  CBGs	  with	  11.7%	  higher	  white	  population	  than	  non-­‐charters	  and	  12.8%	  lower	  Black	  population	  than	  non-­‐charters.	  Despite	  these	  sizable	  differences	  in	  CBG	  racial	  composition,	  there	  is	  no	  statistically	  significant	  difference	  in	  racial	  enrollment	  by	  school	  type.	  Compared	  to	  independent	  charters,	  EMO-­‐operated	  charters	  enroll	  more	  white	  students	  (13.6%),	  more	  Hispanic	  students	  (6.2%),	  and	  fewer	  Black	  students	  (27.2%).	  This	  suggests	  that	  EMO-­‐operated	  charters	  substantially	  under-­‐enroll	  Black	  students.	  For-­‐profit	  charters	  enroll	  18.6%	  fewer	  white	  students	  than	  non-­‐profit	  charters,	  and	  21.5%	  more	  Black	  students	  than	  non-­‐profit	  EMO	  charters.	  In	  Cleveland,	  non-­‐profit	  charter	  schools	  in	  particular	  are	  enrolling	  substantially	  more	  white	  students	  and	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Table	  4.8:	  Cleveland	  Results	  Summary	  
	  Outcome	  Var.	   Predictor	  Var.	   Parameter	  Est.	   Std.	  Error	   t-­‐value	  	   	   	   	   	  CBG	  Median	   Intercept	   26,689	   1,000	   26.684	  *	  Income	   Charter	   699	   1,727	   0.405	  	   	   	   	   	  Free/Reduced	   Intercept	   0.806	   0.032	   25.566	  *	  Lunch	  Elig.	   Charter	   -­‐0.194	   0.054	   -­‐3.557	  *	  	   	   	   	   	  Free/Reduced	   Intercept	   0.804	   0.119	   3.502	  *	  Lunch	  Elig.	   Med.	  Income	   0.00000006	   0.000003	   0.98	  w/	  Income	  Cont.	   Charter	   -­‐0.194	   0.055	   -­‐3.544	  *	  	   	   	   	   	  White	  Stud.	   Intercept	   0.134	   0.020	   6.649	  *	  Enrollment	  %	   Charter	   0.066	   0.035	   1.913	  	   	   	   	   	  Hispanic	  Stud.	  	   Intercept	   0.112	   0.016	   7.145	  *	  Enrollment	  %	   Charter	   -­‐0.024	   0.027	   -­‐0.907	  	   	   	   	   	  Black	  Stud.	  	   Intercept	   0.711	   0.033	   21.764	  *	  Enrollment	  %	   Charter	   -­‐0.041	   0.056	   -­‐0.726	  	   	   	   	   	  White	  Prop.	  	   Intercept	   0.318	   0.030	   10.628	  *	  In	  CBG	  Pop.	   Charter	   0.117	   0.052	   2.274	  *	  	   	   	   	   	  Hispanic	  Prop.	   Intercept	   0.088	   0.011	   8.266	  *	  In	  CBG	  Pop.	   Charter	   -­‐0.002	   0.018	   -­‐0.125	  	   	   	   	   	  Black	  Prop.	   Intercept	   0.592	   0.035	   17.023	  *	  In	  CBG	  Pop.	   Charter	   -­‐0.128	   0.060	   -­‐2.123	  *	  	   	   	   	   	  White	  Stud.	  	   Intercept	   -­‐0.025	   0.018	   -­‐1.392	  Enrollment	  %	   White	  Pop.	  %	   0.499	   0.037	   13.521	  *	  w/	  race	  cont.	   Charter	   0.008	   0.024	   0.329	  	   	   	   	   	  Hispanic	  Stud.	   Intercept	   -­‐0.005	   0.011	   0.466	  Enrollment	  %	   Hisp.	  Pop.	  %	   1.217	   0.068	   17.878	  *	  w/	  race	  cont.	   Charter	   -­‐0.022	   0.015	   -­‐1.420	  	   	   	   	   	  Black	  Stud.	   Intercept	   0.253	   0.032	   7.946	  *	  Enrollment	  %	   Black	  Pop.	  %	   0.772	   0.044	   17.679	  *	  w/	  race	  cont.	   Charter	   0.058	   0.033	   1.765	  *	  significant	  at	  α	  =	  0.05	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fewer	  Black	  students	  than	  all	  other	  school	  types.	  It	  is	  also	  notable	  that	  non-­‐profit	  charter	  schools	  in	  Cleveland	  are	  the	  only	  charter	  school	  subset	  in	  any	  of	  the	  six	  districts	  to	  locate	  in	  CBGs	  where	  the	  median	  income	  is	  higher	  than	  it	  is	  for	  non-­‐charter	  schools.	  The	  racial	  and	  socioeconomic	  location	  and	  enrollment	  patterns	  of	  non-­‐profit	  schools	  in	  Cleveland	  suggests	  that	  they	  may	  not	  be	  operating	  in	  a	  mission-­‐oriented	  fashion,	  as	  they	  appear	  to	  be	  enrolling	  students	  in	  patterns	  more	  consistent	  with	  profit-­‐maximization.	  It	  could	  be	  that	  the	  presence	  of	  for-­‐profit	  charter	  schools	  has	  some	  impact	  on	  the	  enrollment	  patterns	  of	  non-­‐profit	  charters	  in	  Cleveland.	  	  	  
Districts	  Where	  For-­Profit	  Charters	  Predominate	  
Miami	  -­	  Dade	  County	  Public	  Schools,	  Florida	  	   In	  Miami,	  19.4%	  of	  public	  schools	  are	  charters	  (7.5%	  independent,	  0.6%	  non-­‐profit	  11.2%	  for-­‐profit,	  90	  total	  charters).	  For-­‐profit	  charters	  are	  the	  most	  common	  type	  of	  charter	  schools,	  outnumbering	  non-­‐profits	  52	  to	  3.	  Charter	  status	  was	  not	  predictive	  of	  CBG	  median	  income,	  but	  was	  predictive	  of	  free/reduced	  lunch	  eligibility	  rates.	  Charter	  schools	  educate	  a	  17.9%	  lower	  proportion	  of	  free/reduced	  lunch	  eligible	  students	  than	  non-­‐charter	  schools.	  After	  controlling	  for	  the	  median	  family	  income	  in	  the	  CBG	  where	  a	  school	  is	  located,	  charter	  schools	  average	  a	  17.4%	  lower	  percentage	  of	  free-­‐and-­‐reduced	  lunch	  eligible	  students	  than	  non-­‐charter	  schools	  located	  in	  CBGs	  with	  the	  same	  median	  income.	  Like	  the	  previous	  districts	  (with	  the	  exception	  of	  Houston)	  the	  socioeconomic	  enrollment	  differences	  appear	  to	  be	  unrelated	  to	  the	  socioeconomic	  location	  of	  schools.	  Both	  independent	  and	  for-­‐profit	  charters	  enroll	  substantially	  lower	  proportions	  of	  low-­‐income	  students	  than	  non-­‐charters.	  Non-­‐profit	  charters	  educate	  the	  highest	  proportion	  of	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Table	  4.9:	  Miami	  Results	  Summary	  
	  Outcome	  Var.	   Predictor	  Var.	   Parameter	  Est.	   Std.	  Error	   t-­‐value	  	   	   	   	   	  CBG	  Median	   Intercept	   43,713	   1,366	   32.000	  *	  Income	   Charter	   -­‐1,539	   3,102	   -­‐0.496	  	   	   	   	   	  Free/Reduced	   Intercept	   0.741	   0.012	   64.063	  *	  Lunch	  Elig.	   Charter	   -­‐0.179	   0.026	   -­‐6.812	  *	  	   	   	   	   	  Free/Reduced	   Intercept	   0.902	   0.045	   12.234	  *	  Lunch	  Elig.	   Med.	  Income	   -­‐0.000004	   0.0000004	   -­‐10.356	  *	  w/	  Income	  Cont.	   Charter	   -­‐0.174	   0.023	   -­‐7.455	  *	  	   	   	   	   	  White	  Stud.	   Intercept	   0.075	   0.005	   14.350	  *	  Enrollment	  %	   Charter	   0.027	   0.012	   2.284	  *	  	  	   	   	   	   	  Hispanic	  Stud.	  	   Intercept	   0.574	   0.016	   36.544	  *	  Enrollment	  %	   Charter	   0.129	   0.036	   3.614	  *	  	   	   	   	   	  Black	  Stud.	  	   Intercept	   0.334	   0.017	   20.117	  *	  Enrollment	  %	   Charter	   -­‐0.154	   0.038	   -­‐4.066	  *	  	   	   	   	   	  White	  Prop.	  	   Intercept	   0.644	   0.016	   39.499	  In	  CBG	  Pop.	   Charter	   0.063	   0.037	   1.721	  	   	   	   	   	  Hispanic	  Prop.	   Intercept	   0.574	   0.015	   37.758	  In	  CBG	  Pop.	   Charter	   0.087	   0.034	   2.536	  *	  	   	   	   	   	  Black	  Prop.	   Intercept	   0.289	   0.016	   17.681	  *	  In	  CBG	  Pop.	   Charter	   -­‐0.082	   0.037	   -­‐2.225	  *	  	   	   	   	   	  White	  Stud.	  	   Intercept	   	  0.014	   0.010	   1.359	  Enrollment	  %	   White	  Pop.	  %	   	  0.092	   0.014	   	  6.446	  *	  w/	  race	  cont.	   Charter	   0.022	   0.011	   1.942	  	   	   	   	   	  Hispanic	  Stud.	   Intercept	   	  0.102	   0.019	   5.206	  *	  Enrollment	  %	   Hisp.	  Pop.	  %	   	  0.826	   0.030	   	  27.849	  *	  w/	  race	  cont.	   Charter	   0.055	   0.022	   2.510	  *	  	   	   	   	   	  Black	  Stud.	   Intercept	   0.089	   0.012	   7.248	  *	  Enrollment	  %	   Black	  Pop.	  %	   	  0.846	   0.027	   31.377	  *	  w/	  race	  cont.	   Charter	   -­‐	  0.083	   0.021	   -­‐3.868	  *	  *	  significant	  at	  α	  =	  0.05	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free/reduced	  lunch	  students	  of	  all	  school	  types,	  representing	  a	  small	  outlier	  of	  three	  schools,	  representing	  less	  than	  one	  percent	  of	  public	  schools	  in	  the	  district.	  	   Charter	  schools	  locate	  in	  CBGs	  with	  8.7%	  higher	  Hispanic	  populations	  and	  8.2%	  lower	  Black	  populations	  than	  non-­‐charters.	  Charters	  enroll	  2.7%	  higher	  white	  student	  proportions,	  12.9%	  higher	  Hispanic	  student	  proportions,	  and	  15.4%	  lower	  Black	  student	  proportions	  than	  non-­‐charters.	  After	  controlling	  for	  the	  racial	  composition	  of	  CBGs	  where	  schools	  are	  located,	  charters	  enroll	  5.5%	  more	  Hispanic	  students,	  and	  8.3%	  less	  Black	  students	  than	  non-­‐charters.	  This	  suggests	  that	  differences	  in	  the	  racial	  composition	  of	  the	  school’s	  location	  are	  the	  main	  factors	  driving	  racial	  differences	  in	  student	  enrollment.	  There	  are	  no	  significant	  differences	  in	  the	  racial	  composition	  of	  independent	  and	  EMO-­‐operated	  charter	  schools.	  In	  Miami,	  charters	  educate	  fewer	  free/reduced	  lunch	  eligible	  students,	  fewer	  Black	  students,	  and	  more	  white	  and	  Hispanic	  students	  than	  non-­‐charters.	  These	  patterns	  are	  similar	  to	  those	  in	  Tucson	  and	  Cleveland.	  In	  these	  three	  districts	  with	  for-­‐profit	  charters,	  independent	  charter	  schools	  have	  enrollment	  patterns	  more	  in	  line	  with	  what	  would	  be	  expected	  from	  a	  profit-­‐maximization	  than	  a	  mission-­‐oriented	  strategy.	  	  
Detroit	  Public	  Schools,	  Michigan	  	   In	  Detroit,	  34.7%	  of	  public	  schools	  are	  charters	  (8.9%	  independent,	  4.0%	  non-­‐profit,	  21.8%	  for-­‐profit,	  78	  total	  charters).	  Detroit	  is	  the	  only	  district	  in	  the	  study	  that	  did	  not	  show	  statistically	  significant	  differences	  in	  free/reduced	  lunch	  eligibility	  rates	  between	  charter	  schools	  and	  non-­‐charters.	  There	  was	  also	  no	  difference	  between	  CBG	  median	  income	  between	  charter	  schools	  and	  non-­‐charters.	  Detroit	  and	  Cleveland	  have	  much	  lower	  median	  income	  levels	  compared	  to	  the	  other	  districts	  under	  examination.	  This	  could	  be	  one	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explanation	  for	  why	  there	  is	  no	  difference	  in	  the	  free/reduced	  lunch	  eligibility	  rates	  between	  charters	  and	  non-­‐charters	  in	  Detroit.	  Detroit	  is	  also	  the	  one	  deviation	  from	  the	  emerging	  pattern	  whereby	  districts	  with	  for-­‐profit	  schools	  enroll	  substantially	  fewer	  free/reduced	  lunch	  eligible	  students	  compared	  with	  non-­‐charters	  (Miami	  17.9%,	  Cleveland	  19.4%,	  Tucson	  11.8%	  lower),	  while	  districts	  without	  for-­‐profit	  charters	  enroll	  substantially	  more	  free/reduced	  lunch	  students	  than	  non-­‐charters	  (Los	  Angeles	  8.4%,	  Houston	  21.4%	  higher).	  It	  does	  not	  contradict	  the	  pattern,	  but	  instead	  does	  not	  show	  any	  significant	  socioeconomic	  charter/non-­‐charter	  differences.	  	   Charter	  schools	  are	  located	  in	  neighborhoods	  that	  have	  7.8%	  higher	  white	  population	  and	  10.4%	  lower	  Black	  population	  in	  Detroit.	  Despite	  this,	  charters	  do	  not	  enroll	  students	  from	  different	  racial	  groups	  at	  different	  rates	  than	  non-­‐charters.	  This	  is	  because	  Black	  students	  are	  proportionally	  over-­‐represented	  in	  charter	  schools	  based	  on	  the	  CBGs	  where	  the	  schools	  are	  located,	  with	  charters	  predicted	  to	  have	  a	  7.6%	  higher	  Black	  enrollment	  after	  controlling	  for	  the	  proportion	  of	  Black	  population	  in	  the	  CBGs	  where	  they	  locate.	  The	  difference	  in	  the	  racial	  composition	  of	  the	  CBGs	  where	  charters	  versus	  non-­‐charters	  locate	  could	  indicate	  that	  charter	  schools	  intended	  to	  locate	  in	  areas	  that	  would	  allow	  them	  to	  enroll	  lower	  proportions	  of	  Black	  students,	  but	  student	  enrollment	  does	  not	  reflect	  this.	  There	  are	  no	  significant	  differences	  in	  the	  racial	  enrollment	  of	  independent	  versus	  EMO-­‐operated	  charter	  schools.	  Detroit	  presents	  a	  contrast	  to	  the	  other	  districts	  studied.	  It	  is	  the	  only	  district	  with	  no	  free/reduced	  lunch	  eligibility	  rate	  differences	  between	  charters	  and	  non-­‐charters.	  The	  fact	  that	  it	  is	  the	  only	  one	  of	  the	  six	  with	  no	  difference	  suggests	  that,	  at	  least	  in	  the	  districts	  being	  studied,	  substantial	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Table	  4.10:	  Detroit	  Results	  Summary	  
	  Outcome	  Var.	   Predictor	  Var.	   Parameter	  Est.	   Std.	  Error	   t-­‐value	  	   	   	   	   	  CBG	  Median	   Intercept	   28,361	   970	   29.234	  *	  Income	   Charter	   -­‐1,289	   1,655	   -­‐0.779	  	   	   	   	   	  Free/Reduced	   Intercept	   0.796	   0.013	   62.36	  *	  Lunch	  Elig.	   Charter	   0.037	   0.021	   1.70	  	  	   	   	   	   	  Free/Reduced	   Intercept	   0.766	   0.044	   19.220	  *	  Lunch	  Elig.	   Med.	  Income	   0.000001	   0.0000009	   1.210	  w/	  Income	  Cont.	   Charter	   0.038	   0.022	   1.762	  	   	   	   	   	  White	  Stud.	   Intercept	   0.027	   0.011	   2.499	  *	  Enrollment	  %	   Charter	   0.035	   0.018	   1.902	  	   	   	   	   	  Hispanic	  Stud.	  	   Intercept	   0.090	   0.019	   4.615	  *	  Enrollment	  %	   Charter	   -­‐0.011	   0.033	   -­‐0.341	  	   	   	   	   	  Black	  Stud.	  	   Intercept	   0.873	   0.024	   36.908	  *	  Enrollment	  %	   Charter	   -­‐0.016	   0.040	   -­‐0.397	  	   	   	   	   	  White	  Prop.	  	   Intercept	   0.098	   0.015	   6.627	  *	  In	  CBG	  Pop.	   Charter	   0.078	   0.025	   3.076	  *	  	   	   	   	   	  Hispanic	  Prop.	   Intercept	   0.080	   0.017	   4.619	  *	  In	  CBG	  Pop.	   Charter	   0.018	   0.030	   0.593	  	   	   	   	   	  Black	  Prop.	   Intercept	   0.834	   0.023	   35.538	  *	  In	  CBG	  Pop.	   Charter	   -­‐0.104	   0.040	   -­‐2.605	  *	  	   	   	   	   	  White	  Stud.	  	   Intercept	   -­‐0.016	   0.009	   -­‐1.736	  Enrollment	  %	   White	  Pop.	  %	   0.436	   0.039	   11.316	  *	  w/	  race	  cont.	   Charter	   0.001	   0.015	   0.048	  	   	   	   	   	  Hispanic	  Stud.	   Intercept	   0.009	   0.009	   0.998	  Enrollment	  %	   Hisp.	  Pop.	  %	   1.004	   0.033	   30.809	  *	  w/	  race	  cont.	   Charter	   -­‐0.029	   0.014	   -­‐2.006	  *	  	   	   	   	   	  Black	  Stud.	   Intercept	   0.139	   0.029	   4.652	  *	  Enrollment	  %	   Black	  Pop.	  %	   0.880	   0.033	   26.639	  *	  w/	  race	  cont.	   Charter	   0.076	   0.019	   3.788	  *	  *	  significant	  at	  α	  =	  0.05	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socioeconomic	  enrollment	  differences	  are	  the	  norm,	  with	  the	  presence	  of	  for-­‐profit	  charters	  generally	  predicting	  the	  directionality	  of	  the	  difference.	  	  	   	  
Summary	  
Socioeconomic	  Status	  	   In	  five	  of	  the	  six	  districts,	  there	  are	  no	  statistically	  significant	  differences	  between	  the	  CBG	  median	  income	  of	  charters	  versus	  non-­‐charters.	  The	  exception	  is	  Houston,	  where	  charters	  locate	  in	  CBGs	  where	  the	  median	  family	  income	  is	  $6,736	  (17%	  of	  district	  median	  income)	  lower	  than	  non-­‐charters.	  Despite	  the	  fact	  that	  there	  is	  no	  statistically	  significant	  relationship	  between	  CBG	  median	  income	  and	  charter	  status	  in	  five	  of	  six	  districts,	  there	  are	  statistically	  significant	  free/reduced	  lunch	  rate	  gaps	  between	  charters	  and	  non-­‐charters	  in	  five	  of	  the	  six	  districts.	  The	  direction	  of	  this	  gap	  was	  not	  uniform.	  In	  the	  two	  districts	  without	  for-­‐profit	  charter	  schools,	  charters	  had	  significantly	  higher	  proportions	  of	  free/reduced	  lunch	  eligible	  students	  than	  non-­‐charter	  schools	  located	  in	  census	  block	  groups	  with	  the	  same	  median	  income	  (Houston	  21.4%	  and	  Los	  Angeles	  8.4%	  more).	  In	  three	  of	  the	  four	  districts	  with	  substantial	  proportions	  of	  for-­‐profit	  EMOCS,	  the	  opposite	  effect	  is	  seen.	  Charter	  schools	  enroll	  significantly	  lower	  proportions	  of	  free/reduced	  lunch	  eligible	  students	  than	  traditional	  public	  schools	  in	  census	  block	  groups	  with	  the	  same	  median	  income	  (Miami,	  17.9%	  lower,	  Cleveland,	  19.4%	  Tucson	  11.8%).	  The	  fourth	  district	  with	  large	  numbers	  of	  for-­‐profit	  EMOCS,	  Detroit,	  demonstrated	  no	  statistically	  significant	  differences	  in	  the	  free/reduced	  lunch	  student	  proportion	  between	  charters	  and	  traditional	  public	  schools.	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   The	  results	  suggest	  that	  gaps	  in	  free/reduced	  lunch	  rates	  are	  not	  due	  to	  differences	  in	  school	  location	  neighborhood	  demographics,	  but	  instead	  due	  to	  differences	  in	  the	  demographic	  composition	  of	  each	  school’s	  student	  enrollment	  unrelated	  to	  socioeconomic	  geography.	  This	  may	  indicate	  that	  other	  factors	  beyond	  geo-­‐demographic	  differences	  impact	  student	  composition	  in	  ways	  that	  may	  intensify	  stratification.	  It	  also	  provides	  additional	  evidence	  that	  for-­‐profit	  and	  non-­‐profit	  EMO	  operated	  charter	  schools	  take	  different	  approaches	  to	  the	  cultivation	  of	  particular	  socio-­‐demographic	  profiles	  of	  their	  student	  populations.	  	  	  Comparing	  the	  rate	  at	  which	  charters	  and	  non-­‐charters	  educate	  the	  highest	  proportion	  of	  low-­‐income	  students	  in	  Houston	  and	  Miami	  offers	  an	  example	  of	  these	  differences.	  Both	  districts	  are	  predominantly	  Hispanic,	  Southern	  districts	  with	  similar	  median	  income	  levels.	  In	  Houston,	  charter	  schools	  are	  much	  more	  likely	  than	  non-­‐charters	  to	  educate	  the	  highest-­‐poverty	  populations	  (Figures	  4.4	  &	  4.6).	  This	  indicates	  that	  in	  Houston,	  there	  is	  a	  concentration	  of	  high-­‐poverty	  students	  in	  charter	  schools.	  A	  sizeable	  34.3%	  (37	  out	  of	  108)	  of	  charter	  schools	  have	  between	  90-­‐100%	  free/reduced	  lunch	  eligible	  students,	  while	  only	  0.8%	  (2	  out	  of	  256)	  of	  non-­‐charter	  schools	  enroll	  90-­‐100%	  of	  free/reduced	  lunch	  students.	  The	  corollary	  of	  this	  is	  that	  traditional	  public	  schools	  end	  up	  educating	  lower	  proportions	  of	  high-­‐poverty	  students	  than	  if	  charters	  did	  not	  have	  such	  highly	  concentrated	  proportions	  of	  free	  and	  reduced	  lunch	  eligible	  students.	  In	  Miami,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  charter	  schools	  have	  disproportionately	  fewer	  free	  and	  reduced	  lunch	  eligible	  students	  (Figures	  4.5	  &	  4.7).	  Very	  few	  independent	  or	  for-­‐profit	  charter	  schools	  educate	  the	  highest	  proportion	  of	  low-­‐income	  students.	  Only	  3	  out	  of	  87	  (3.4%)	  for-­‐profit	  or	  independent	  charter	  schools,	  have	  between	  90-­‐100%	  free/reduced	  lunch	  eligible	  	  
	  	   121	  
Figure	  4.4:	  Houston	  FRL	  Proportion	  By	  CBG	  Income	  and	  Charter	  Status	  



























0 50000 100000 150000 200000
Houston
0 1




Figure	  4.5:	  Miami	  FRL	  Proportion	  By	  CBG	  Income	  and	  Charter	  Status	  
Blue	  =	  Non-­Charter	  Schools.	  Pink	  =	  Charter	  Schools.	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Figure	  4.6:	  Houston	  FRL	  Eligibility	  Rates	  By	  School	  Type	  	  
	  
Figure	  4.7:	  Miami	  FRL	  Eligibility	  Rates	  By	  School	  Type	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students,	  while	  118	  out	  of	  374	  (31.6%)	  of	  non-­‐charter	  schools	  enroll	  90-­‐100%	  proportion	  of	  free/reduced	  lunch	  students.	  This	  suggests	  that	  charter	  schools	  in	  Miami-­‐Dade	  may	  indeed	  be	  pursuing	  exclusionary	  strategies	  to	  avoid	  cultivating	  student	  populations	  with	  highly	  concentrated	  proportions	  of	  high-­‐risk	  students	  (Lubienski,	  Gulosino	  &	  Weitzel,	  2009).	  This	  absence	  of	  low-­‐income	  students	  in	  charters	  in	  Miami	  could	  result	  in	  an	  increased	  concentration	  of	  lower-­‐income	  students	  in	  non-­‐charter	  schools,	  and	  through	  this	  concentration	  disadvantaging	  these	  students	  (Rumberger	  &	  Palardy,	  2005).	  	  If	  charter	  schools	  systematically	  seek	  to	  avoid	  low-­‐income	  students,	  it	  could	  push	  non-­‐charters	  to	  take	  on	  higher	  proportions	  of	  these	  students,	  further	  concentrating	  poverty.	  The	  existence	  of	  for-­‐profit	  charters	  here	  may	  be	  associated	  with	  a	  market-­effect	  whereby	  low-­‐income	  students	  are	  disproportionately	  sorted	  into	  non-­‐charter	  schools.	  This	  
market-­effect,	  inasmuch	  as	  it	  works	  to	  identify	  a	  particular	  school	  type	  (either	  charters	  or	  non-­‐charters)	  with	  concentrated	  poverty,	  and	  another	  school	  type	  with	  relative	  affluence	  could	  become	  a	  self-­‐reinforcing	  pattern	  exacerbating	  between-­‐school	  socioeconomic	  segregation.	  	  Figure	  4.8	  Illustrates	  the	  free/reduced	  lunch	  eligible	  student	  rate	  for	  each	  school	  type	  for	  each	  district.	  Independent	  charter	  schools	  in	  each	  district	  with	  for-­‐profit	  charters	  had	  lower	  free/reduced	  lunch	  enrollment	  rates	  than	  non-­‐charters.	  In	  the	  two	  districts	  without	  for-­‐profits,	  independent	  charters	  enrolled	  higher	  proportions	  of	  free/reduced	  lunch	  students	  than	  non-­‐charters.	  Likewise,	  non-­‐profit	  charter	  schools	  in	  each	  district	  with	  for-­‐profit	  charters	  had	  lower	  free/reduced	  lunch	  enrollment	  rates	  than	  non-­‐charters	  (with	  the	  exception	  of	  three	  non-­‐profit	  charters	  in	  Miami),	  while	  the	  opposite	  holds	  in	  districts	  without	  for-­‐profit	  charters.	  This	  suggests	  that	  independent	  and	  non-­‐profit	  charters	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demonstrate	  different	  student	  enrollment	  patterns	  in	  districts	  with	  for-­‐profit	  charters	  than	  in	  those	  without.	  The	  presence	  of	  for-­‐profit	  charters	  seems	  to	  be	  associated	  with	  other	  charter	  school	  types	  emulating	  profit-­‐oriented	  enrollment	  patterns.	  
	  
	  
Figure	  4.8:	  Proportion	  of	  FRL	  Eligible	  Students	  By	  School	  Type	  &	  District	  	  
	  	  TPRFLRPCT	  =	  Non-­‐charter	  school	  free/reduced	  lunch	  percent	  INDFRLPCT	  =	  Independent	  charter	  school	  free/reduced	  lunch	  percent	  NPFRLPCT	  =	  Non-­‐profit	  charter	  school	  free/reduced	  lunch	  percent	  FPFRLPCT	  =	  For-­‐profit	  school	  free/reduced	  lunch	  percent	  	   Outside	  of	  Houston	  charter	  schools	  do	  not	  systematically	  locate	  in	  CBGs	  with	  statistically	  different	  median	  income	  levels	  than	  non-­‐charter	  schools.	  Despite	  this,	  charters	  of	  all	  types	  in	  Cleveland,	  Tucson,	  and	  Miami	  (with	  the	  exception	  of	  Miami’s	  3	  non-­‐profit	  charters)	  enroll	  lower	  proportions	  of	  low-­‐income	  students	  than	  non-­‐charters.	  Meanwhile,	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in	  Houston	  and	  Los	  Angeles,	  both	  non-­‐profit	  and	  independent	  charters	  enroll	  higher	  proportions	  of	  low-­‐income	  students	  compared	  to	  non-­‐charters.	  Enrollment	  patterns	  at	  independent	  charter	  schools	  are	  very	  different	  in	  districts	  with	  for-­‐profit	  charters	  than	  in	  districts	  without.	  This	  suggests	  that	  where	  for-­‐profit	  charters	  exist,	  a	  more	  market-­‐oriented	  philosophy	  may	  come	  to	  take	  hold	  throughout	  the	  charter	  school	  segment.	  In	  five	  of	  the	  six	  districts	  studied,	  something	  besides	  school	  location	  appears	  to	  be	  impacting	  whether	  students	  from	  lower-­‐income	  families	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  attend	  charter	  or	  non-­‐charter	  schools.	  There	  is	  evidence	  that	  this	  market-­effect	  is	  associated	  with	  the	  presence	  of	  for-­‐profit	  charter	  schools.	  This	  market	  effect	  may	  influence	  socioeconomic	  sorting	  patterns	  in	  ways	  that	  increase	  between-­‐school	  socioeconomic	  stratification.	  	  
Race	  	   The	  racial	  composition	  of	  the	  six	  districts	  under	  examination	  vary	  substantially.	  There	  are	  four	  majority	  Hispanic	  districts	  (Tucson,	  57.9%,	  Miami-­‐Dade,	  60.6%,	  Houston,	  61.2%,	  and	  Los	  Angeles,	  73.0%)	  and	  two	  majority	  Black	  districts	  (Cleveland,	  64.7%	  and	  Detroit,	  83.1%,	  see	  Table	  3.1	  for	  full	  racial	  breakdown).	  Non-­‐profit	  charter	  schools	  in	  districts	  without	  for-­‐profit	  charter	  schools	  (Los	  Angeles	  and	  Houston)	  under-­‐enroll	  white	  students.	  This	  is	  consistent	  with	  a	  mission-­‐orientation	  whereby	  with	  non-­‐profit	  providers	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  seek	  out	  higher-­‐need	  populations	  (Weisbrod,	  1985).	  Generally,	  non-­‐white	  students	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  be	  an	  under-­‐served,	  higher-­‐need	  student	  population.	  Significantly,	  non-­‐profit	  charter	  schools	  in	  districts	  where	  there	  are	  for-­‐profit	  charter	  schools	  do	  not	  demonstrate	  the	  same	  lower	  proportional	  enrollment	  of	  white	  students.	  In	  both	  of	  the	  non-­‐profit/for-­‐profit	  mixed	  districts	  (Cleveland	  and	  Tucson)	  non-­‐profit	  charter	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schools	  actually	  enroll	  the	  highest	  proportion	  of	  white	  students	  of	  any	  of	  the	  four	  school	  types	  in	  those	  districts.	  This	  suggests	  that	  in	  the	  case	  of	  non-­‐profit	  charter	  schools,	  there	  may	  be	  some	  connection	  between	  the	  presence	  of	  for-­‐profit	  charter	  schools	  and	  the	  likely	  racial	  composition	  of	  student	  enrollment.	  In	  the	  absence	  of	  for-­‐profit	  charters,	  non-­‐profit	  charters	  behave	  consistent	  with	  mission-­‐oriented	  principles,	  while	  in	  the	  presence	  of	  for-­‐profit	  charters,	  non-­‐profit	  charters	  exhibit	  racial	  enrollment	  patterns	  more	  like	  what	  would	  be	  expected	  of	  profit-­‐oriented	  providers.	  This	  is	  similar	  to	  the	  differences	  in	  non-­‐profit	  socioeconomic	  enrollment	  discussed	  above.	  In	  two	  of	  the	  four	  districts	  with	  for-­‐profit	  charters	  (Tucson	  and	  Miami),	  white	  enrollment	  is	  substantially	  higher	  in	  charters	  than	  in	  non-­‐charters.	  This	  suggests	  a	  possible	  targeting	  of	  white	  students	  by	  for-­‐profit	  charter	  operators.	  It	  also	  suggests	  that	  districts	  with	  for-­‐profit	  charters	  may	  develop	  distinct	  charter/non-­‐charter	  racial	  sorting	  patterns	  compared	  to	  those	  without	  for-­‐profit	  charter	  schools.	  Looking	  solely	  at	  the	  racial	  composition	  of	  CBGs,	  there	  are	  significant	  differences	  between	  the	  non-­‐profit	  only	  districts	  and	  the	  districts	  with	  for-­‐profit	  charters.	  In	  the	  districts	  without	  for-­‐profit	  charters	  (Houston	  and	  Los	  Angeles)	  charter	  schools	  locate	  in	  CBGs	  where	  there	  is	  a	  lower	  white	  population	  proportion	  (9.0%	  and	  6.3%	  respectively)	  and	  a	  nearly	  equivalent	  higher	  Black	  population	  proportion	  (9.0%	  and	  6.8%).	  Two	  of	  the	  four	  districts	  with	  for-­‐profit	  charters	  (Cleveland	  and	  Detroit)	  locate	  in	  districts	  with	  a	  higher	  white	  population	  proportion	  (12.8%	  and	  10.4%	  respectively)	  and	  lower	  Black	  population	  proportion	  (11.7%	  and	  7.8%),	  while	  the	  other	  two	  districts	  with	  for-­‐profits	  (Miami	  and	  Tucson)	  have	  no	  statistically	  significant	  difference	  in	  white	  CBG	  proportion.	  It	  is	  the	  two	  majority-­‐Black	  districts	  where	  charters	  are	  likely	  to	  locate	  in	  more-­‐white,	  less-­‐
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Black	  neighborhoods.	  These	  are	  also	  the	  districts	  with	  the	  highest	  absolute	  charter/non-­‐charter	  differential	  in	  Black	  CBG	  composition,	  with	  charters	  locating	  in	  CBGs	  with	  12.8%	  lower	  Black	  population	  proportion	  in	  Cleveland	  and	  10.4%	  lower	  in	  Detroit.	  Despite	  the	  location	  differences,	  charters	  in	  for-­‐profit	  districts	  do	  not	  systematically	  under	  enroll	  Black	  students.	  It	  may	  be	  that	  locating	  in	  areas	  with	  a	  lower	  proportion	  of	  Black	  population	  equates	  with	  the	  ability	  to	  attract	  relatively	  higher-­‐income	  Black	  students,	  as	  is	  reflected	  in	  the	  gaps	  in	  low-­‐income	  enrollment	  between	  charters	  and	  non-­‐charters	  in	  for-­‐profit	  districts	  discussed	  above.	  Racial	  geo-­‐demography	  and	  socioeconomic	  student	  enrollment	  may	  thus	  interact	  in	  complicated	  ways.	  Either	  way,	  CBG	  Black	  population	  proportion	  is	  the	  one	  racial	  category	  for	  which	  there	  are	  significant	  differences	  between	  charters	  and	  non-­‐charters	  in	  each	  district.	  In	  the	  districts	  without	  for-­‐profit	  schools,	  charters	  locate	  in	  CBGs	  where	  the	  Black	  population	  is	  at	  least	  6.8%	  higher.	  In	  the	  districts	  with	  for-­‐profit	  charters,	  one	  district	  has	  slightly	  higher	  Black	  population	  proportion	  than	  non-­‐charters	  (Tucson	  at	  1.4%)	  while	  in	  the	  other	  three	  districts,	  charters	  locate	  in	  CBGs	  that	  have	  at	  least	  8.2%	  lower	  proportion	  of	  Black	  population.	  	  The	  primary	  purpose	  of	  Analysis	  2	  was	  to	  test	  Hypothesis	  4:	  in	  districts	  where	  for	  profit	  charter	  schools	  proliferate,	  charter	  schools	  as	  a	  whole	  are	  less	  likely	  than	  non-­‐charter	  schools	  to	  enroll	  non-­‐white	  and	  low-­‐income	  students	  compared	  to	  districts	  without	  for-­‐profit	  charters.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  low-­‐income	  students	  there	  is	  evidence	  of	  charter	  schools	  of	  all	  types	  being	  less	  likely	  to	  enroll	  low-­‐income	  students	  in	  districts	  with	  for-­‐profit	  charters	  than	  in	  districts	  without	  for-­‐profit	  charters.	  In	  the	  two	  districts	  without	  for-­‐profits,	  charters	  are	  likely	  to	  locate	  in	  CBGs	  with	  higher	  Black	  population	  proportions	  and	  lower	  white	  population	  proportion,	  while	  the	  opposite	  pattern	  holds	  in	  two	  of	  the	  four	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districts	  with	  for-­‐profit	  charters.	  This	  does	  not	  directly	  translate	  to	  racial	  enrollment	  differences,	  however.	  The	  evidence	  is	  stronger	  for	  a	  socioeconomic	  market-­‐effect,	  but	  there	  is	  some	  evidence	  for	  a	  racial	  market-­‐effect	  as	  well.	  The	  results	  of	  Analysis	  2	  indicate	  that	  it	  is	  reasonable	  to	  fail	  to	  reject	  Hypothesis	  4,	  and	  that	  further	  research	  into	  a	  potential	  for-­‐profit	  market-­effect	  is	  warranted.	  	  
Table	  4.11:	  Charter/Non-­Charter	  CBG	  Racial	  Composition	  Difference	  
District	  	   Difference	  between	  charter	  and	  non-­‐charter	  white	  enrollment	  	   Difference	  between	  charter	  and	  non-­‐charter	  Black	  enrollment	  Houston	   -­‐	  0.090	  *	   +	  0.090	  *	  Los	  Angeles	   -­‐	  0.063	  *	   +	  0.068	  *	  Tucson	   Non-­significant	  difference	   +	  0.014	  *	  Cleveland	   +	  0.117	   -­‐	  0.128	  *	  Miami	   Non-­significant	  difference	   -­‐	  0.082	  *	  Detroit	   +	  0.078	  *	   -­‐	  0.104	  *	  	  *	  =	  statistically	  significant	  difference	  at	  α	  =	  0.05	  	  Negative	  numbers	  indicate	  charter	  schools	  enroll	  lower	  proportions	  than	  non-­‐charters	  of	  the	  racial	  group,	  positive	  numbers	  indicate	  charters	  enroll	  higher	  proportions	  than	  non-­‐charters.	  	  	  
Discussion:	  	   The	  results	  of	  Analysis	  1	  demonstrated	  that	  nationally,	  there	  are	  significant	  differences	  in	  the	  socioeconomic	  characteristics	  where	  for-­‐profit	  and	  non-­‐profit	  charter	  schools	  locate,	  and	  significant	  differences	  in	  the	  likelihood	  of	  each	  segment	  educating	  high	  proportions	  of	  low-­‐income	  students.	  For-­‐profit	  schools	  were	  found	  to	  be	  less	  likely	  to	  locate	  in	  low	  homeownership	  census	  block	  groups,	  and	  less	  likely	  to	  educate	  high	  proportions	  of	  low-­‐income	  students	  (as	  expressed	  in	  Title-­‐I	  eligibility).	  No	  significant	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differences	  were	  found	  in	  the	  racial	  composition	  of	  student	  populations	  of	  for-­‐profit	  versus	  non-­‐profit	  schools.	  	  Analysis	  2	  examined	  six	  districts	  in	  greater	  detail,	  providing	  a	  more	  nuanced	  picture	  of	  socioeconomic	  differences	  associated	  with	  for-­‐profit	  charter	  schools.	  There	  is	  evidence	  that	  differences	  between	  the	  free/reduced	  lunch	  rates	  of	  charter	  versus	  non-­‐charters	  in	  districts	  are	  directionally	  opposite	  in	  those	  districts	  where	  for-­‐profit	  charter	  schools	  were	  present	  versus	  those	  where	  they	  were	  not	  present.	  In	  three	  of	  four	  districts	  with	  for-­‐profit	  charter	  schools,	  charters	  educated	  lower	  proportions	  of	  free	  and	  reduced	  lunch	  eligible	  students	  than	  non-­‐charters.	  In	  both	  of	  the	  districts	  without	  for-­‐profit	  charters,	  charter	  schools	  educated	  higher	  proportions	  of	  free-­‐and-­‐reduced	  lunch	  eligible	  students	  than	  non-­‐charters.	  This	  suggests	  the	  possibility	  that	  there	  may	  be	  something	  distinct	  about	  the	  districts,	  or	  “markets”	  where	  for-­‐profit	  charters	  exist.	  This	  analysis	  cannot	  determine	  whether	  there	  is	  a	  causal	  relationship	  between	  the	  presence	  of	  for-­‐profit	  charter	  schools,	  and	  the	  general	  behavior	  of	  charter	  schools	  in	  a	  district.	  However,	  the	  analysis	  does	  provide	  evidence	  that	  suggests	  that	  in	  districts	  with	  for-­‐profit	  charters,	  it	  is	  more	  likely	  that	  charters	  of	  all	  types	  will	  operate	  according	  to	  market	  incentives	  by	  seeking	  to	  avoid	  low-­‐income	  students.	  There	  may	  be	  a	  socioeconomic	  market-­effect	  whereby	  the	  average	  socioeconomic	  status	  of	  student	  enrollment	  in	  charter	  schools	  that	  are	  independent	  or	  non-­‐profit	  is	  different	  when	  for-­‐profit	  charters	  exist	  or	  do	  not	  exist	  in	  the	  district.	  The	  predominantly	  for-­‐profit	  and	  mixed	  for-­‐profit/non-­‐profit	  districts	  exhibit	  substantially	  similar	  results	  in	  this	  analysis,	  while	  the	  districts	  without	  for-­‐profits	  exhibit	  directly	  opposite	  results.	  	  
	  	   132	  
Racial	  differences	  are	  not	  as	  straightforward.	  It	  is	  notable	  that	  three	  of	  the	  four	  districts	  with	  for-­‐profit	  charters,	  charter	  schools	  located	  in	  neighborhoods	  with	  substantially	  lower	  Black	  populations	  compared	  to	  non-­‐charters,	  while	  in	  both	  districts	  without	  for-­‐profit	  charter	  schools,	  charters	  located	  in	  neighborhoods	  with	  substantially	  higher	  Black	  populations.	  This	  did	  not	  equate	  to	  clear	  racial	  enrollment	  differences,	  but	  may	  be	  linked	  to	  socioeconomic	  enrollment	  differences.	  It	  could	  be	  that	  schools	  located	  in	  intensely	  racially	  segregated	  areas	  are	  less	  appealing	  to	  higher	  income	  Black	  families,	  although	  this	  is	  only	  one	  possible	  interpretation	  of	  the	  data.	  There	  is	  less	  evidence	  for	  a	  racial	  market-­effect	  than	  for	  a	  socioeconomic	  market-­effect.	  However,	  there	  is	  enough	  evidence	  of	  racial	  geo-­‐demographic	  differences	  that	  the	  possibility	  of	  a	  racial	  market-­effect	  cannot	  be	  discounted.	  It	  could	  be	  that	  these	  factors	  are	  related	  in	  more	  complicated	  ways,	  and	  that	  students	  are	  targeted	  based	  on	  multiple	  intersecting	  demographic	  factors.	  Every	  school	  district	  is	  different,	  and	  differences	  in	  student	  sorting	  patterns	  no	  doubt	  reflect	  a	  number	  of	  local	  particularities.	  However,	  the	  results	  of	  this	  analysis	  suggest	  that	  one	  common	  factor	  influencing	  student-­‐sorting	  patterns	  is	  whether	  for-­‐profit	  charter	  schools	  exist	  in	  significant	  numbers	  in	  a	  district.	  It	  is	  not	  possible	  to	  infer	  causality	  from	  these	  patterns.	  It	  could	  be	  that	  the	  presence	  of	  for-­‐profit	  schools	  creates	  a	  neoliberal-­‐ized	  school	  choice	  market	  where	  charter	  schools	  pursue	  competitive	  strategies	  to	  avoid	  the	  highest-­‐need	  students	  (Brown,	  2015,	  Lubienski,	  2007;	  Lubienski	  &	  Weitzel,	  2009).	  It	  could	  be	  that	  causality	  is	  reversed,	  that	  prior	  to	  the	  entry	  of	  for-­‐profit	  charter	  schools	  into	  a	  district	  that	  there	  were	  pre-­‐existing	  patterns	  whereby	  socioeconomically	  privileged	  students	  were	  more	  likely	  to	  attend	  charters.	  Either	  scenario	  is	  consistent	  with	  the	  hypothesis	  that	  for-­‐profit	  charter	  schools	  are	  incented	  to	  avoid	  certain	  student	  populations	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in	  order	  to	  maximize	  student	  outcomes,	  and	  by	  extension,	  return	  on	  investment.	  This	  might	  happen	  through	  choosing	  to	  enter	  or	  not	  enter	  particular	  districts,	  or	  it	  may	  entail	  effecting	  transformations	  to	  charter/non-­‐charter	  sorting	  patterns	  upon	  entering	  a	  district.	  There	  are	  clear	  differences	  in	  the	  overall	  enrollment	  of	  for-­‐profit	  charter	  schools	  versus	  non-­‐profit	  charters.	  Additionally,	  there	  is	  evidence	  of	  a	  market-­effect	  whereby	  in	  districts	  with	  for-­‐profit	  charters,	  other	  types	  of	  charter	  schools	  behave	  more	  like	  profit-­‐oriented	  than	  mission-­‐oriented	  schools.	  The	  next	  chapter	  will	  discuss	  in	  greater	  detail	  the	  implications	  of	  the	  findings	  described	  in	  this	  chapter.	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Chapter 5: Discussion & Conclusion 	  	   The	  previous	  chapter	  laid	  out	  the	  findings	  from	  the	  two-­‐stage	  analysis	  undertaken	  in	  this	  dissertation.	  This	  Chapter	  expands	  on	  these	  findings,	  comparing	  the	  results	  to	  the	  hypothesized	  relationships	  from	  Chapter	  Two’s	  theoretical	  framework.	  After	  that,	  there	  is	  a	  discussion	  of	  the	  implications	  of	  these	  findings.	  Then,	  the	  dissertation’s	  contribution	  to	  broader	  research	  will	  be	  detailed.	  Promising	  directions	  for	  future	  research	  will	  be	  laid	  out	  and	  a	  series	  of	  policy	  recommendations	  will	  be	  presented.	  The	  dissertation	  closes	  with	  a	  brief	  discussion	  of	  the	  implications	  of	  neoliberal	  school	  reform	  and	  the	  broader	  questions	  underlying	  current	  school	  reform	  initiatives.	  	  
Revisiting	  the	  Theoretical	  Framework	  	   In	  Chapter	  2,	  it	  was	  theorized	  that	  for-­‐profit	  charter	  schools	  represent	  a	  distinct	  phenomenon	  in	  public	  education.	  For-­‐profit	  charters	  are	  the	  paradigmatic	  exemplar	  of	  neoliberal	  logic	  in	  contemporary	  public	  education	  reform.	  This	  neoliberal	  logic	  radically	  re-­‐prioritizes	  the	  social	  functions	  of	  public	  education	  and	  normalizes	  market-­‐based	  competition	  as	  the	  proper	  regulator	  of	  the	  new	  “marketplace”	  of	  public	  education.	  The	  charter	  school	  movement	  emerged	  from	  dual	  origins	  (Scott	  &	  DiMartino,	  2010).	  On	  one	  hand,	  the	  democratic-­‐control	  perspective	  envisioned	  charters	  as	  a	  way	  to	  cultivate	  local	  schools	  that	  better	  fit	  specific	  community	  needs	  and	  which	  would	  be	  able	  to	  experiment	  with	  promising	  new	  educational	  methodologies.	  In	  contrast,	  the	  market-­‐control	  perspective	  is	  premised	  upon	  bringing	  market	  logic	  to	  public	  education.	  For-­‐profit	  charter	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schools	  are	  the	  natural	  outgrowth	  of	  the	  market	  control	  model.	  They	  exemplify	  public	  education	  recast	  as	  a	  free-­‐market	  competition.	  While	  individual	  independent	  and	  non-­‐profit	  charter	  schools	  may	  be	  more	  or	  less	  mission	  or	  profit-­‐oriented,	  for-­‐profit	  charters	  by	  definition	  can	  only	  be	  profit-­‐oriented	  (Weisbrod,	  1988,	  Conn,	  2002).	  It	  is	  this	  that	  distinguishes	  for-­‐profit	  charter	  schools.	  It	  is	  also	  what	  makes	  for-­‐profit	  charter	  schools	  a	  compelling	  test	  case	  for	  the	  impact	  of	  the	  neoliberal-­‐ization	  of	  public	  education.	  Neoliberal	  logic	  normalizes	  inequity	  through	  the	  reformulation	  of	  education	  as	  a	  zero-­‐sum	  competition.	  Schools	  that	  more	  closely	  follow	  neoliberal	  logic	  would	  be	  expected	  to	  be	  ideologically	  disinclined	  to	  and	  structurally	  incapable	  of	  promoting	  educational	  equity.	  Neoliberalism	  envisions	  market	  competition	  in	  public	  education	  as	  compelling	  increased	  efficiency,	  and	  by	  extension	  improvement	  in	  all	  schools.	  However,	  the	  behavior	  of	  charters	  in	  school	  marketplaces	  suggests	  their	  marketing	  tactics	  may	  not	  be	  geared	  towards	  competitive	  optimization,	  but	  instead	  towards	  cultivating	  a	  more	  desirable	  student	  population	  (Lubienski,	  2005,	  2007).	  In	  market-­‐ized	  public	  school	  districts,	  profit-­‐seeking	  charter	  schools	  may	  be	  able	  to	  take	  advantage	  of	  under-­‐informed	  consumers	  and	  competitive	  incentives	  in	  order	  to	  cultivate	  a	  demographically	  desirable	  student	  population.	  Targeting	  “less-­‐risky”	  student	  populations	  may	  permit	  for	  a	  greater	  educational	  return	  on	  investment.	  Because	  of	  the	  ideological	  and	  structural	  particularities	  of	  for-­‐profit	  charter	  schools,	  it	  was	  hypothesized	  that	  they	  may	  systematically	  under-­‐enroll	  the	  highest	  need	  student	  populations.	  Specifically	  it	  was	  hypothesized	  that	  for-­‐profit	  charters	  may	  under-­‐enroll	  low-­‐income	  and	  non-­‐white	  students.	  	  	   The	  results	  described	  in	  Chapter	  4	  present	  a	  complex	  picture,	  but	  one	  that	  is	  consistent	  with	  some	  of	  the	  hypothesized	  relationships	  in	  the	  theoretical	  framework.	  The	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clearest	  factors	  distinguishing	  for-­‐profit	  charters	  are	  socioeconomic.	  Analysis	  1	  demonstrated	  that	  there	  are	  significant	  differences	  in	  Title-­‐I	  eligibility	  rates	  between	  for-­‐profit	  and	  non-­‐profit	  charter	  schools,	  and	  in	  homeownership	  rates	  in	  Census	  Block	  Groups	  where	  they	  locate.	  There	  were	  clear	  socioeconomic	  differences	  in	  both	  the	  geo-­‐demography	  and	  student	  enrollment	  of	  for-­‐profit	  versus	  non-­‐profit	  charter	  schools.	  These	  differences	  are	  consonant	  with	  the	  hypothesis	  that	  profit-­‐seeking	  charter	  schools	  may	  seek	  to	  avoid	  enrolling	  low-­‐income	  students.	  Analysis	  2	  demonstrated	  systematic	  differences	  in	  the	  socioeconomic	  student	  sorting	  patterns	  between	  districts	  that	  had	  or	  did	  not	  have	  for-­‐profit	  charter	  schools.	  The	  presence	  of	  for-­‐profit	  charter	  schools	  may	  be	  linked	  to	  a	  decreased	  likelihood	  that	  all	  types	  of	  charter	  schools,	  not	  just	  for-­‐profit	  charters,	  educate	  low-­‐income	  student	  populations.	  In	  districts	  with	  for-­‐profit	  charter	  schools,	  independent	  charter	  schools	  enroll	  lower	  free/reduced	  lunch	  eligibility	  rates	  than	  non-­‐charters,	  while	  in	  districts	  without	  for-­‐profit	  charters,	  independent	  charters	  over-­‐enroll	  free/reduced	  lunch	  eligible	  students	  (Figure	  4.8).	  	  	   These	  results,	  taken	  together,	  suggest	  that	  there	  may	  be	  both	  a	  general	  difference	  between	  the	  student	  enrollment	  of	  for-­‐profit	  and	  non-­‐profit	  schools,	  as	  well	  as	  a	  potential	  socioeconomic	  market-­effect	  associated	  with	  the	  presence	  of	  for-­‐profit	  schools	  that	  impacts	  broader	  student	  enrollment	  patterns.	  Both	  of	  these	  patterns	  are	  consistent	  with	  the	  hypothesized	  relationships	  from	  the	  theoretical	  framework.	  For-­‐profit	  charter	  schools	  are	  distinctly	  less	  likely	  to	  enroll	  certain	  student	  population	  demographics,	  and	  districts	  with	  for-­‐profit	  charter	  schools	  demonstrate	  distinct	  student-­‐sorting	  patterns	  compared	  to	  districts	  that	  do	  not	  have	  for-­‐profit	  charters.	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Implications	  of	  Research	  Findings	  	   The	  overall	  differences	  between	  student	  populations	  in	  for-­‐profit	  and	  non-­‐profit	  charter	  schools	  as	  well	  as	  the	  evidence	  of	  a	  for-­‐profit	  market-­effect,	  suggest	  that	  the	  proliferation	  of	  for-­‐profit	  charter	  schools	  in	  a	  district	  may	  lead	  to	  systematic	  changes	  in	  student-­‐sorting	  patterns.	  What	  are	  the	  implications	  of	  these	  differences?	  In	  the	  districts	  in	  this	  study	  with	  for-­‐profit	  schools,	  charters	  tend	  to	  educate	  fewer	  low-­‐income	  students	  than	  non-­‐charters,	  while	  in	  the	  districts	  without	  for-­‐profit	  charters,	  charter	  schools	  tend	  to	  over-­‐enroll	  low-­‐income	  students	  relative	  to	  overall	  student	  populations.	  Interestingly,	  both	  of	  these	  patterns	  may	  be	  problematic.	  	  	   If	  charter	  schools	  in	  a	  district	  were	  predisposed	  to	  disproportionately	  under-­‐enroll	  low-­‐income	  students,	  as	  charter	  schools	  grew,	  enrolling	  an	  increasing	  proportion	  of	  students	  in	  the	  district,	  low-­‐income	  students	  could	  be	  increasingly	  concentrated	  in	  fewer	  non-­‐charter	  schools.	  The	  concentration	  of	  low-­‐income	  students	  is	  likely	  to	  be	  disadvantageous	  to	  their	  academic	  achievement	  and	  attainment	  (Rumberger	  &	  Palardy,	  2005;	  Borman	  &	  Dowling,	  2010).	  The	  disproportionate	  over-­‐enrollment	  of	  low-­‐income	  students	  in	  charter	  schools,	  as	  opposed	  to	  non-­‐charters,	  could	  also	  be	  problematic	  inasmuch	  as	  it	  likewise	  may	  entail	  the	  increasing	  concentration	  of	  disadvantaged	  students	  in	  fewer	  schools,	  in	  this	  case	  charter	  schools.	  In	  either	  case,	  there	  is	  a	  possibility	  of	  increased	  socioeconomic	  polarization	  with	  low-­‐income	  students	  over-­‐represented	  in	  one	  segment	  of	  schools.	  Either	  pattern	  risks	  concentrating	  students	  in	  ways	  that	  could	  worsen	  pre-­‐existing	  educational	  inequities.	  The	  magnitude	  of	  the	  socioeconomic	  gaps	  between	  charters	  and	  non-­‐charters	  varies	  by	  district.	  The	  comparison	  of	  Miami	  and	  Houston	  discussed	  in	  Chapter	  4	  illustrates	  there	  is	  a	  potential	  for	  extreme	  polarization	  by	  
	  	   138	  
socioeconomic	  status	  (illustrated	  in	  Figures	  4.4	  -­‐	  4.7).	  In	  Miami,	  3%	  of	  charter	  schools	  have	  a	  90-­‐100%	  free/reduced	  lunch	  eligible	  student	  population,	  while	  32%	  of	  traditional	  public	  schools	  do.	  By	  contrast,	  in	  Houston,	  34%	  of	  charter	  schools	  educate	  a	  90-­‐100%	  free/reduced	  lunch	  eligible	  student	  population,	  while	  less	  than	  1%	  of	  traditional	  public	  schools	  do.	  While	  every	  district	  does	  not	  demonstrate	  gaps	  so	  large,	  patterns	  such	  as	  this	  may	  reflect	  a	  meaningful	  increase	  in	  socioeconomic	  polarization,	  with	  fewer	  schools	  educating	  higher	  proportions	  of	  low-­‐income	  students.	  It	  is	  beyond	  the	  scope	  of	  this	  analysis	  to	  determine	  what	  the	  overall	  rates	  of	  increase	  in	  between-­‐school	  socioeconomic	  segregation	  result	  from	  the	  entry	  of	  charter	  schools.	  	   For	  a	  number	  of	  reasons,	  it	  may	  be	  more	  problematic	  when	  low-­‐income	  students	  are	  concentrated	  in	  non-­‐charter	  schools	  than	  when	  they	  are	  concentrated	  in	  charter	  schools.	  Large-­‐scale	  non-­‐profit	  charter	  operators	  may	  be	  able	  to	  disproportionately	  access	  supplemental	  funding.	  Houston,	  one	  of	  the	  districts	  in	  the	  study,	  is	  notable	  as	  the	  origin	  of	  the	  Knowledge	  is	  Power	  Program	  (KIPP)	  schools,	  the	  largest	  non-­‐profit	  charter	  chain	  in	  the	  United	  States.	  KIPP	  has	  demonstrated	  the	  ability	  to	  leverage	  substantial	  philanthropic	  investment,	  such	  that	  its	  per-­‐pupil	  funding	  levels	  tend	  to	  be	  substantially	  higher	  than	  traditional	  public	  schools	  in	  the	  districts	  where	  they	  operate,	  averaging	  $6,500	  more	  per	  pupil	  than	  traditional	  public	  schools	  in	  the	  same	  districts	  (Miron,	  Urschel	  &	  Saxton,	  2011).	  KIPP	  is	  exceptional	  in	  this	  regard,	  but	  non-­‐profits	  in	  general	  are	  structurally	  better	  suited	  to	  leveraging	  additional	  funding	  compared	  to	  for-­‐profit	  charters.	  The	  higher	  level	  of	  funding	  for	  schools	  that	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  disproportionately	  enroll	  low-­‐income	  students	  could	  be	  seen	  as	  an	  essentially	  redistributive	  measure.	  If	  low-­‐income	  students	  are	  receiving	  more	  per-­‐pupil	  funding	  at	  non-­‐profit	  charter	  schools	  like	  KIPP,	  this	  represents	  a	  form	  of	  
	  	   139	  
equity-­‐based	  reform,	  although	  it	  is	  not	  entirely	  unproblematic.	  KIPP	  has	  also	  been	  shown	  to	  have	  extremely	  high	  attrition	  rates,	  indicating	  that	  they	  may	  be	  actively	  trying	  to	  eliminate	  their	  highest-­‐need	  students	  while	  maintaining	  an	  overall	  high-­‐need	  student	  population	  demographic	  (Miron,	  Urschel,	  &	  Saxton,	  2011).	  	   For-­‐profit	  schools	  are	  generally	  not	  able	  to	  procure	  philanthropic	  funding	  on	  the	  same	  order	  as	  non-­‐profits,	  and	  as	  such	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  have	  lower	  per	  pupil	  expenditures	  than	  traditional	  public	  schools	  (Morley,	  2006).	  They	  also	  have	  been	  found	  to	  spend	  lower	  proportions	  of	  their	  Total	  Current	  Expenditures	  on	  instruction	  than	  both	  traditional	  public	  schools	  and	  other	  types	  of	  charter	  schools	  (Miron	  &	  Urschel,	  2010).	  Additionally,	  in	  their	  effort	  to	  maximize	  profits,	  for-­‐profits	  are	  incentivized	  to	  lower	  instructional	  costs	  as	  much	  as	  possible	  (Miron,	  Urschel,	  Mathis	  &	  Tonquist,	  2010).	  Following	  a	  corporate	  model,	  for-­‐profit	  providers	  are	  also	  more	  likely	  to	  spend	  higher	  proportions	  of	  their	  funding	  on	  marketing,	  leaving	  less	  for	  instruction.	  Of	  course	  they	  seek	  to	  retain	  a	  profit	  as	  well,	  further	  reducing	  instructional	  funding.	  Given	  these	  facts,	  it	  is	  perhaps	  better	  if	  for-­‐profit	  charter	  schools	  do	  not	  serve	  the	  highest-­‐need	  students,	  as	  students	  in	  for-­‐profit	  schools	  are	  likely	  to	  receive	  a	  lower	  level	  of	  per-­‐pupil	  investment	  than	  students	  in	  either	  non-­‐profit	  charters	  or	  traditional	  public	  schools.	  For-­‐profit	  schools	  have	  demonstrated	  worse	  academic	  outcomes	  than	  non-­‐profit	  charters	  even	  when	  for-­‐profit	  schools	  educate	  lower	  proportions	  of	  low-­‐income	  students	  (Miron	  &	  Gulosino,	  2013).	  However,	  if	  for-­‐profit	  charters	  skim	  the	  lowest-­‐need	  students	  in	  a	  district,	  this	  leaves	  dwindling	  numbers	  of	  traditional	  public	  schools	  to	  enroll	  disproportionately	  higher-­‐need	  student	  populations.	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For-­‐profit	  charter	  schools,	  operating	  in	  a	  market-­‐oriented	  manner,	  typically	  invest	  heavily	  in	  marketing	  (Lubienski	  2005,	  2007).	  The	  expansion	  of	  school	  marketing	  concurrent	  with	  the	  entry	  of	  for-­‐profit	  charter	  schools	  into	  a	  district	  may	  compel	  other	  charter	  schools	  and	  traditional	  public	  schools	  to	  reallocate	  funds	  into	  marketing	  in	  order	  to	  compete	  for	  enrollment.	  This	  coincides	  with	  a	  decrease	  in	  enrollment	  for	  district-­‐operated	  schools	  with	  every	  new	  charter	  school	  that	  opens	  in	  a	  district.	  As	  traditional	  public	  schools	  are	  closed	  in	  favor	  of	  charter	  schools,	  this	  increases	  their	  transportation	  budget,	  as	  fewer	  schools	  must	  serve	  larger	  areas	  of	  districts.	  If	  for-­‐profit	  charters	  do	  disproportionately	  under-­‐enroll	  low-­‐income	  students,	  traditional	  public	  schools	  are	  compelled	  to	  make	  up	  the	  difference	  by	  over-­‐enrolling	  low-­‐income	  students.	  Traditional	  public	  schools	  may	  simultaneously	  have	  less	  money,	  and	  increased	  marketing	  and	  transportation	  costs,	  resulting	  in	  a	  seriously	  diminished	  capacity	  to	  adequately	  educate	  these	  students.	  The	  entry	  of	  non-­‐profit	  charter	  schools	  into	  struggling	  urban	  districts	  presents	  its	  own	  set	  of	  challenges.	  In	  addition	  to	  the	  aforementioned	  structural	  stresses	  on	  marketing	  and	  transportation,	  non-­‐profits	  may	  be	  filtering	  their	  student	  populations	  in	  other	  ways.	  KIPP,	  and	  other	  non-­‐profit	  charters	  have	  been	  found	  to	  engage	  in	  “push-­‐out”	  tactics	  that	  seek	  to	  eliminate	  students	  that	  do	  not	  perform	  up	  to	  a	  certain	  academic	  level	  (Miron,	  Urschel	  &	  Saxton,	  2011).	  There	  is	  also	  a	  selection	  bias	  at	  work	  in	  the	  case	  of	  charters	  in	  general,	  one	  that	  may	  be	  particularly	  magnified	  at	  schools	  like	  KIPP	  that	  call	  for	  particularly	  stringent	  requirements	  on	  students	  and	  families	  seeking	  to	  enroll.	  This	  selection	  bias	  means	  that	  parents	  that	  seek	  to	  enroll	  in	  a	  charter	  school	  are	  demonstrating	  a	  certain	  baseline	  level	  of	  involvement	  in	  their	  child(ren)’s	  education,	  a	  factor	  that	  is	  substantially	  predictive	  of	  academic	  success.	  Thus	  the	  population	  of	  families	  that	  seek	  to	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enroll	  in	  charter	  schools	  and	  those	  that	  send	  their	  children	  to	  neighborhood	  public	  schools	  would	  not	  be	  expected	  to	  be	  similarly	  successful.	  In	  these	  ways,	  schools	  that	  appear	  to	  educate	  a	  high-­‐need	  population	  (primarily	  low-­‐income,	  largely	  non-­‐white)	  may	  actually	  be	  educating	  the	  particular	  subset	  of	  this	  population	  that	  would	  be	  most	  likely	  to	  demonstrate	  higher	  educational	  achievement	  and	  attainment.	  That	  being	  said,	  it	  seems	  likely	  that	  the	  enrollment	  patterns	  associated	  with	  for-­‐profit	  charter	  schools	  are	  likely	  to	  be	  more	  harmful	  to	  the	  most	  high-­‐needs	  students	  than	  the	  changes	  associated	  with	  non-­‐profit	  charters.	  	  
Contribution	  to	  Research	  
	  	   Prior	  to	  the	  analyses	  conducted	  in	  this	  dissertation,	  there	  had	  been	  no	  population-­‐level	  comparisons	  of	  the	  student	  demographic	  composition	  and	  geo-­‐demography	  of	  for-­‐profit	  and	  non-­‐profit	  charter	  schools.	  Analysis	  1	  provided	  the	  first	  such	  comparison	  of	  how	  these	  two	  school	  types	  differ	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  demographics	  of	  their	  student	  enrollment	  and	  of	  the	  neighborhoods	  where	  they	  locate.	  Analysis	  1	  permits	  a	  clearer	  understanding	  of	  how	  the	  profit	  motive	  may	  influence	  the	  behavior	  of	  charter	  school	  operators	  by	  under-­‐enrolling	  socioeconomically	  disadvantaged	  students.	  Analysis	  2	  deepened	  the	  insights	  from	  the	  population-­‐level	  study,	  providing	  evidence	  of	  a	  possible	  market-­effect	  associated	  with	  the	  presence	  of	  for-­‐profit	  charter	  schools.	  The	  possibility	  that	  the	  existence	  of	  for-­‐profit	  charter	  schools	  could	  impact	  the	  demographic	  student-­‐sorting	  patterns	  of	  other	  types	  of	  charter	  schools,	  not	  only	  for-­‐profit	  charters,	  suggests	  that	  market-­‐oriented	  reforms	  may	  have	  an	  impact	  beyond	  what	  had	  previously	  been	  thought.	  Analysis	  2	  contributes	  to	  research	  by	  suggesting	  that	  it	  is	  important	  to	  attend	  to	  the	  ways	  that	  new	  institutional	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forms	  of	  schools,	  guided	  by	  particular	  ideological	  commitments,	  may	  transform	  the	  broader	  landscape	  for	  equity	  in	  public	  education.	  It	  is	  the	  first	  study	  to	  suggest	  and	  provide	  evidence	  of	  a	  for-­‐profit	  market-­effect.	  	   This	  study	  provides	  a	  basis	  for	  further	  analyses	  of	  for-­‐profit	  charter	  schools.	  It	  suggests	  that	  a	  closer	  investigation	  of	  the	  impacts	  of	  for-­‐profit	  charters	  on	  racial	  and	  socioeconomic	  segregation	  is	  warranted.	  The	  current	  study	  cannot	  demonstrate	  how	  student	  enrollment	  gaps	  between	  for-­‐profit	  charters	  and	  other	  types	  of	  schools	  develop,	  although	  the	  role	  of	  geography	  is	  likely	  to	  be	  critical.	  Both	  of	  these	  analyses	  expanded	  knowledge	  about	  the	  distinct	  impact	  of	  for-­‐profit	  charters	  on	  racial	  and,	  particularly,	  socioeconomic	  segregation.	  Beyond	  the	  contributions	  represented	  by	  the	  particular	  insights	  of	  this	  dissertation,	  this	  research	  demonstrates	  the	  importance	  of	  looking	  at	  charter	  schools	  in	  a	  more	  nuanced	  manner.	  Too	  often	  charter	  school	  research	  treats	  charter	  schools	  as	  a	  singular	  phenomenon,	  when	  in	  fact	  they	  represent	  an	  incredibly	  diverse	  set	  of	  forms	  (Wells	  et	  al,	  1999).	  While	  differences	  between	  for-­‐profit	  charters	  and	  other	  types	  of	  charters	  was	  the	  focus	  of	  this	  analysis,	  there	  are	  a	  great	  many	  other	  ways	  to	  structure	  research	  in	  order	  to	  further	  explore	  particular	  subsets	  of	  charter	  schools.	  Some	  researchers	  have	  sought	  to	  better	  define	  typologies	  of	  charter	  schools	  and	  why	  these	  distinctions	  matter	  (Henig,	  Holyoke,	  Brown	  &	  Lacireno-­‐Paquet,	  2005;	  Miron,	  2007).	  However	  too	  much	  research	  on	  charter	  schools	  still	  relies	  on	  over-­‐generalizations,	  failing	  to	  contextualize	  fundamental	  differences	  between,	  for	  example,	  for-­‐profit,	  non-­‐profit	  and	  independent	  charter	  schools.	  	  	   This	  study	  also	  emphasizes	  the	  importance	  of	  utilizing	  a	  geographic	  perspective	  in	  researching	  school	  segregation	  issues.	  By	  combining	  variables	  analyzing	  the	  demographic	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characteristics	  of	  both	  census	  block	  groups	  where	  schools	  locate	  and	  demographic	  student	  enrollment	  across	  various	  types	  of	  schools,	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  better	  understand	  what	  might	  drive	  observed	  patterns	  of	  segregation.	  Analysis	  1	  showed	  that	  differences	  in	  the	  locational	  choices	  of	  for-­‐profit	  and	  non-­‐profit	  charters	  seemed	  to	  be	  driving	  student	  enrollment	  differences,	  affirming	  existing	  local-­‐level	  findings	  (Lubienski,	  Gulosino	  &	  Weitzel,	  2009;	  Gulosino	  &	  Lubienski,	  2011).	  In	  the	  new,	  often	  highly	  marketized	  urban	  education	  landscape,	  it	  may	  not	  be	  clear	  whether	  geography	  and/or	  marketing	  and/or	  something	  else	  are	  driving	  segregation.	  Cities	  in	  the	  United	  States	  remain	  highly	  racially	  segregated,	  and	  increasingly	  socioeconomically	  segregated.	  Segregation	  is	  a	  spatial	  concept,	  whereby	  the	  persistent	  spatial	  isolation	  of	  certain	  groups	  of	  people	  (historically	  non-­‐white	  and	  low-­‐income	  people)	  from	  others	  based	  on	  exclusionary	  practices	  on	  the	  part	  of	  dominant	  groups	  drives	  persistent	  inequality.	  The	  new	  age	  of	  vastly	  expanded	  school	  marketing,	  and	  increased	  student	  mobility	  associated	  with	  charter	  schools	  means	  that	  school	  segregation	  may	  increasingly	  be	  driven	  by	  non-­‐geographic	  factors.	  Analysis	  2	  found	  that	  many	  of	  the	  socioeconomic	  enrollment	  differences	  between	  charters	  and	  non-­‐charters	  was	  not	  attributable	  to	  geo-­‐demography,	  suggesting	  that	  marketing	  and/or	  other	  non-­‐geographic	  factors	  may	  play	  an	  increasingly	  significant	  role	  in	  student	  segregation.	  It	  is	  important	  to	  continue	  to	  develop	  better	  understandings	  of	  how	  geographic	  and	  non-­‐geographic	  factors	  interact	  to	  drive	  processes	  of	  racial	  and	  socioeconomic	  segregation.	  	  
Directions	  For	  Future	  Research	  	   The	  analyses	  described	  in	  this	  dissertation	  represent	  the	  beginning	  of	  a	  research	  program	  exploring	  how	  for-­‐profit	  charter	  schools	  may	  impact	  student-­‐sorting	  patterns,	  and	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by	  extension	  racial	  and	  socioeconomic	  segregation.	  There	  are	  a	  number	  of	  different	  analytical	  strategies	  that	  could	  expand	  on	  this	  research.	  	  
Multivariate	  Analysis	  	   Because	  of	  the	  exploratory	  nature	  of	  the	  analyses	  in	  this	  dissertation,	  each	  regression	  model	  entailed	  the	  use	  of	  one	  or	  two	  predictive	  variables.	  A	  follow-­‐up	  analysis	  utilizing	  a	  multivariate	  approach	  would	  be	  better	  able	  to	  determine	  whether	  omitted	  variable	  bias	  or	  confounding	  factors	  may	  challenge	  the	  findings	  of	  these	  analyses.	  In	  addition,	  a	  multivariate	  analysis	  could	  offer	  a	  more	  nuanced	  perspective	  of	  how	  the	  factors	  explored	  here	  interact	  with	  other	  variables,	  and	  thus	  give	  a	  clearer	  picture	  of	  how	  the	  growth	  of	  charter	  schools	  in	  general,	  and	  for-­‐profit	  charter	  schools	  in	  particular,	  may	  be	  likely	  to	  impact	  racial	  and	  socioeconomic	  segregation.	  	  	  
Longitudinal	  Analysis	  	   The	  analyses	  presented	  here	  are	  from	  a	  single	  point	  in	  time.	  A	  longitudinal	  analysis	  would	  be	  better	  suited	  to	  tracing	  the	  impact	  of	  growth	  patterns	  of	  for-­‐profit	  charter	  schools.	  This	  may	  permit	  a	  clearer	  understanding	  of	  how	  the	  growth	  of	  for-­‐profit	  charter	  schools	  impacts	  student-­‐sorting	  patters	  in	  particular	  districts	  by	  exploring	  whether	  and	  how	  increases	  in	  student	  enrollment	  at	  for-­‐profit	  charter	  schools	  over	  time	  was	  associated	  with	  increases	  in	  overall	  between-­‐school	  racial	  or	  socioeconomic	  segregation	  in	  a	  given	  school	  district.	  If	  it	  was	  found	  that	  either	  increases	  in	  for-­‐profit	  enrollment,	  the	  entry	  of	  for-­‐profit	  charter	  schools	  into	  a	  district,	  or	  the	  reaching	  of	  some	  threshold	  point	  in	  for-­‐profit	  charter	  enrollment	  correlated	  with	  a	  rise	  in	  between	  school	  segregation,	  this	  would	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provide	  stronger	  evidence	  of	  a	  link	  between	  for-­‐profit	  charter	  schools	  and	  particular	  between-­‐school	  segregation	  patterns.	  It	  may	  also	  provide	  better	  evidence	  for	  what,	  if	  any,	  threshold	  of	  for-­‐profit	  penetration	  is	  necessary	  to	  produce	  a	  for-­profit	  market	  effect.	  Conversely,	  if	  no	  increase	  in	  between-­‐school	  segregation	  was	  associated	  with	  the	  growth	  of	  for-­‐profit	  charters,	  that	  may	  indicate	  that	  for-­‐profit	  charters	  are	  instead	  more	  likely	  to	  be	  taking	  over	  existing	  niches	  within	  already	  racially	  and	  socioeconomically	  segregated	  school	  districts.	  	   Longitudinal	  geospatial	  analysis	  could	  also	  be	  utilized	  to	  analyze	  charter	  school	  growth	  patterns.	  For-­‐profit	  charter	  schools	  are	  highly	  concentrated	  in	  a	  few	  states,	  with	  78%	  of	  all	  for-­‐profit	  charters	  located	  in	  four	  states:	  Michigan,	  Florida,	  Arizona	  or	  Ohio.	  Within	  those	  states,	  for-­‐profit	  charters	  are	  further	  concentrated	  in	  a	  limited	  number	  of	  urban	  districts.	  Understanding	  how	  for-­‐profit	  charter	  schools	  have	  historically	  expanded	  within	  districts,	  between	  districts,	  and	  between	  states	  could	  offer	  greater	  insight	  into	  what,	  if	  any,	  coordinated	  market	  strategies	  for-­‐profit	  charter	  schools	  have	  pursued	  to	  grow	  in	  general,	  and	  how	  growth	  strategies	  have	  aligned	  with	  geo-­‐demographic	  student	  recruitment	  strategies.	  	  	  	  
Greater	  Detail	  in	  Individual	  Districts	  	   The	  second	  part	  of	  this	  dissertation’s	  two-­‐part	  analysis	  looks	  at	  six	  districts	  in	  detail.	  This	  allowed	  for	  the	  development	  of	  a	  more	  nuanced	  understanding	  of	  how	  the	  existence	  of	  for-­‐profit	  charter	  schools	  in	  a	  district	  is	  associated	  with	  particular	  student-­‐sorting	  patterns.	  However,	  an	  even	  more	  fine-­‐grained	  analysis	  that	  focused	  on	  a	  single	  school	  district	  could	  provide	  a	  deeper	  understanding	  of	  the	  dynamics	  related	  to	  the	  growth	  of	  for-­‐profit	  charter	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schools	  and	  student	  sorting	  patterns.	  Such	  an	  analysis	  could	  better	  account	  for	  the	  unique	  history	  and	  current	  conditions	  of	  a	  district.	  It	  would	  also	  permit	  a	  more	  in-­‐depth	  examination	  of	  individual	  education	  management	  organizations,	  which	  may	  yield	  additional	  insight	  into	  why	  observed	  student-­‐sorting	  patterns	  hold.	  Some	  studies	  of	  this	  nature	  have	  been	  conducted,	  such	  as	  Gulsonio	  &	  Lubienski’s	  (2011)	  analysis	  of	  Detroit	  and	  Gulsonio	  &	  D’Entremont’s	  (2011)	  analysis	  in	  New	  Jersey.	  Further	  studies	  of	  this	  nature	  could	  provide	  a	  clearer	  knowledge	  base	  of	  how	  and	  why	  certain	  segregation	  patterns	  emerge	  in	  concert	  with	  the	  growth	  of	  charter	  schools	  of	  various	  types.	  It	  could	  also	  provide	  insight	  into	  complex	  differences	  between	  different	  charter	  school	  providers	  that	  are	  not	  entirely	  exposed	  by	  looking	  solely	  at	  whether	  they	  are	  or	  are	  for-­‐profit,	  non-­‐profit	  or	  independent.	  	  
Virtual	  Schools	  	   For-­‐profit	  EMOs	  are	  increasingly	  moving	  into	  the	  realm	  of	  online,	  or	  virtual	  education.	  Virtual	  schools	  can	  reduce	  or	  eliminate	  many	  of	  the	  costs	  associated	  with	  so-­‐called	  brick-­‐and-­‐mortar	  schools,	  including	  facility	  construction,	  rent	  and	  maintenance,	  and	  can	  dramatically	  reduce	  other	  costs,	  particularly	  in	  instructional	  staff.	  This	  potentially	  makes	  virtual	  schools	  a	  more	  profitable	  venture	  than	  brick-­‐and-­‐mortar	  schools	  for	  profit-­‐oriented	  EMOs.	  Research	  is	  limited	  at	  this	  point,	  but	  with	  virtual	  schools	  growing	  at	  exponential	  rates	  (projected	  growth	  of	  3,100%	  between	  2010-­‐2016,	  Waters,	  Barbour,	  Menchaca,	  2014),	  this	  is	  sure	  to	  be	  a	  similarly	  quickly	  developing	  area	  of	  research.	  For-­‐profit	  EMOs	  are	  currently	  dominant	  in	  the	  field	  of	  virtual	  schools,	  and	  there	  are	  indications	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that	  virtual	  schools	  will	  be	  the	  primary	  growth	  segment	  for	  for-­‐profit	  charter	  operators	  in	  the	  near	  future.	  	   Virtual	  schools	  present	  a	  different	  challenge	  in	  terms	  of	  segregation.	  By	  virtue	  of	  their	  structure	  they	  serve	  to	  segregate	  students	  at	  a	  much	  more	  granular	  scale,	  at	  the	  level	  of	  the	  individual	  or	  the	  household.	  They	  may	  also	  be	  more	  likely	  to	  serve	  suburban	  and	  rural	  populations	  where	  brick-­‐and-­‐mortar	  charters	  are	  less	  likely	  to	  be	  located.	  What	  impact	  these	  trends	  have	  on	  overall	  student	  segregation	  levels	  is	  not	  well	  understood	  at	  this	  time.	  It	  is	  also	  not	  well	  understood	  what	  the	  long-­‐term	  impact	  on	  individual	  students	  and	  more	  broadly	  of	  increasing	  segregation	  from	  other	  students	  result	  if	  the	  growth	  of	  virtual	  schools	  leads	  to	  increasing	  numbers	  of	  students	  not	  attending	  brick-­‐and-­‐mortar	  schools.	  On	  one	  hand,	  online	  schooling	  could	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  possible	  route	  for	  bypassing	  segregated	  schooling,	  by	  rendering	  neighborhood	  demographics	  irrelevant	  to	  school	  composition.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  online	  schooling	  could	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  particularly	  pernicious	  form	  of	  segregation	  as	  it	  isolates	  individual	  students	  from	  substantial	  in-­‐person	  contact	  with	  peers.	  There	  are	  also	  questions	  about	  which	  students	  are	  likely	  to	  exit	  physical	  schools	  and	  enroll	  in	  virtual	  schools.	  There	  are	  gaps	  in	  online	  access	  that	  may	  result	  in	  low-­‐income	  students	  being	  less	  able	  to	  access	  online	  schools.	  Additionally,	  recent	  research	  into	  online	  schools	  has	  found	  that	  student	  academic	  performance	  consistently	  trails	  far	  behind	  that	  of	  students	  in	  brick	  and	  mortar	  schools	  (Gill	  et	  al,	  2015).	  Whether	  online	  charter	  schools	  will	  continue	  to	  grow,	  or	  whether	  continued	  academic	  failures	  will	  impede	  the	  segment’s	  expansion	  is	  unclear.	  More	  research	  is	  needed	  into	  this	  growing	  phenomenon,	  although	  the	  
	  	   148	  
methods	  utilized	  in	  this	  study	  may	  be	  inadequate	  to	  that	  task	  due	  to	  the	  non-­‐traditional	  geography	  of	  attending	  school	  in	  “cyber-­‐space”.	  	  
Regional	  Analyses	  	   The	  United	  States	  is	  a	  large,	  diverse	  nation.	  States	  differ	  substantially	  from	  each	  other,	  and	  districts	  within	  and	  between	  states	  likewise	  differ	  greatly.	  In	  addition,	  there	  are	  certain	  regional	  particularities	  that	  make	  generalizations	  about	  public	  education	  in	  the	  US	  difficult	  at	  times.	  In	  particular,	  the	  US	  South	  differs	  in	  important	  ways	  from	  other	  regions	  of	  the	  US	  (Morris	  &	  Monroe,	  2009).	  Historically,	  the	  scale	  of	  segregation	  in	  the	  South	  has	  been	  different	  than	  in	  the	  North,	  dating	  back	  to	  before	  the	  Civil	  War,	  when	  Black	  slaves	  and	  white	  masters	  lived	  in	  close	  proximity.	  Under	  Jim	  Crow	  laws,	  residential	  segregation	  was	  not	  required	  on	  the	  same	  scale	  as	  in	  the	  North	  to	  maintain	  segregation	  of	  public	  institutions.	  Also	  of	  note,	  school	  districts	  tend	  to	  be	  larger	  and	  coterminous	  with	  county	  boundaries	  in	  the	  South.	  All	  of	  these	  differences	  mean	  that	  in	  the	  South,	  desegregation	  within	  district	  boundaries	  has	  historically	  been	  theoretically	  easier.	  Indeed	  the	  South	  experienced	  the	  highest	  degree	  of	  success	  in	  desegregating	  public	  schools	  between	  the	  1960s	  and	  1980s	  (Orfield	  &	  Lee,	  2004).	  Because	  of	  the	  unique	  history	  of	  school	  segregation	  in	  the	  South,	  a	  study	  focusing	  on	  charters	  and	  segregation	  in	  this	  region	  could	  be	  particularly	  illuminating.	  	  	   Because	  of	  particular	  regional	  differences,	  an	  analysis	  that	  explores	  the	  nature	  of	  racial	  and	  socioeconomic	  sorting	  of	  students	  between	  charters	  and	  non-­‐charters,	  and	  between	  different	  sorts	  of	  charters	  in	  the	  US	  South	  could	  be	  useful.	  The	  typology	  utilized	  in	  this	  study	  selected	  six	  districts,	  two	  from	  what	  would	  be	  considered	  the	  South	  (Miami	  and	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Houston),	  but	  sorted	  them	  into	  different	  categories	  based	  on	  the	  proliferation	  of	  for-­‐profit	  schools.	  There	  were	  substantial	  differences	  between	  those	  districts	  with	  for-­‐profit	  charters	  and	  those	  without,	  but	  a	  regional	  analysis	  may	  reveal	  additional	  distinguishing	  factors	  characteristic	  of	  that	  particular	  region.	  	  
Policy	  Recommendations	  and	  Obstacles	  	   A	  few	  policy	  suggestions	  are	  presented	  here.	  However,	  each	  of	  the	  recommendations	  comes	  with	  a	  unique	  set	  of	  obstacles,	  making	  it	  difficult	  to	  present	  clear,	  easily	  implemented,	  uncontroversial	  fixes	  to	  problems	  presented	  by	  for-­‐profit	  charter	  schools.	  Many	  of	  the	  solutions	  proposed	  below	  directly	  contradict	  the	  central	  ideology	  behind	  the	  charter	  school	  movement.	  The	  lack	  of	  easy	  solutions	  points	  to	  the	  need	  to	  take	  up	  broader	  questions	  regarding	  the	  social	  purposes	  of	  public	  education.	  	  
Enact/Enforce	  Racial	  and	  Socioeconomic	  Status	  Balancing	  Provisions	  	   At	  least	  fourteen	  states	  have	  some	  sort	  of	  provision	  stipulating	  that	  the	  racial	  composition	  of	  charter	  schools	  must	  reflect	  to	  some	  extent	  the	  racial	  composition	  of	  the	  area	  or	  district	  in	  which	  they	  are	  located	  (Oluwole	  &	  Green,	  2009).	  Because	  charter	  school	  law	  is	  primarily	  determined	  at	  the	  state	  level,	  the	  structure	  and	  language	  of	  racial	  balance	  provisions	  for	  charter	  schools	  likewise	  differ	  by	  state.	  Some	  prescribe	  particular	  racial	  balance	  targets	  that	  charter	  schools	  are	  supposed	  to	  achieve.	  As	  an	  example	  of	  a	  strict	  guideline:	  “Nevada's	  racial-­‐balancing	  provision	  requires	  that	  the	  racial	  balance	  of	  charter	  schools	  not	  differ	  by	  more	  than	  10%	  from	  the	  racial	  composition	  of	  students	  in	  the	  school	  district”	  (Oluwole	  &	  Green,	  2009,	  p.	  34).	  Some	  states	  lack	  specific	  guidance,	  in	  favor	  of	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“general	  non-­‐discrimination	  provisions”.	  However,	  even	  in	  those	  states	  where	  charter	  law	  contains	  clear,	  unambiguous	  racial	  balance	  provisions	  and	  strict	  consequences	  are	  prescribed	  for	  violations,	  enforcement	  tends	  to	  be	  weak	  or	  non-­‐existent.	  If	  strict	  racial	  representational	  stipulations	  existed	  in	  every	  state,	  and	  were	  consistently	  enforced,	  this	  would	  effectively	  create	  a	  barrier	  to	  charter	  school	  growth	  leading	  to	  the	  concentration	  of	  students	  by	  race.	  Notably,	  these	  provisions	  do	  not	  deal	  with	  socioeconomic	  balance,	  which	  may	  be	  of	  particular	  concern	  given	  the	  findings	  of	  this	  dissertation.	  There	  is	  also	  reason	  to	  believe	  that	  this	  approach	  may	  present	  more	  problems	  than	  it	  solves.	  	   One	  problem	  with	  enforcing	  representational	  enrollment	  in	  charter	  schools	  is	  that	  it	  goes	  against	  one	  of	  the	  central	  justifications	  for	  charter	  schools.	  A	  fundamental	  appeal	  of	  charter	  schools	  is	  that	  they	  represent	  a	  more	  diverse	  range	  of	  specific	  curricula,	  pedagogical	  approaches,	  subject-­‐area	  concentrations	  and	  cultural	  orientations	  than	  traditional	  public	  schools	  can	  offer.	  The	  greater	  specificity	  of	  approach	  represented	  by	  different	  charter	  schools	  may	  explicitly	  or	  implicitly	  appeal	  differently	  to	  families	  from	  diverse	  racial	  and	  socioeconomic	  backgrounds.	  Enforcing	  representational	  enrollment	  may	  conflict	  with	  the	  efforts	  of	  charter	  schools	  to	  actively	  cultivate	  particular	  academic	  niches,	  and	  in	  the	  process	  compromise	  the	  rationale	  for	  charter	  schools	  overall.	  Ethnic,	  cultural,	  racial	  or	  linguistically	  oriented	  charter	  schools	  present	  a	  particular	  challenge	  to	  the	  notion	  that	  charter	  schools	  should	  be	  racially	  representative	  of	  the	  districts	  in	  which	  they	  locate	  (Eckes,	  Fox	  &	  Buchanan,	  2011).	  In	  these	  contexts	  a	  particular	  school	  may	  serve	  a	  felt	  need	  in	  a	  particular	  community,	  and	  yet	  serve	  to	  exacerbate	  segregation.	  Can	  a	  culturally	  focused	  charter	  school	  be	  compelled	  to	  enroll	  a	  racially	  representative	  student	  population	  when	  families	  from	  different	  cultural	  backgrounds	  may	  have	  no	  interest	  in	  enrolling	  their	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child(ren)	  in	  such	  a	  school?	  Or	  should	  such	  schools	  be	  prohibited?	  Either	  option	  seems	  to	  violate	  a	  key	  assumption	  about	  the	  value	  and	  purpose	  of	  charter	  schools.	  Either	  approach	  serves	  to	  reduce	  the	  family/consumer	  freedom	  of	  choice.	  Any	  strict	  racial/socioeconomic	  balancing	  requirements	  will	  naturally	  conflict	  with	  the	  freedom	  of	  choice	  ideal	  central	  to	  the	  school	  choice	  narrative.	  	   Another	  factor	  inhibiting	  proportional	  enrollment	  is	  pre-­‐existing	  residential	  segregation	  in	  urban	  school	  districts.	  In	  a	  district	  with	  substantial	  racial	  and/or	  socioeconomic	  segregation,	  which	  is	  to	  say	  virtually	  any	  large	  urban	  district	  in	  the	  nation,	  a	  school	  must	  surmount	  substantial	  logistical	  barriers	  in	  order	  to	  garner	  school	  enrollment	  patterns	  that	  reflect	  the	  overall	  racial	  composition	  of	  the	  district.	  This	  is	  and	  has	  been	  a	  problem	  for	  traditional	  public	  schools,	  as	  demonstrated	  by	  the	  high	  costs	  associated	  with	  desegregating	  bussing	  programs.	  It	  may	  be	  an	  even	  more	  intractable	  problem	  for	  charters.	  There	  is	  a	  question	  of	  who	  would	  bear	  the	  costs	  for	  ensuring	  that	  individual	  charter	  schools	  enroll	  racially	  and	  socioeconomically	  representative	  sample	  of	  a	  district’s	  population.	  This	  could	  present	  extreme	  obstacles	  in	  terms	  of	  providing	  transportation,	  even	  if	  it	  was	  possible	  to	  convince	  families	  to	  send	  children	  to	  schools	  quite	  distant	  from	  their	  homes.	  Traditional	  public	  schools	  may	  be	  better	  equipped	  than	  a	  multitude	  of	  charter	  operators	  to	  coordinate	  across	  an	  entire	  district	  due	  to	  their	  central	  administration	  and	  district-­‐wide	  purview.	  There	  is	  also	  the	  question	  of	  whether	  a	  school	  being	  demographically	  representative	  of	  a	  school	  district	  reflects	  any	  true	  level	  of	  integration.	  In	  many	  highly	  segregated	  metropolitan	  areas,	  individual	  districts	  have	  highly	  concentrated	  disadvantaged	  populations,	  often	  surrounded	  by	  wealthier,	  whiter	  suburbs.	  Detroit	  for	  example	  has	  83%	  Black	  students	  and	  a	  46%	  poverty	  rate,	  meaning	  that	  integration	  within	  the	  district	  may	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not	  substantially	  represent	  a	  truly	  desegregated	  education.	  Proportional	  enrollment	  in	  Detroit	  would	  essentially	  maintain	  racial	  and	  socioeconomic	  segregation.	  The	  existence	  of	  segregated	  cities	  is	  one	  reason	  why	  charter	  schools	  are	  able	  to	  target	  particular	  student	  populations	  through	  locational	  choice.	  Schools	  may	  make	  locational	  choices	  with	  the	  best	  of	  intentions,	  in	  order	  to	  educate	  an	  underserved	  population.	  Alternatively,	  they	  may	  locate	  in	  order	  to	  target	  “less	  risky”	  student	  populations.	  Expecting	  charter	  schools	  to	  reflect	  the	  racial	  and	  socioeconomic	  composition	  of	  a	  district	  or	  region	  is	  difficult	  at	  a	  time	  when	  increasingly	  even	  traditional	  public	  schools	  do	  not	  do	  so	  in	  any	  meaningful	  way	  as	  desegregation	  programs	  collapse	  (Orfield	  &	  Lee,	  2004).	  This,	  along	  with	  the	  very	  nature	  of	  charters	  as	  schools	  of	  choice,	  would	  make	  the	  establishment	  and	  enforcement	  of	  racial	  and/or	  socioeconomic	  balance	  provisions	  in	  charter	  enrollment	  difficult	  to	  effectively	  implement.	  That	  being	  said,	  because	  meaningfully	  equitable	  education	  fundamentally	  depends	  on	  the	  dismantling	  of	  segregated	  schooling,	  key	  actors	  may	  wish	  to	  more	  carefully	  consider	  the	  proper	  balance	  between	  unlimited	  choice	  and	  the	  pursuit	  of	  equity.	  	  
Utilize	  More	  Nuanced	  Assessment	  Strategies	  	   So-­‐called	  high-­‐stakes	  testing	  has	  proliferated	  in	  conjunction	  with	  the	  rise	  of	  school	  choice.	  These	  two	  phenomena	  are	  the	  most	  notable	  feature	  of	  the	  modern	  education	  reform	  movement	  (Ravitch,	  2013).	  High-­‐stakes	  testing,	  as	  the	  name	  implies,	  attempts	  to	  dramatically	  increase	  the	  consequences	  associated	  with	  tests	  of	  student	  achievement.	  It	  can	  determine	  the	  continued	  existence	  of	  individual	  public	  schools,	  with	  poor	  scores	  leading	  to	  school	  closure.	  With	  this	  imperative	  comes	  substantial	  pressure	  on	  school	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administrators	  to	  boost	  their	  test	  scores.	  One	  way	  to	  raise	  these	  scores	  is	  by	  avoiding	  student	  populations	  that	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  perform	  poorly	  on	  these	  testing	  measures,	  including	  low-­‐income	  students,	  students	  with	  learning	  disabilities,	  English	  language	  learners,	  and	  traditionally	  under-­‐served	  racial	  minorities.	  This	  incentivizes	  schools,	  especially	  though	  not	  exclusively	  for-­‐profit	  schools,	  to	  take	  steps	  to	  cultivate	  a	  particular	  student	  population.	  One	  way	  to	  counteract	  this	  is	  to	  make	  high-­‐stakes	  accountability	  measures	  more	  sensitive	  to	  a	  school’s	  student	  demographics.	  	  Current	  accountability	  measures	  are	  often	  not	  sensitive	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  schools	  enroll	  demographically	  dissimilar	  student	  populations	  and	  that	  this	  has	  profound	  impacts	  on	  student	  outcomes.	  Schools	  are	  compared	  in	  a	  manner	  that	  presumes	  that	  the	  student	  population	  of	  each	  school	  is	  equally	  likely	  to	  perform	  at	  a	  given	  level	  on	  local,	  state	  and	  federal	  accountability	  measures.	  Research	  has	  demonstrated	  that	  student	  population	  demographics	  matter	  individually	  and	  collectively	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  expected	  performance	  of	  students	  and	  schools	  on	  testing	  measures	  (Rumberger	  &	  Palardy,	  2005;	  Borman	  &	  Dowling,	  2010).	  All	  else	  being	  equal,	  a	  school	  that	  enrolled	  90%	  free	  or	  reduced	  lunch	  eligible	  students	  would	  be	  likely	  to	  perform	  worse	  on	  accountability	  measures	  than	  a	  school	  that	  enrolls	  10%	  free	  or	  reduced	  lunch	  eligible	  students.	  Many	  testing	  measures	  are	  not	  sensitive	  to	  these	  important	  student	  population	  differences.	  One	  solution	  to	  this	  problem	  is	  to	  make	  accountability	  measures	  sensitive	  to	  the	  actual	  composition	  of	  the	  student	  population.	  In	  such	  a	  system,	  a	  school’s	  expected	  level	  of	  achievement	  would	  be	  based	  in	  part	  on	  the	  demographic	  composition	  of	  the	  student	  population.	  This	  could	  increase	  the	  pressure	  on	  schools	  with	  relatively	  privileged	  student	  populations,	  by	  raising	  the	  level	  of	  expectations	  of	  schools	  with	  such	  a	  demographic	  
	  	   154	  
composition.	  It	  could	  also	  reduce	  or	  eliminate	  the	  existing	  incentivize	  for	  charter	  school	  operators	  to	  seek	  out	  disproportionately	  easier	  to	  educate	  student	  populations	  if	  it	  no	  longer	  provided	  them	  an	  assessment	  advantage.	  	   Some	  major	  difficulties	  arise	  with	  this	  approach.	  First,	  such	  a	  testing	  regime	  could	  be	  interpreted	  as	  setting	  lower	  standards	  at	  those	  schools	  with	  higher	  proportions	  of	  lower-­‐income,	  or	  Black	  or	  Latino	  student	  populations.	  This	  runs	  the	  risk	  of	  enshrining	  existing	  achievement	  gaps	  as	  normative	  and	  acceptable,	  if	  students	  are	  held	  to	  different	  standards	  of	  success.	  Second,	  concentration	  effects	  research	  has	  demonstrated	  that	  it	  is	  not	  only	  a	  student’s	  own	  family’s	  socioeconomic	  status	  that	  impacts	  their	  academic	  outcomes,	  it	  is	  also	  the	  socioeconomic	  status	  of	  their	  peers’	  families	  that	  impacts	  a	  students’	  achievement.	  This	  means	  that	  even	  a	  testing	  regime	  that	  controlled	  for	  disproportionate	  enrollment	  of	  low-­‐income,	  or	  English-­‐language	  learner	  students	  may	  be	  likely	  to	  underestimate	  the	  concentration	  effect	  on	  student	  outcomes.	  	   Another	  major	  problem	  is	  the	  feasibility	  of	  developing	  reliable	  testing	  instruments	  that	  accurately	  measure	  student	  learning	  and	  that	  are	  sensitive	  to	  demographic	  difference.	  The	  most	  current	  and	  analytically	  sophisticated	  accountability	  strategies,	  such	  as	  value-­‐added	  assessment,	  have	  been	  found	  to	  be	  unreliable	  in	  the	  contexts	  they	  are	  used,	  and	  are	  projected	  to	  be	  prohibitively	  expensive	  to	  implement	  in	  a	  meaningful	  way	  (Ravitch,	  2013;	  Harris,	  2011).	  With	  the	  flaws	  of	  current	  testing	  and	  assessment	  strategies,	  developing	  an	  even	  more	  complex	  system	  that	  allowed	  for	  the	  comparison	  of	  schools	  in	  ways	  that	  are	  sensitive	  to	  student	  demographic	  composition	  may	  be	  unrealistic.	  	   There	  is	  also	  a	  broader	  inherent	  problem	  with	  using	  testing	  strategies	  to	  determine	  school	  quality.	  Test-­‐based	  accountability	  regimes	  may	  more	  accurately	  measure	  how	  well	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students	  are	  coached	  in	  test-­‐taking	  as	  opposed	  to	  measuring	  their	  cognitive	  growth.	  This	  reality	  may	  be	  more	  likely	  to	  be	  exploited	  by	  for-­‐profit	  charter	  schools.	  In	  Arizona,	  for-­‐profit	  charters’	  curricula	  and	  pedagogy	  are	  aligned	  to	  maximize	  test-­‐based	  competencies	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  developing	  higher-­‐order	  thinking	  (Garcia,	  Barber	  &	  Molnar,	  2009).	  Thus	  test-­‐based	  accountability	  itself	  may	  incentivize	  the	  sort	  of	  superficially	  high-­‐quality,	  but	  lacking	  in	  depth	  sort	  of	  education	  that	  could	  be	  expected	  from	  a	  profit-­‐oriented	  provider	  (Weisbrod,	  1988).	  	  	  
A	  Moratorium	  on	  For-­Profit	  Charter	  Schools	  A	  more	  straightforward	  policy	  solution	  would	  be	  the	  prohibition	  of	  for-­‐profit	  corporations	  from	  operating	  publicly	  funded	  schools.	  One	  of	  the	  foundational	  justifications	  for	  public	  education	  is	  that	  it	  is	  supposed	  to	  promote	  a	  more	  equitable	  society.	  For-­‐profit	  charter	  schools	  may	  be	  less	  likely	  to	  serve	  high-­‐need	  student	  populations,	  and	  may	  exacerbate	  existing	  socioeconomic	  segregation,	  based	  on	  the	  findings	  of	  this	  dissertation.	  If	  these	  findings	  were	  confirmed	  more	  broadly,	  a	  case	  could	  be	  made	  that	  the	  existence	  of	  for-­‐profit	  charter	  schools	  is	  counterproductive	  to	  the	  achievement	  of	  basic	  public	  education	  objectives.	  If	  further	  research	  confirmed	  that	  for-­‐profit	  charters	  systematically	  undermine	  equity	  outcomes,	  there	  would	  be	  a	  compelling	  justification	  for	  the	  elimination	  of	  for-­‐profit	  charter	  schools.	  Some	  states	  already	  specifically	  prohibit	  for-­‐profit	  charter	  schools,	  demonstrating	  that	  substantial	  skepticism	  exists	  in	  many	  states	  about	  the	  implications	  of	  allowing	  public	  schools	  to	  be	  operated	  by	  profit-­‐seeking	  entities.	  	  	  Like	  the	  other	  policy	  suggestions,	  there	  are	  problems	  here.	  The	  largest	  obstacle	  is	  the	  fact	  that	  in	  2009-­‐10,	  there	  were	  over	  700	  for-­‐profit	  charter	  schools,	  educating	  more	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than	  300,000	  students.	  The	  number	  of	  students	  served	  by	  for-­‐profit	  charters	  has	  increased	  since	  then.	  There	  is	  no	  clear	  path	  towards	  the	  elimination	  of	  for-­‐profit	  charter	  schools	  in	  a	  district	  like	  Detroit,	  where	  for-­‐profit	  charters	  educate	  substantial	  proportions	  of	  the	  overall	  student	  population.	  Clearly	  a	  mass	  closing	  of	  these	  schools	  would	  not	  be	  a	  viable	  option.	  It	  is	  possible	  that	  these	  schools	  be	  moved	  from	  for-­‐profit	  management	  to	  non-­‐profit	  management.	  Imagine	  Schools,	  which	  was	  until	  recently	  the	  largest	  for-­‐profit	  charter	  chain,	  transitioned	  to	  non-­‐profit	  status	  in	  2015	  (Imagine	  Schools	  Website).	  Questions	  remain	  as	  to	  whether	  an	  EMO	  that	  transitions	  from	  for-­‐profit	  to	  non-­‐profit	  status	  is	  likely	  to	  exhibit	  mission-­‐oriented	  behaviors.	  However,	  the	  transition	  may	  result	  in	  reduced	  pressure	  to	  maximize	  profit.	  The	  case	  of	  Imagine	  Schools	  for-­‐profit	  to	  non-­‐profit	  transition	  would	  make	  for	  a	  compelling	  case	  study	  into	  whether	  and	  how	  operating	  as	  a	  for-­‐profit	  or	  non-­‐profit	  impacts	  the	  demographic	  enrollment	  of	  an	  EMO’s	  schools.	  Given	  the	  difficulties	  of	  closing	  existing	  schools,	  and	  questions	  about	  the	  impacts	  of	  transitioning	  from	  for-­‐profit	  to	  non-­‐profit	  status,	  the	  policy	  focus	  may	  be	  best	  placed	  on	  those	  schools	  that	  do	  not	  yet	  exist.	  Those	  states	  and	  districts	  that	  do	  not	  currently	  have	  for-­‐profit	  charter	  schools	  should	  carefully	  consider	  the	  evidence	  presented	  here	  and	  elsewhere	  about	  for-­‐profit	  charter	  schools	  before	  permitting	  for-­‐profit	  corporations	  to	  open	  new	  schools	  in	  their	  localities.	  Those	  states	  with	  existing	  for-­‐profit	  charter	  schools	  may	  wish	  to	  consider	  a	  moratorium	  on	  the	  opening	  of	  new	  for-­‐profit	  charter	  schools	  pending	  more	  research	  into	  their	  impacts.	  This	  may	  meet	  serious	  political	  resistance,	  with	  continuing	  pressure	  from	  market-­‐control	  advocates	  calling	  for	  the	  unrestricted	  expansion	  of	  charter	  schools	  of	  any	  and	  all	  types.	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If	  for-­‐profit	  charters	  were	  to	  be	  universally	  rejected,	  it	  would	  represent	  a	  decisive	  defeat	  for	  the	  market-­‐control	  vision	  in	  public	  education.	  A	  rejection	  of	  for-­‐profit	  charter	  schools	  would	  constitute	  an	  understanding	  that	  treating	  public	  education	  like	  a	  market	  good	  may	  present	  more	  problems	  than	  it	  solves.	  Because	  charter	  school	  proliferation	  is	  generally	  determined	  by	  a	  combination	  of	  a	  local	  district’s	  political	  economy,	  and	  the	  state-­‐level	  policy	  environment,	  any	  effort	  to	  curtail	  for-­‐profit	  charter	  schools	  would	  need	  to	  target	  local	  and	  state,	  and	  possibly	  federal	  agencies	  for	  charter	  reform.	  	  
Summary	  of	  Recommendations	  All	  of	  the	  policy	  suggestions	  presented	  come	  with	  substantial	  caveats.	  This	  is	  because	  any	  solutions	  to	  the	  increase	  in	  socioeconomic	  and	  racial	  segregation	  associated	  with	  charter	  school	  growth	  generally,	  and	  for-­‐profit	  charter	  schools	  in	  particular,	  contradict	  the	  very	  logic	  out	  of	  which	  charter	  schools	  emerged.	  The	  school	  choice	  movement	  emerged	  in	  part	  in	  reaction	  against	  the	  equity-­‐focus	  of	  desegregation	  programs	  (Orfield	  &	  Frankenberg,	  2013).	  Charter	  schools	  are	  in	  some	  cases	  leveraged	  by	  individual	  families	  and	  privileged	  groups	  in	  the	  pursuit	  of	  competitive	  advantage	  (Bifulco,	  Ladd	  &	  Ross,	  2009a).	  For	  these	  reasons,	  it	  may	  be	  the	  case	  that	  charter	  schools,	  in	  their	  current	  form,	  may	  inevitably	  increase	  socioeconomic	  and	  racial	  segregation.	  It	  may	  also	  be	  the	  case	  that	  for-­‐profit	  charter	  schools	  complicate	  these	  effects	  in	  particular	  ways.	  This	  emphasizes	  that	  the	  question	  of	  what	  to	  do	  about	  racial	  and	  socioeconomic	  segregation	  associated	  with	  charter	  schools	  ultimately	  goes	  back	  to	  more	  fundamental	  questions	  about	  the	  purposes	  of	  public	  education.	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The	  Continuing	  Evolution	  of	  For-­Profit	  Charter	  Schools	  	   Charter	  schools	  continue	  to	  expand	  rapidly.	  The	  six	  districts	  examined	  in	  Analysis	  2	  are	  experiencing	  a	  particularly	  quick	  growth	  of	  charter	  schools.	  Between	  2010-­‐11	  and	  2013-­‐14,	  these	  districts	  on	  average	  went	  from	  having	  20%	  to	  29%	  of	  their	  public	  school	  students	  enrolled	  in	  charter	  schools.	  This	  represents,	  on	  average,	  a	  46%	  growth	  in	  the	  proportion	  of	  the	  overall	  student	  proportion	  educated	  in	  charter	  schools	  in	  only	  three	  years.	  In	  the	  same	  three-­‐year	  span,	  the	  total	  number	  of	  charter	  schools	  nationally	  grew	  from	  5,258	  to	  6,440,	  a	  22%	  growth.	  Charter	  schools	  remain	  a	  rapidly	  growing	  phenomenon,	  and	  they	  seem	  to	  be	  growing	  most	  rapidly	  in	  those	  districts	  where	  they	  already	  exist	  in	  substantial	  numbers.	  As	  this	  increasingly	  EMO-­‐fuelled	  growth	  of	  charter	  schools	  continues,	  the	  impact	  that	  these	  schools	  have	  on	  student	  sorting	  patterns	  will	  be	  magnified.	  In	  this	  context,	  the	  decisions	  that	  states	  and	  districts	  make	  about	  whether	  they	  will	  permit	  or	  encourage	  the	  proliferation	  of	  for-­‐profit	  charter	  schools	  could	  increasingly	  influence	  student-­‐sorting	  patterns.	  The	  number	  of	  for-­‐profit	  charter	  schools	  is	  increasing	  at	  a	  slower	  rate	  than	  that	  of	  non-­‐profit	  charters,	  but	  per-­‐pupil	  enrollment	  is	  higher	  in	  for-­‐profit	  charters	  (Miron	  &	  Gulosino,	  2013).	  In	  the	  two	  years	  between	  2009-­‐10	  and	  2011-­‐12	  (the	  latest	  year	  for	  which	  data	  is	  available),	  for-­‐profit	  charters	  increased	  from	  637	  to	  840	  (31.9%	  increase)	  while	  non-­‐profit	  charters	  grew	  from	  774	  to	  1,206	  (55.8%	  increase)	  (Miron	  &	  Gulosino,	  2013).	  For-­‐profit	  EMOs	  are	  increasingly	  moving	  into	  other	  realms,	  including	  supplementary	  educational	  services	  and	  technology	  and	  virtual/online	  schools.	  Virtual	  charter	  schools	  have	  grown	  from	  enrolling	  150,000	  students	  in	  2010	  to	  enrolling	  4,800,000	  in	  2016	  (projected),	  a	  31-­‐fold	  increase	  in	  enrollment	  in	  six	  years	  (Waters,	  Barbour	  &	  Menchaca,	  2014).	  The	  limited	  rate	  of	  increase	  in	  the	  number	  of	  non-­‐virtual	  for-­‐
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profit	  charter	  schools,	  along	  with	  the	  continued	  rapid	  growth	  of	  non-­‐profit	  charter	  schools,	  suggests	  that	  corporations	  may	  be	  increasingly	  seeing	  brick	  and	  mortar	  charter	  schools	  as	  less	  than	  optimal	  enterprises	  for	  profit-­‐seeking	  and/or	  that	  school	  districts	  and	  states	  are	  becoming	  less	  willing	  to	  sanction	  the	  expansion	  of	  for-­‐profit	  charters.	  This	  may	  be	  the	  reason	  for	  the	  2015	  transition	  of	  what	  had	  been	  the	  largest	  for-­‐profit	  EMO,	  Imagine	  Schools,	  to	  non-­‐profit	  status.	  The	  current	  landscape	  for	  brick	  and	  mortar	  charter	  schools	  may	  favor	  non-­‐profit	  providers,	  with	  for-­‐profits	  increasingly	  moving	  to	  online	  schooling	  in	  search	  of	  greater	  profits.	  However,	  when	  a	  for-­‐profit	  provider	  transitions	  to	  non-­‐profit	  status	  it	  may	  further	  obscure	  connections	  between	  formal	  for-­‐profit-­‐status	  and	  profit-­‐seeking	  behavior,	  resulting	  in	  increased	  numbers	  of	  profit-­‐seeking	  actors	  disguised	  as	  mission-­‐oriented	  operators	  (Weisbrod,	  1988).	  	   Non-­‐profit	  EMOs	  are	  not	  necessarily	  unproblematic	  either.	  As	  the	  findings	  of	  the	  six-­‐district	  analysis	  found,	  in	  districts	  without	  for-­‐profit	  charters,	  non-­‐profit	  charters	  tend	  to	  enroll	  substantially	  higher	  rates	  of	  low-­‐income	  students	  and	  lower	  rates	  of	  white	  students	  than	  non-­‐charter	  schools.	  While	  the	  segregation	  patterns	  in	  these	  districts	  seem	  to	  be	  less	  opportunistically	  motivated	  than	  in	  the	  districts	  with	  for-­‐profit	  schools,	  that	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  they	  are	  harmless.	  Inasmuch	  as	  distinct	  gaps	  in	  the	  racial	  and	  socioeconomic	  composition	  of	  charters	  and	  non-­‐charters	  represent	  increases	  in	  between-­‐school	  segregation,	  equity	  concerns	  arise.	  Also,	  this	  dissertation	  provides	  evidence	  that	  non-­‐profit	  charter	  schools	  may	  behave	  more	  like	  profit-­‐oriented	  charters	  when	  they	  locate	  in	  the	  same	  districts	  as	  for-­‐profit	  charters.	  There	  are	  other	  complicating	  factors	  as	  well.	  Some	  large	  non-­‐profit	  EMOs,	  have	  high	  student	  attrition	  rates	  associated	  with	  “push-­‐out”	  strategies,	  indicating	  that	  even	  though	  these	  schools	  serve	  a	  demographically	  high-­‐need	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student	  population,	  they	  may	  actually	  be	  counseling	  out	  their	  highest	  need	  individual	  students	  (Miron,	  Urschel	  &	  Saxton,	  2011).	  Traditional	  public	  schools	  must	  then	  take	  on	  any	  students	  counseled	  out	  of	  charter	  schools.	  .	  As	  non-­‐profit	  charters	  continue	  to	  grow,	  and	  especially	  as	  high-­‐profile	  charter	  chains	  like	  KIPP	  proliferate,	  there	  are	  a	  number	  of	  unpredictable	  student	  sorting	  impacts	  likely	  to	  result.	  	  
Towards	  A	  Larger	  Question	  	   The	  growth	  of	  charter	  schools	  has	  been	  linked	  to	  segregation	  by	  race,	  socioeconomic	  status,	  “ability”,	  special	  needs	  status,	  and	  language-­‐learner	  status	  (Frankenberg,	  Siegel-­‐Hawley,	  &	  Wang,	  2011;	  Miron,	  Urschel,	  Mathis	  &	  Tonquist,	  2010).	  This	  dissertation	  was	  undertaken	  to	  better	  understand	  what,	  if	  any,	  specific	  effect	  for-­‐profit	  charters	  might	  have	  on	  student	  segregation.	  For-­‐profit	  charters	  were	  found	  to	  be	  less	  likely	  to	  educate	  low-­‐income	  students	  compared	  to	  non-­‐profit	  charters.	  Evidence	  was	  found	  for	  a	  possible	  additional	  market-­effect	  whereby,	  in	  districts	  with	  for-­‐profit	  charter	  schools,	  other	  charter	  schools	  may	  be	  more	  likely	  to	  enroll	  student	  populations	  similar	  to	  for-­‐profit	  charters,	  promoting	  broader	  charter/non-­‐charter	  segregation	  patterns.	  There	  is,	  at	  best,	  mixed	  evidence	  regarding	  the	  educational	  performance	  of	  charter	  schools.	  Further,	  there	  is	  evidence	  that	  as	  a	  group,	  for-­‐profit	  charter	  schools	  perform	  worse	  than	  other	  types	  of	  charter	  schools	  (Miron	  &	  Gulosino,	  2013).	  While	  this	  dissertation	  has	  explored	  the	  equity	  implications	  of	  for-­‐profit	  charter	  schools,	  if	  they	  also	  fail	  to	  deliver	  on	  educational	  performance	  measures,	  there	  remains	  little	  to	  recommend	  them.	  	  At	  a	  time	  of	  increasing	  socioeconomic	  segregation	  and	  growing	  gaps	  in	  student	  achievement	  by	  socioeconomic	  status,	  alongside	  persistent	  racial	  achievement	  gaps,	  it	  is	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increasingly	  important	  to	  consider	  how	  to	  address	  these	  inequalities.	  Neoliberal	  models	  of	  education	  reform	  de-­‐emphasize	  equity	  concerns	  in	  favor	  of	  ideals	  of	  productive	  efficiency	  and	  consumer	  choice	  that	  are	  likely	  to	  intensify	  competition	  and	  inequity.	  Although	  most	  have	  sidestepped	  the	  issue,	  some	  charter	  advocates	  have	  posited	  that	  market-­‐based	  education	  reforms	  could	  be	  the	  solution	  to	  persistent	  educational	  inequities	  (A.	  Thernstrom,	  &	  S.	  Thernstrom,	  2004).	  This	  ignores	  the	  link	  between	  the	  rise	  of	  charter	  schools	  and	  the	  abandonment	  of	  school	  desegregation	  (Orfield	  &	  Frankenberg,	  2013).	  While	  desegregation	  was	  not	  unproblematic,	  it	  represented	  a	  concerted	  commitment	  to	  addressing	  very	  real	  equity	  concerns.	  In	  those	  particular	  times	  and	  places	  where	  desegregation	  was	  robustly	  implemented,	  it	  resulted	  in	  substantial	  progress	  in	  the	  racial	  integration	  of	  schools	  and	  an	  expansion	  of	  educational	  opportunity	  for	  Black	  students	  (Orfield	  &	  Lee,	  2004,	  Wells	  &	  Crain,	  1997).	  	  The	  move	  away	  from	  desegregation	  and	  towards	  neoliberal	  reform	  represents	  a	  rejection	  of	  the	  equity	  imperative	  in	  public	  education.	  In	  its	  place	  is	  a	  collection	  of	  atomized	  individuals	  struggling	  for	  competitive	  advantage	  on	  an	  uneven	  playing	  field.	  This	  raises	  a	  basic	  question	  about	  the	  importance	  of	  equity	  within	  the	  public	  education	  system	  in	  the	  United	  States.	  Evidence	  has	  demonstrated	  that	  charter	  school	  growth	  is	  associated	  with	  increased	  segregation.	  This	  dissertation	  has	  shown	  that	  for-­‐profit	  charter	  schools,	  the	  most	  neoliberal	  contemporary	  school	  reform,	  are	  associated	  with	  particularly	  problematic	  student	  sorting	  patterns.	  Neoliberal	  reforms	  have	  demonstrated	  an	  inability	  to	  ameliorate	  educational	  inequity,	  and	  the	  fundamental	  nature	  of	  neoliberal	  logic	  renders	  them	  unlikely	  to	  have	  the	  capacity	  to	  address	  equity	  concerns.	  	  Direct	  replacement	  of	  desegregation	  with	  “mandatory	  school	  choice”	  has	  been	  tried	  and	  found	  to	  result	  in	  substantial	  increases	  in	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racial	  segregation	  and	  the	  Black/white	  achievement	  gap	  (Godwin,	  Baxter,	  Leland	  &	  Southworth,	  2006).	  The	  dissertation	  opened	  with	  a	  quote	  from	  Jeffrey	  Henig	  (1994)	  who	  noted	  that	  conflicts	  about	  charter	  schools	  center	  around	  “questions	  about	  the	  kind	  of	  society	  we	  wish	  to	  become”	  (p.	  116).	  Ultimately,	  the	  pursuit	  of	  educational	  equity	  depends	  on	  a	  public	  that	  demands	  an	  educational	  system	  that	  is	  structured	  to	  promote	  equity.	  Worsening	  racial	  and	  socioeconomic	  segregation	  of	  schools	  is	  the	  natural	  result	  of	  the	  competitive	  struggle	  built	  into	  capitalist	  public	  education	  systems	  when	  they	  are	  not	  explicitly	  structured	  to	  ameliorate	  educational	  inequity	  rooted	  in	  existing	  social	  inequalities	  (Bowles	  &	  Gintis,	  2011:1976).	  Neoliberal	  school	  reform	  structurally	  and	  ideologically	  elides	  equity	  in	  favor	  of	  promoting	  each	  individual’s	  ability	  to	  pursue	  educational	  advantage.	  For-­‐profit	  charter	  schools	  are	  the	  ultimate	  exemplification	  of	  neoliberal	  rationality	  in	  public	  education.	  If	  the	  public	  demands	  educational	  institutions	  that	  promote	  a	  more	  equitable	  society,	  for-­‐profit	  charter	  schools	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  be	  part	  of	  the	  problem	  then	  part	  of	  the	  solution.	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Appendix	  1:	  Analysis	  of	  state	  policy	  contexts	  &	  profit-­‐status	  
	  	   States	  differ	  significantly	  in	  terms	  of	  their	  charter	  school	  policies.	  Some	  states	  still	  do	  not	  allow	  charter	  schools	  at	  all,	  while	  others	  have	  continually	  revised	  their	  laws	  in	  order	  to	  encourage	  a	  rapid	  expansion	  of	  charters.	  There	  are	  relationships	  between	  particular	  policy	  approaches	  and	  the	  relative	  proliferation	  of	  for-­‐profit	  or	  non-­‐profit	  charters	  in	  a	  state.	  Chi	  and	  Welner	  (2007)	  note	  that	  many	  different	  organizations	  publish	  ideologically	  driven	  charter	  law	  state	  report	  cards.	  The	  Center	  for	  Education	  Reform	  (CER)	  is	  one	  such	  group	  that	  publishes	  ratings	  of	  state	  charter	  school	  policies	  (Consoletti,	  2012).	  CER	  advocates	  for	  the	  expansion	  of	  charter	  schools,	  and	  their	  ratings	  largely	  reflect	  the	  ease	  with	  which	  charter	  schools	  can	  begin	  and	  sustain	  operations	  in	  a	  given	  state.	  CER	  does	  seem	  to	  have	  a	  clear,	  consistent	  and	  transparent	  system	  for	  ranking	  states,	  even	  as	  the	  rankings	  they	  provide	  reflect	  a	  pre-­‐existing	  pro-­‐charter	  bias.	  Holyoke,	  Henig,	  Brown	  &	  Lacireno-­‐Paquet	  (2009)	  have	  utilized	  CER	  scores	  to	  measure	  the	  flexibility	  of	  charter	  school	  policy	  and	  found	  it	  be	  a	  consistent,	  valid	  and	  reliable	  metric	  for	  this	  purpose.	  	  Each	  of	  CER’s	  ranking	  criteria	  might	  also	  be	  of	  particular	  interest	  to	  for-­‐profit	  firms.	  CER	  provides	  higher	  rankings	  to	  those	  states	  that	  offer	  multiple	  paths	  to	  charter	  authorization,	  specifically	  routes	  that	  are	  independent	  of	  government.	  More	  favorable	  grades	  are	  given	  to	  states	  that	  have	  high	  numbers	  of	  charters	  allowed,	  or	  preferably,	  no	  caps	  on	  the	  number	  of	  charter	  schools	  and	  total	  enrollment	  allowed	  in	  the	  charter	  segment	  in	  a	  state.	  Both	  of	  these	  factors	  contribute	  to	  ease	  of	  entry	  and	  expansion	  for	  EMOs	  in	  a	  given	  state.	  CER	  assigns	  favorable	  grades	  to	  states	  that	  allow	  charters	  to	  operate	  more	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autonomously,	  reducing	  the	  need	  of	  EMOs	  to	  expend	  resources	  tailoring	  their	  approach	  on	  a	  state-­‐by-­‐state	  basis.	  Finally,	  CER	  grades	  states	  highly	  where	  charters	  receive	  equal	  or	  close	  to	  equal	  per	  pupil	  funding	  compared	  to	  traditional	  public	  schools,	  a	  direct	  factor	  in	  the	  potential	  profitability	  of	  an	  EMOCS.	  Combining	  these	  four	  criteria,	  CER	  provides	  ordered	  rankings	  (1-­‐42)	  for	  each	  state’s	  charter	  policy	  (including	  DC,	  please	  note	  that	  nine	  states	  do	  not	  allow	  charter	  schools	  and	  thus	  do	  not	  receive	  rankings).	  Holyoke,	  Henig,	  Brown	  &	  Lacireno-­‐Paquet	  (2009)	  describe	  the	  calculation	  of	  CER	  scores	  in	  greater	  detail.	  	  	   CER	  state	  rankings	  were	  regressed	  on	  the	  for-­‐profit	  status	  of	  EMOCS	  to	  determine	  if	  state	  level	  policy	  contexts	  influenced	  the	  relative	  distribution	  of	  for-­‐profit	  and	  non-­‐profit	  schools	  in	  each	  state	  (Table	  A1.1)	  (methodological	  note:	  multilevel	  modeling	  was	  not	  used	  here	  due	  to	  autocorrelation	  effects	  from	  the	  state	  level	  variable	  used	  in	  analysis).	  State	  rankings	  were	  utilized	  instead	  of	  raw	  scores	  because	  they	  can	  be	  more	  readily	  understood	  by	  the	  wider	  public	  as	  an	  indicator	  of	  how	  charter-­‐friendly	  a	  state’s	  policy	  is.	  Because	  of	  the	  widespread	  popularity	  of	  charter	  schools,	  state	  policymakers	  may	  feel	  pressure	  to	  be	  at	  the	  top	  of	  the	  CER	  state	  policy	  rankings.	  	  There	  was	  a	  statistically	  significant	  relationship	  between	  CER	  state	  charter	  policy	  rankings	  and	  the	  percentage	  of	  a	  state’s	  EMOCS	  that	  are	  operated	  by	  for-­‐profit	  organizations.	  Higher	  state	  rankings	  were	  associated	  with	  a	  higher	  relative	  percentage	  of	  for-­‐profit	  EMOCS.	  The	  results	  can	  be	  seen	  visually	  in	  figure	  A1.1.	  A	  particular	  EMOCS	  located	  in	  a	  state	  with	  a	  rank	  of	  1	  would	  be	  predicted	  to	  have	  a	  greater	  than	  70%	  probability	  of	  being	  operated	  by	  a	  for-­‐profit	  EMO,	  while	  an	  EMOCS	  located	  in	  a	  state	  with	  a	  rank	  of	  42	  would	  be	  predicted	  to	  have	  a	  less	  than	  10%	  probability	  of	  being	  operated	  by	  a	  for-­‐profit	  EMO.	  The	  R2	  value	  of	  0.162	  indicates	  that	  while	  CER	  rankings	  are	  significantly	  predictive	  of	  the	  likely	  for-­‐profit/non-­‐profit	  ratios	  in	  a	  state,	  most	  of	  the	  
	  	   178	  
variance	  remains	  unexplained	  by	  the	  CER	  rankings.	  However,	  the	  explanatory	  value	  provided	  by	  this	  analysis	  is	  an	  indication	  that	  state-­‐level	  charter	  school	  policy	  can	  influence	  the	  relative	  proliferation	  of	  for-­‐profit	  or	  non-­‐profit	  EMOCS.	  Those	  states	  with	  more	  favorable	  policy	  towards	  charter	  schools	  may	  be	  more	  likely	  to	  have	  higher	  proportions	  of	  for-­‐profit	  charter	  schools	  in	  the	  EMOCS	  sector.	  The	  attractiveness	  of	  fewer	  restrictions	  and	  greater	  per-­‐pupil	  funding	  is	  correlated	  with	  an	  increased	  proliferation	  of	  for-­‐profit	  instead	  of	  non-­‐profit	  EMOs.	  It	  may	  also	  be	  that	  for-­‐profit	  providers	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  target	  states	  with	  more	  charter-­‐friendly	  policies,	  as	  they	  perceive	  them	  to	  offer	  fewer	  barriers	  to	  rapid	  expansion.	  Further	  research	  that	  isolates	  specific	  policy	  differences	  is	  necessary	  to	  determine	  what	  specific	  measures	  are	  most	  likely	  to	  encourage	  the	  proliferation	  of	  for-­‐profit	  EMOCS.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
Table	  A1.1:	  Log	  Regression	  of	  CER	  State	  Rank	  on	  EMOCS’	  For-­Profit	  Status	  	   Estimate	   Stand.	  Error	   z	  value	   pr>z	  	  	  	  	  	  Intercept	   	  0.736	   0.021	   	  	  36.28	   2	  x	  10-­‐16	  ***	  	  	  	  	  	  CER	  GPA	   -­‐0.021	   0.001	   -­‐16.41	   2	  x	  10-­‐16	  ***	  R2	  :	  0.162	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Figure	  A1.1:	  CER	  State	  Rank	  and	  For-­Profit	  Status	  
	  	  R2	  :	  0.162	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Appendix	  2:	  Factors	  influencing	  state	  level	  
proliferation	  of	  charter	  schools	  
	   Why	  do	  some	  states	  have	  higher	  proportions	  of	  charter	  schools	  than	  others?	  Why	  some	  states	  have	  more	  EMO	  operated	  charters	  than	  others?	  And	  why	  do	  some	  states	  have	  more	  for-­‐profit	  charter	  schools	  than	  others?	  A	  series	  of	  analyses	  were	  conducted	  using	  ordinary	  least-­‐squares	  regression	  to	  determine	  what	  factors	  influence	  the	  proliferation	  of	  charter	  schools	  in	  general,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  proliferation	  of	  various	  types	  of	  charter	  schools.	  The	  results	  are	  shown	  in	  detail	  in	  Tables	  A2.1	  –	  A2.5.	  The	  first	  analysis	  examined	  how	  a	  number	  of	  policy	  and	  demographic	  factors	  impacted	  the	  proportion	  of	  public	  schools	  that	  were	  charters	  in	  each	  state.	  Of	  all	  the	  policy	  factors,	  only	  state	  autonomy	  was	  found	  to	  be	  a	  statistically	  significant	  predictor	  of	  the	  proportion	  of	  schools	  that	  were	  charters	  in	  a	  state.	  Of	  the	  demographic	  factors,	  only	  urban	  population	  percentage	  was	  found	  to	  be	  a	  statistically	  significant	  predictor	  of	  the	  proportion	  of	  schools	  that	  are	  charters.	  As	  charter	  schools	  are	  more	  likely	  than	  non-­‐charter	  schools	  to	  be	  located	  in	  urban	  areas	  (in	  the	  school	  year	  2011-­‐2012,	  52%	  of	  charter	  schools	  were	  located	  in	  cities,	  compared	  to	  25%	  of	  non-­‐charter	  schools	  (NAPCS	  Dashboard))	  it	  is	  not	  surprising	  that	  urbanicity	  is	  a	  predictor	  of	  charter	  proliferation.	  	   The	  existence	  of	  multiple	  independent	  charter	  authorizers	  was	  the	  only	  statistically	  significant	  predictor	  of	  EMO-­‐operated	  charters	  as	  a	  proportion	  of	  charter	  schools.	  This	  accords	  with	  previous	  findings	  that	  multiple	  authorizers	  are	  strong	  predictors	  of	  charter	  proliferation	  (Kuscova	  &	  Buckley,	  2004).	  State	  autonomy	  was	  the	  only	  statistically	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significant	  predictor	  of	  for-­‐profit	  charter	  schools	  as	  a	  proportion	  of	  EMO-­‐operated	  charter	  schools.	  Thus	  state	  autonomy	  is	  found	  to	  be	  doubly	  predictive	  of	  both	  relative	  proportion	  of	  charter	  schools	  and	  relative	  proliferation	  of	  for-­‐profit	  charter	  schools.	  More	  autonomy	  from	  state	  operational	  rules	  and	  procedures	  is	  a	  clear	  factor	  in	  the	  proliferation	  of	  charter	  schools	  in	  general,	  and	  for-­‐profit	  charter	  schools	  in	  particular.	  Following	  from	  last	  chapter’s	  discussion	  of	  how	  for-­‐profit	  charter	  schools	  uniquely	  reflect	  an	  abiding	  neoliberal	  preference	  for	  subordinating	  the	  state	  to	  market	  imperatives,	  it	  makes	  sense	  that	  autonomy	  from	  state	  rules	  appeals	  to	  for-­‐profit	  operators.	  The	  concluding	  chapter	  will	  discuss	  the	  implications	  of	  the	  connection	  between	  state	  autonomy	  and	  for-­‐profit	  charter	  growth	  in	  more	  detail.	  	  
Table	  A2.1:	  Regression	  of	  Policy	  &	  Demographic	  Factors	  on	  State	  Charter	  %	  	  	  Variable	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Estimate	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Std.	  Error	   t-­‐value	  	   	  	  	  	  p	  of	  t	  	  	  	  Intercept	   -­‐0.001047	   0.06403	   -­‐0.016	   0.9871	  POLICY	  FACTORS	   	   	   	   	  	  	  	  Years	   0.000431	   0.00152	   0.284	   0.7784	  	  	  	  Total	  Schools	   -­‐4.35	  x	  10-­‐6	   3.01	  x	  10-­‐6	   -­‐1.447	   0.1599	  	  	  	  Ind.	  Authorizers	   -­‐0.001041	   0.00257	   -­‐0.405	   0.6889	  	  	  	  Number	  Allowed	   0.001842	   0.00205	   0.901	   0.3760	  	  	  	  State	  Autonomy	   0.01412	   0.00646	   2.185	   0.0381	  *	  	  	  	  District	  Autonomy	   0.006812	   0.00721	   0.945	   0.3534	  	  	  	  Teacher	  Freedom	   -­‐0.00187	   0.00054	   -­‐0.346	   0.7324	  	  	  	  Funding	   -­‐0.00106	   0.0038	   -­‐0.279	   0.7827	  	  	  	  Facility	  Funding	   0.01421	   0.01291	   1.100	   0.2813	  	  	  	  Implementation	   0.00049	   0.00588	   0.077	   0.9396	  DEMOGRAPHY	   	   	   	   	  	  	  	  Urban	  Pop.	  Prop.	   0.1796	   0.0868	   2.069	   0.0487	  *	  	  	  	  Hispanic	  Pop.	  Prop.	   0.06284	   0.07391	   0.850	   0.4030	  	  	  	  Black	  Pop.	  Prop.	   -­‐0.05782	   0.07045	   -­‐0.821	   0.4192	  	  	  	  White	  Pop.	  Prop.	   -­‐0.05106	   0.05917	   -­‐0.863	   0.3961	  Adjusted	  R-­‐squared:	  	  0.5225	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Table	  A2.2:	  State	  Political	  Affiliation	  as	  (Non)	  Predictor	  of	  State	  Charter	  Percent	  	  Variable	   	   	  	  	  	  	  Estimate	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Std.	  Error	  	   t-­‐value	  	   	  	  	  	  p	  of	  t	  Intercept	   0.054302	   0.006995	   7.763	   1.97	  x	  10-­‐9	  Political	  Affiliation	   -­‐0.033319	   0.049782	   -­‐0.669	   0.507	  Adjusted	  R-­‐squared:	  	  -­‐0.01399	  	  	  
	  
Table	  A2.3:	  Best	  Fit	  Model	  of	  Charter	  Percent	  In	  State	  	  Variable	   	   	  	  	  	  	  Estimate	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Std.	  Error	  	   t-­‐value	  	   	  	  	  	  p	  of	  t	  Intercept	   -­‐0.042915	   0.015251	   -­‐2.814	   0.007709*	  State	  Autonomy	   0.017402	   0.003603	   4.830	   2.25	  x	  10-­‐5	  *	  Urban	  Pop.	  Prop.	   0.225049	   0.056752	   3.965	   0.000313	  *	  Adjusted	  R-­‐squared:	  	  0.5407	  	  	  
Table	  A2.4:	  EMO-­operated	  Charter	  Schools	  as	  a	  Proportion	  of	  Charters	  	  	  Variable	   	   	  	  	  	  	  Estimate	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Std.	  Error	  	   t-­‐value	  	   	  	  	  	  p	  of	  t	  Intercept	   0.019749	   0.037117	   0.532	   0.597625	  Ind.	  Authorizers	   0.023946	   0.006489	   3.690	   0.000668	  *	  Adjusted	  R-­‐squared:	  	  0.2353	  	  	  
Table	  A2.5:	  For-­Profits	  as	  Proportion	  of	  EMOCS	  	  Variable	   	   	  	  	  	  	  Estimate	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Std.	  Error	  	   t-­‐value	  	   	  	  	  	  p	  of	  t	  Intercept	   0.09862	   0.12829	   0.769	   0.4466	  State	  Autonomy	   0.10721	   0.04311	   2.487	   0.0171	  *	  Adjusted	  R-­‐squared:	  	  0.1123	  	  
	  	   183	  
	  	  
Appendix	  3:	  Full	  Analytical	  Results	  	  	  
	  
	   The	  following	  tables	  and	  figures	  (Tables	  A3.1	  –	  A3.15,	  and	  Figures	  A3.1	  -­‐	  A3.21)	  show	  those	  portions	  of	  the	  complete	  results	  of	  Analysis	  #2	  that	  were	  omitted	  from	  Chapter	  4	  due	  to	  space	  considerations.	  The	  significant	  results	  are	  described	  in	  the	  text	  of	  Chapter	  4	  where	  relevant.	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Table	  A3.1:	  CBG	  Median	  Income	  &	  Charter	  Status	  Regressed	  on	  FRL	  Proportion	  	  	  District	   Variable	   Parameter	  Est.	   Std.	  Error	   t-­‐value	  	   	   	   	   	  Miami	   Intercept	   0.902	   0.045	   12.234	  *	  	   Med.	  Income	   -­‐0.000004	   0.0000004	   -­‐10.356	  *	  	   Charter	   -­‐0.174	   0.023	   -­‐7.455	  *	  	   	   	   	   	  Cleveland	   Intercept	   0.804	   0.119	   3.502	  *	  	   Med.	  Income	   0.00000006	   0.000003	   0.98	  	   Charter	   -­‐0.194	   0.055	   -­‐3.544	  *	  	   	   	   	   	  Tucson	   Intercept	   0.782	   0.087	   6.202	  *	  	   Med.	  Income	   -­‐0.000005	   0.000001	   -­‐4.420	  *	  	   Charter	   -­‐0.123	   0.043	   -­‐2.841	  *	  	   	   	   	   	  Los	  Angeles	   Intercept	   0.753	   0.037	   24.755	  *	  	   Med.	  Income	   -­‐0.000003	   0.0000003	   -­‐10.395	  *	  	   Charter	   0.076	   0.019	   4.045	  *	  	   	   	   	   	  Houston	   Intercept	   0.568	   0.038	   25.451	  *	  	   Med.	  Income	   -­‐0.000002	   0.0000004	   -­‐4.065	  *	  	   Charter	   0.203	   0.021	   9.69	  *	  	   	   	   	   	  Detroit	   Intercept	   0.766	   0.044	   19.220	  *	  	   Med.	  Income	   0.000001	   0.0000009	   1.210	  	   Charter	   0.038	   0.022	   1.762	  	   	   	   	   	  *	  significant	  at	  α	  =	  0.05	  	  	  NOTE:	  This	  table	  shows	  charter/non-­‐charter	  differences	  in	  enrollment	  after	  controlling	  for	  CBG	  SES.	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Figure	  A3.1:	  FRL	  Eligibility	  By	  CBG	  Income	  and	  School	  Type	  in	  Houston	  	  
0=Non-­Charters,	  1=Independent	  Charters,	  2=Non-­Profit	  Charters.	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Table	  A3.2:	  Free	  &	  Reduced	  Lunch	  Proportion	  By	  School	  Type	  and	  District	  	  	  	   Traditional	  Public	  School	   Independent	  Charter	  School	   Non-­‐Profit	  EMO	  Charter	  School	   For-­‐Profit	  EMO	  Charter	  School	  Houston	   50.3%	   63.2%	   86.1%	   -­‐	  Los	  Angeles	   61.3%	   71.2%	   65.6%	   -­‐	  Miami-­‐Dade	   74.1%	   54.2%	   *	   55.4%	  Cleveland	   80.6%	   58.7%	   62.4%	   64.3%	  Tucson	   57.8%	   52.3%	   53.2%	   15.2%	  -­‐	  There	  are	  no	  for-­‐profit	  charters	  in	  Houston	  or	  Los	  Angeles	  *	  Non-­‐profit	  charters	  are	  omitted	  in	  Miami-­‐Dade	  due	  to	  small	  sample	  size	  (3).	  	  




Table	  A3.3:	  CBG	  Median	  Income	  and	  School	  Type	  By	  District	  	   	   Traditional	  Public	  School	   Independent	  Charter	  School	   Non-­‐Profit	  EMO	  Charter	  School	   For-­‐Profit	  EMO	  Charter	  School	  Houston	   $33,239	   $31,427	   $30,849	   -­‐	  Los	  Angeles	   $38,366	   $34,353	   $34,896	   -­‐	  Miami-­‐Dade	   $38,321	   $35,122	   $33,120	   $37,095	  Cleveland	   $25,660	   $25,220	   $32,196	   $24,957	  Tucson	   $37,728	   $32,280	   $35,230	   $37,548	  	  
Note:	  statistics	  are	  descriptive	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Figure	  A3.2:	  Median	  Household	  Income	  of	  CBG	  By	  School	  Type	  and	  District	  
	  
	  	  
Note:	  For-­‐profit	  charter	  schools	  do	  not	  exhibit	  higher	  median	  household	  income	  by	  location	  except	  in	  Miami-­‐Dade.	  In	  Cleveland	  and	  Tucson,	  median	  income	  is	  lower	  for	  for-­‐profit	  charters	  than	  it	  is	  for	  traditional	  public	  schools.	  Compare	  to	  following	  chart.	  	  
Note:	  statistics	  are	  descriptive	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Table	  A3.4:	  CBG	  Median	  Family	  Income	  by	  Charter	  Status	  (Expressed	  in	  Dollars)	  District	   Variable	   Parameter	  Est.	   Std.	  Error	   t-­‐value	  	   	   	   	   	  MIAMI	  -­‐	  DADE	   Intercept	   43,713	   1,366	   32.000	  *	  	   Charter	   -­‐1,539	   3,102	   -­‐0.496	  	   	   	   	   	  CLEVELAND	   Intercept	   26,689	   1,000	   26.684	  *	  	   Charter	   699	   1,727	   0.405	  	   	   	   	   	  TUCSON	   Intercept	   39,137	   1,801	   21.734	  *	  	   Charter	   -­‐972	   3,067	   0.752	  	   	   	   	   	  LOS	  ANGELES	   Intercept	   46,571	   972	   47.924	  *	  	   Charter	   -­‐2,584	   2,138	   -­‐1.209	  	   	   	   	   	  HOUSTON	   Intercept	   41,126	   1,535	   26.80	  *	  	   Charter	   -­‐6,736	   2,818	   -­‐2.39	  *	  	   	   	   	   	  DETROIT	   Intercept	   28,361	   970	   29.234	  *	  	   Charter	   -­‐1,289	   1,655	   -­‐0.779	  	   	   	   	   	  
	  
	  
Table	  A3.5:	  FRL	  Eligible	  Student	  Proportion	  by	  Charter	  Status	  District	   Variable	   Parameter	  Est.	   Std.	  Error	   t-­‐value	  	   	   	   	   	  MIAMI	  -­‐	  DADE	   Intercept	   0.741	   0.012	   64.063	  *	  	   Charter	   -­‐0.179	   0.026	   -­‐6.812	  *	  	   	   	   	   	  CLEVELAND	   Intercept	   0.806	   0.032	   25.566	  *	  	   Charter	   -­‐0.194	   0.054	   -­‐3.557	  *	  	   	   	   	   	  TUCSON	   Intercept	   0.578	   0.027	   21.389	  *	  	   Charter	   -­‐0.118	   0.046	   -­‐2.563	  *	  	   	   	   	   	  LOS	  ANGELES	   Intercept	   0.612	   0.009	   67.858	  *	  	   Charter	   0.084	   0.020	   4.241	  *	  	   	   	   	   	  HOUSTON	   Intercept	   0.503	   0.012	   43.35	  *	  	   Charter	   0.214	   0.021	   10.06	  *	  	   	   	   	   	  DETROIT	   Intercept	   0.796	   0.013	   62.36	  *	  	   Charter	   0.037	   0.021	   1.70	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Table	  A3.6a:	  Charter	  /	  Non-­Charter	  Differences	  in	  Racial	  Enrollment	  Rates	  After	  
Controlling	  For	  Racial	  Composition	  of	  CBGs	  Where	  Schools	  are	  Located	  	  TUCSON	   	   Estimate	   Standard	  Error	   t-­‐value	  White	  Stud.	  %	   Intercept	   -­‐0.429	   0.070	   -­‐6.098	  *	  	   White	  Pop.	  %	   0.941	   0.096	   	  9.787	  *	  	   Charter	   0.112	   0.028	   3.955	  *	  	   	   	   	   	  Hisp.	  Stud.	  %	   Intercept	   0.331	   0.031	   10.578	  *	  	   Hisp.	  Pop	  %	   0.651	   0.060	   10.784	  *	  	   Charter	   -­‐0.062	   0.031	   -­‐2.016	  *	  	   	   	   	   	  Black	  Stud.	  %	   Intercept	   0.040	   0.005	   6.882	  *	  	   Black	  Pop.	  %	   0.397	   0.102	   3.878	  *	  	   Charter	   -­‐0.012	   0.007	   -­‐1.685	  	  	   	   	   	   	  	   	   	   	   	  MIAMI	  –	  DADE	   	   Estimate	   Standard	  Error	   t-­‐value	  White	  Stud.	  %	   Intercept	   	  0.014	   0.010	   1.359	  	   White	  Pop.	  %	   	  0.092	   0.014	   	  6.446	  *	  	   Charter	   0.022	   0.011	   1.942	  	   	   	   	   	  Hisp.	  Stud.	  %	   Intercept	   	  0.102	   0.019	   5.206	  *	  	   Hisp.	  Pop.	  %	   	  0.826	   0.030	   	  27.849	  *	  	   Charter	   0.055	   0.022	   2.510	  *	  	   	   	   	   	  Black	  Stud.	  %	   Intercept	   0.089	   0.012	   7.248	  *	  	   Black	  Pop.	  %	   	  0.846	   0.027	   31.377	  *	  	   Charter	   -­‐	  0.083	   0.021	   -­‐3.868	  *	  	   	   	   	   	  	   	   	   	   	  HOUSTON	   	   Estimate	   Standard	  Error	   t-­‐value	  White	  Stud.	  %	   Intercept	   -­‐0.019	   0.012	   -­‐1.586	  	   White	  Pop.	  %	   0.176	   0.021	   8.406	  *	  	   Charter	   -­‐0.019	   0.012	   -­‐1.634	  	   	   	   	   	  Hisp.	  Stud.	  %	   Intercept	   0.246	   0.020	   12.106	  	   Hisp.	  Pop.	  %	   0.757	   0.034	   22.148	  *	  	   Charter	   -­‐0.036	   0.023	   -­‐1.587	  	   	   	   	   	  Black	  Stud.	  %	   Intercept	   0.101	   0.014	   7.002	  *	  	   Black	  Pop.	  %	   0.737	   0.032	   23.071	  *	  	   Charter	   0.037	   0.022	   1.691	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Table	  A3.6b:	  Charter	  /	  Non-­Charter	  Differences	  in	  Racial	  Enrollment	  Rates	  After	  
Controlling	  For	  Racial	  Composition	  of	  CBGs	  Where	  Schools	  are	  Located,	  cont	  	  LOS	  ANGELES	   	   Estimate	   Standard	  Error	   t-­‐value	  White	  Stud.	  %	   Intercept	   -­‐0.172	   0.0114	   -­‐15.126	  *	  	   White	  Pop.	  %	   0.549	   0.022	   25.204	  *	  	   Charter	   0.046	   0.011	   4.381	  *	  	   	   	   	   	  Hisp.	  Stud.	  %	   Intercept	   0.353	   0.013	   26.838	  *	  	   Hisp.	  Pop	  %	   0.675	   0.020	   33.74	  *	  	   Charter	   -­‐0.122	   0.015	   -­‐8.244	  *	  	   	   	   	   	  Black	  Stud.	  %	   Intercept	   0.021	   0.005	   4.211	  *	  	   Black	  Pop.	  %	   0.843	   0.023	   36.794	  *	  	   Charter	   0.031	   0.010	   3.084	  *	  	   	   	   	   	  	   	   	   	   	  CLEVELAND	   	   Estimate	   Standard	  Error	   t-­‐value	  White	  Stud.	  %	   Intercept	   -­‐0.025	   0.018	   -­‐1.392	  	   White	  Pop.	  %	   0.499	   0.037	   13.521	  *	  	   Charter	   0.008	   0.024	   0.329	  	   	   	   	   	  Hisp.	  Stud.	  %	   Intercept	   -­‐0.005	   0.011	   0.466	  	   Hisp.	  Pop.	  %	   1.217	   0.068	   17.878	  *	  	   Charter	   -­‐0.022	   0.015	   -­‐1.420	  	   	   	   	   	  Black	  Stud.	  %	   Intercept	   0.253	   0.032	   7.946	  *	  	   Black	  Pop.	  %	   0.772	   0.044	   17.679	  *	  	   Charter	   0.058	   0.033	   1.765	  	   	   	   	   	  	   	   	   	   	  DETROIT	   	   Estimate	   Standard	  Error	   t-­‐value	  White	  Stud.	  %	   Intercept	   -­‐0.016	   0.009	   -­‐1.736	  	   White	  Pop.	  %	   0.436	   0.039	   11.316	  *	  	   Charter	   0.001	   0.015	   0.048	  	   	   	   	   	  Hisp.	  Stud.	  %	   Intercept	   0.009	   0.009	   0.998	  	   Hisp.	  Pop.	  %	   1.004	   0.033	   30.809	  *	  	   Charter	   -­‐0.029	   0.014	   -­‐2.006	  *	  	   	   	   	   	  Black	  Stud.	  %	   Intercept	   0.139	   0.029	   4.652	  *	  	   Black	  Pop.	  %	   0.880	   0.033	   26.639	  *	  	   Charter	   0.076	   0.019	   3.788	  *	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Table	  A3.7:	  Houston	  Race	  Results	  By	  Student	  Population	  and	  Location	  	  Houston	  School	  Racial	  Comp.	   	   	  Estimate	   	  Standard	  Error	   	  t-­‐value	  White	  Stud.	  Pop.	   Intercept	   0.068	   0.007	   9.878	  *	  	   Charter	   -­‐0.035	   0.013	   -­‐2.738	  *	  	   	   	   	   	  Hisp.	  Stud.	  Pop.	   Intercept	   0.598	   0.019	   31.44	  *	  	   Charter	   -­‐0.050	   0.035	   -­‐1.44	  	   	   	   	   	  Black	  Stud.	  Pop.	   Intercept	   0.296	   0.019	   15.965	  *	  	   Charter	   0.098	   0.034	   2.892	  *	  	   	   	   	   	  	  Houston	  CBG	  Racial	  Comp.	   	   	  	   	  	   	  	  White	  CBG	  Pop.	   Intercept	   0.498	   0.016	   31.283	  	   Charter	   -­‐0.090	   0.029	   -­‐3.084	  *	  	   	   	   	   	  Hisp.	  CBG	  Pop.	   Intercept	   0.471	   0.019	   24.643	  *	  	   Charter	   -­‐0.024	   0.0349	   -­‐0.681	  	   	   	   	   	  Black	  CBG	  Pop.	   Intercept	   0.259	   0.019	   13.377	  *	  	   Charter	   0.090	   0.035	   2.533	  *	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Table	  A3.8a:	  EMO/Non-­EMO	  Differences	  in	  Racial	  Enrollment	  Rates	  After	  Controlling	  
For	  Racial	  Composition	  of	  CBGs	  Where	  Schools	  are	  Located	  	  TUCSON	   	   Estimate	   Standard	  Error	   t-­‐value	  White	  Stud.	  %	   Intercept	   -­‐0.347	   0125	   -­‐2.772	  *	  	   White	  Pop.	  %	   0.952	   0.174	   5.474	  *	  	   EMO	   0.040	   0.055	   0.721	  	  	   	   	   	   	  Hisp.	  Stud.	  %	   Intercept	   0.213	   0.075	   2.832	  *	  	   Hisp.	  Pop	  %	   0.812	   0.145	   5.607	  *	  	   EMO	   -­‐0.004	   0.061	   -­‐0.058	  	   	   	   	   	  Black	  Stud.	  %	   Intercept	   0.033	   0.011	   2.901	  *	  	   Black	  Pop.	  %	   0.105	   0.136	   0.769	  	   EMO	   0.019	   0.011	   1.708	  	   	   	   	   	  	   	   	   	   	  MIAMI	  –	  DADE	   	   Estimate	   Standard	  Error	   t-­‐value	  White	  Stud.	  %	   Intercept	   0.046	   0.038	   1.196	  	   White	  Pop.	  %	   0.102	   0.052	   1.951	  	   EMO	   -­‐0.026	   0.026	   -­‐1.021	  	   	   	   	   	  Hisp.	  Stud.	  %	   Intercept	   0.232	   0.061	   3.801	  *	  	   Hisp.	  Pop.	  %	   0.639	   0.085	   7.490	  *	  	   EMO	   0.079	   0.043	   1.833	  	   	   	   	   	  Black	  Stud.	  %	   Intercept	   0.024	   0.035	   0.669	  	   Black	  Pop.	  %	   0.833	   0.076	   10.925	  *	  	   EMO	   -­‐0.025	   0.037	   -­‐0.667	  	   	   	   	   	  	   	   	   	   	  HOUSTON	   	   Estimate	   Standard	  Error	   t-­‐value	  White	  Stud.	  %	   Intercept	   0.013	   0.014	   0.931	  	   White	  Pop.	  %	   0.059	   0.028	   2.135	  *	  	   EMO	   -­‐0.011	   0.014	   -­‐0.836	  	   	   	   	   	  Hisp.	  Stud.	  %	   Intercept	   0.199	   0.048	   4.192	  *	  	   Hisp.	  Pop.	  %	   0.787	   0.084	   9.411	  *	  	   EMO	   -­‐0.009	   0.049	   -­‐0.181	  	   	   	   	   	  Black	  Stud.	  %	   Intercept	   0.153	   0.041	   3.723	  *	  	   Black	  Pop.	  %	   0.701	   0.079	   8.868	  *	  	   EMO	   -­‐0.008	   0.050	   -­‐0.168	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Table	  A3.8b	  continued:	  EMO/Non-­EMO	  Differences	  in	  Racial	  Enrollment	  Rates	  After	  
Controlling	  For	  Racial	  Composition	  of	  CBGs	  Where	  Schools	  are	  Located,	  cont.	  	  LOS	  ANGELES	   	   Estimate	   Standard	  Error	   t-­‐value	  White	  Stud.	  %	   Intercept	   -­‐0.115	   0.027	   -­‐4.205	  *	  	   White	  Pop.	  %	   0.597	   0.056	   10.660	  *	  	   EMO	   -­‐0.105	   0.026	   -­‐4.119	  *	  	   	   	   	   	  Hisp.	  Stud.	  %	   Intercept	   0.226	   0.045	   5.066	  *	  	   Hisp.	  Pop	  %	   0.664	   0.073	   9.148	  *	  	   EMO	   0.040	   0.047	   0.853	  	   	   	   	   	  Black	  Stud.	  %	   Intercept	   0.023	   0.020	   1.171	  	   Black	  Pop.	  %	   0.951	   0.067	   14.197	  *	  	   EMO	   0.038	   0.032	   1.182	  	   	   	   	   	  	   	   	   	   	  CLEVELAND	   	   Estimate	   Standard	  Error	   t-­‐value	  White	  Stud.	  %	   Intercept	   -­‐0.139	   0.056	   -­‐2.465	  *	  	   White	  Pop.	  %	   0.602	   0.095	   6.334	  *	  	   EMO	   0.136	   0.055	   2.470	  *	  	   	   	   	   	  Hisp.	  Stud.	  %	   Intercept	   -­‐0.015	   0.018	   -­‐0.811	  	   Hisp.	  Pop.	  %	   0.779	   0.126	   6.161	  *	  	   EMO	   0.062	   0.023	   2.672	  *	  	   	   	   	   	  Black	  Stud.	  %	   Intercept	   0.467	   0.067	   7.015	  *	  	   Black	  Pop.	  %	   0.769	   0.096	   7.996	  *	  	   EMO	   -­‐0.272	   0.063	   -­‐4.327	  *	  	   	   	   	   	  	   	   	   	   	  DETROIT	   	   Estimate	   Standard	  Error	   t-­‐value	  White	  Stud.	  %	   Intercept	   -­‐0.049	   0.037	   -­‐1.345	  	   White	  Pop.	  %	   0.629	   0.089	   7.038	  *	  	   EMO	   -­‐0.0002	   0.043	   -­‐0.005	  	   	   	   	   	  Hisp.	  Stud.	  %	   Intercept	   -­‐0.036	   0.026	   -­‐1.382	  	   Hisp.	  Pop.	  %	   0.873	   0.059	   14.654	  *	  	   EMO	   0.039	   0.030	   1.268	  	   	   	   	   	  Black	  Stud.	  %	   Intercept	   0.313	   0.068	   4.618	  *	  	   Black	  Pop.	  %	   0.790	   0.064	   12.279	  *	  	   EMO	   -­‐0.044	   0.047	   -­‐0.936	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Table	  A3.9:	  Average	  Racial	  Composition	  of	  Schools	  by	  District	  and	  School	  Type	  	   	  	   Non-­‐Charter	  School	   Independent	  Charter	  School	   Non-­‐Profit	  EMO	  Charter	  School	   For-­‐Profit	  EMO	  Charter	  School	  HOUSTON	   	   	   	   	  White	  %	   6.8%	   3.9%	   2.5%	   -­‐	  Black	  %	   29.6%	   39.6%	   39.1%	   -­‐	  Hispanic	  %	   59.8%	   54.9%	   54.6%	   -­‐	  	   	   	   	   	  LOS	  ANGELES	   	   	   	   	  White	  %	   8.8%	   13.8%	   0.6%	   -­‐	  Black	  %	   10.4%	   17.3%	   24.1%	   -­‐	  Hispanic	  %	   73.4%	   56.7%	   70.9%	   -­‐	  	   	   	   	   	  CLEVELAND	   	   	   	   	  White	  %	   13.4%	   10.4%	   43.6%	   10.0%	  Black	  %	   71.1%	   84.2%	   30.8%	   78.8%	  Hispanic	  %	   11.2%	   2.8%	   17.9%	   12.1%	  	   	   	   	   	  TUCSON	   	   	   	   	  White	  %	   24.0%	   30.1%	   38.3%	   36.0%	  Black	  %	   5.6%	   3.9%	   5.3%	   6.4%	  Hispanic	  %	   60.7%	   55.3%	   44.9%	   49.6%	  	   	   	   	   	  MIAMI	   	   	   	   	  White	  %	   7.5%	   11.0%	   2.0%	   10.1%	  Black	  %	   33.4%	   25.8%	   37.6%	   11.8%	  Hispanic	  %	   57.4%	   61.5%	   60.0%	   76.7%	  	   	   	   	   	  DETROIT	   	   	   	   	  White	  %	   2.7%	   0.3%	   0.4%	   9.5%	  Black	  %	   87.3%	   99.1%	   98.8%	   78.0%	  Hispanic	  %	   9.0%	   0.4%	   0.4%	   12.1%	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Figure	  A3.3	  Average	  Racial	  Composition	  of	  School	  Types	  By	  District	  	  
	  	  Most	  Notable	  Differences:	  	  HOUSTON:	  Declining	  white	  proportions	  from	  non-­‐charter	  to	  ind.	  charter	  to	  NP	  charter.	  LOS	  ANGELES:	  Dramatically	  smaller	  white	  proportion	  in	  non-­‐profit	  charters	  CLEVELAND:	  large	  numbers	  of	  white	  students	  in	  NP	  charters.	  TUCSON:	  higher	  white	  proportions	  in	  all	  school	  types	  compared	  to	  non-­‐charters.	  MIAMI:	  much	  lower	  Black	  proportion	  and	  higher	  Hispanic	  proportion	  in	  FP	  charters	  DETROIT:	  FP	  charters	  similar	  to	  non-­‐charters,	  with	  ind.	  and	  NP	  charters	  by	  contrast	  enrolling	  almost	  entirely	  Black	  students.	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Figure	  A3.4:	  Los	  Angeles	  FRL	  Eligibility	  and	  CBG	  Median	  Income	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Figure	  A3.5:	  FRL	  Eligibility	  By	  CBG	  Income	  and	  School	  Type	  in	  Los	  Angeles	  
	  
0=Non-­Charters,	  1=Independent	  Charters,	  2=Non-­Profit	  Charters.	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Table	  A3.10:	  Los	  Angeles	  Race	  Results	  Disaggregated	  By	  Student	  Pop.	  and	  Location	  	  Los	  Angeles	  School	  Racial	  Comp.	   	   	  	  Estimate	   	  	  Standard	  Error	   	  	  t-­‐value	  White	  Stud.	  Pop.	   Intercept	   0.088	   0.006	   14.168	  *	  	   Charter	   0.012	   0.014	   0.873	  	   	   	   	   	  Hisp.	  Stud.	  Pop.	   Intercept	   0.734	   0.010	   72.978	  *	  	   Charter	   -­‐0.127	   0.022	   -­‐5.724	  *	  	   	   	   	   	  Black	  Stud.	  Pop.	   Intercept	   0.104	   0.007	   14.624	  *	  	   Charter	   0.088	   0.016	   5.645	  *	  	   	   	   	   	  	  Los	  Angeles	  CBG	  Racial	  Comp.	   	   	  	   	  	   	  	  White	  CBG	  Pop.	   Intercept	   0.473	   0.007	   65.286	  *	  	   Charter	   -­‐0.063	   0.016	   -­‐3.935	  *	  	   	   	   	   	  Hisp.	  CBG	  Pop.	   Intercept	   0.562	   0.011	   50.874	  *	  	   Charter	   -­‐0.007	   0.024	   -­‐0.298	  	   	   	   	   	  Black	  CBG	  Pop.	   Intercept	   0.098	   0.007	   15.055	  *	  	   Charter	   0.068	   0.014	   4.739	  *	  	   	   	   	   	  	  Los	  Angeles	  charter	  schools	  are	  located	  in	  CBGs	  that	  have	  6.3%	  lower	  white	  population	  and	  6.8%	  higher	  Black	  population.	  LA	  charters	  have	  12.7%	  less	  Hispanic	  students	  despite	  no	  difference	  in	  CBG	  characteristics,	  and	  8.8%	  more	  Black	  students.	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Figure	  A3.6:	  Los	  Angeles	  Black	  Student	  Proportion	  by	  School	  Type	  
0	  =	  Non-­Charter	  ,	  1	  =	  Independent	  Charter,	  2	  =	  Non-­Profit	  Charter
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Figure	  A3.7:	  Los	  Angeles	  Hispanic	  Student	  Proportion	  by	  School	  Type	  
0	  =	  Non-­Charter	  ,	  1	  =	  Independent	  Charter,	  2	  =	  Non-­Profit	  Charter
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Figure	  A3.8:	  Los	  Angeles	  White	  Student	  Proportion	  by	  School	  Type	  
0	  =	  Non-­Charter	  ,	  1	  =	  Independent	  Charter,	  2	  =	  Non-­Profit	  Charter
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Figure	  A3.9:	  Tucson	  Free	  &	  Reduced	  Lunch	  Eligibility	  Rates	  By	  School	  Type	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Figure	  A3.10:	  Tucson	  FRL	  Rate	  By	  Charter/Non-­Charter	  Status	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Figure	  A3.11:	  Tucson	  FRL	  Rate	  By	  CBG	  Median	  Income	  &	  School	  Type	  	  
	  
0=Non-­Charters,	  1=Ind.	  Charters,	  2=Non-­Profit	  Charters,	  3=For-­Profit	  Charters	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Table	  A3.11:	  Tucson	  Race	  Results	  Disaggregated	  By	  Student	  Population	  and	  Location	  	  Tucson	  School	  Racial	  Comp.	   	   	  Estimate	   	  Standard	  Error	   	  t-­‐value	  White	  Stud.	  Pop.	   Intercept	   0.240	   0.022	   11.17	  *	  	   Charter	   0.102	   0.037	   2.79	  *	  	   	   	   	   	  Hisp.	  Stud.	  Pop.	   Intercept	   0.607	   0.024	   25.228	  *	  	   Charter	   -­‐0.104	   0.041	   -­‐2.537	  *	  	   	   	   	   	  Black	  Stud.	  Pop.	   Intercept	   0.056	   0.004	   12.711	  *	  	   Charter	   -­‐0.007	   0.007	   -­‐0.886	  	   	   	   	   	  	  Tucson	  CBG	  Racial	  Comp.	   	   	  	   	  	   	  	  White	  CBG	  Pop.	   Intercept	   0.712	   0.015	   49.09	  *	  	   Charter	   -­‐0.011	   0.025	   -­‐0.44	  	   	   	   	   	  Hisp.	  CBG	  Pop.	   Intercept	   0.424	   0.025	   17.117	  *	  	   Charter	   -­‐0.064	   0.042	   -­‐1.528	  	   	   	   	   	  Black	  CBG	  Pop.	   Intercept	   0.040	   0.003	   11.560	  *	  	   Charter	   0.014	   0.006	   2.443	  *	  	   	   	   	   	  	  Charters	  are	  located	  in	  CBGs	  with	  1.4%	  higher	  Black	  population.	  Charters	  enroll	  10.2%	  higher	  proportions	  of	  white	  students	  and	  10.4%	  lower	  proportions	  of	  Hispanic	  students.	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Figure	  A3.12:	  Tucson	  White	  Student	  Proportion	  By	  School	  Type	  
	  
0	  =	  Non-­Charter	  ,	  1	  =	  Ind.	  Charter,	  2	  =	  Non-­Profit	  Charter,	  3	  =	  For-­Profit	  Charter
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Figure	  A3.13:	  Tucson	  Hispanic	  Student	  Proportion	  By	  School	  Type	  	  
0	  =	  Non-­Charter	  ,	  1	  =	  Ind.	  Charter,	  2	  =	  Non-­Profit	  Charter,	  3	  =	  For-­Profit	  Charter	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Table	  A3.12:	  Race	  Results	  2:	  For-­Profit/Non-­Profit	  Differences	  in	  Racial	  Enrollment	  
Rates	  After	  Controlling	  For	  Racial	  Composition	  of	  CBGs	  Where	  Schools	  are	  Located	  	  TUCSON	   	   Estimate	   Standard	  Error	   t-­‐value	  White	  Stud.	  %	   Intercept	   -­‐0.135	   0.153	   -­‐0.884	  	   White	  Pop.	  %	   0.729	   0.207	   3.521	  *	  	   For-­‐Profit	   -­‐0.037	   0.075	   -­‐0.497	  	   	   	   	   	  Hisp.	  Stud.	  %	   Intercept	   0.193	   0.071	   2.696	  *	  	   Hisp.	  Pop	  %	   0.857	   0.188	   4.563	  *	  	   For-­‐Profit	   0.007	   0.078	   0.092	  	   	   	   	   	  Black	  Stud.	  %	   Intercept	   0.043	   0.015	   2.753	  *	  	   Black	  Pop.	  %	   0.217	   0.235	   0.924	  	   For-­‐Profit	   0.012	   0.017	   0.661	  	   	   	   	   	  	   	   	   	   	  CLEVELAND	   	   Estimate	   Standard	  Error	   t-­‐value	  White	  Stud.	  %	   Intercept	   0.090	   0.082	   1.106	  	   White	  Pop.	  %	   0.595	   0.119	   4.964	  *	  	   For-­‐Profit	   -­‐0.186	   0.068	   -­‐2.723	  *	  	   	   	   	   	  Hisp.	  Stud.	  %	   Intercept	   0.040	   0.037	   1.081	  	   Hisp.	  Pop.	  %	   0.886	   0.187	   4.747	  *	  	   For-­‐Profit	   -­‐0.009	   0.038	   -­‐0.248	  	   	   	   	   	  Black	  Stud.	  %	   Intercept	   0.066	   0.052	   1.278	  	   Black	  Pop.	  %	   0.823	   0.105	   7.862	  *	  	   For-­‐Profit	   0.215	   0.069	   3.106	  *	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Figure	  A3.14:	  Cleveland	  FRL	  Rates	  By	  Charter/Non-­Charter	  Status	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Figure	  A3.15:	  Cleveland	  FRL	  Rates	  By	  CBG	  Income	  and	  School	  Type.	  	  	  
0=Non-­Charters,	  1=Ind.	  Charters,	  2=Non-­Profit	  Charters,	  3=For-­Profit	  Charters	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Table	  A3.13:	  Cleveland	  Race	  Results	  Disaggregated	  By	  Student	  Pop.	  and	  Location	  	  Cleveland	  School	  Racial	  Comp.	   	   	  	  Estimate	   	  	  Standard	  Error	   	  	  t-­‐value	  White	  Stud.	  Pop.	   Intercept	   0.134	   0.020	   6.649	  *	  	   Charter	   0.066	   0.035	   1.913	  	   	   	   	   	  Hisp.	  Stud.	  Pop.	   Intercept	   0.112	   0.016	   7.145	  *	  	   Charter	   -­‐0.024	   0.027	   -­‐0.907	  	   	   	   	   	  Black	  Stud.	  Pop.	   Intercept	   0.711	   0.033	   21.764	  *	  	   Charter	   -­‐0.041	   0.056	   -­‐0.726	  	   	   	   	   	  	  Cleveland	  CBG	  Racial	  Comp.	   	   	  	   	  	   	  	  White	  CBG	  Pop.	   Intercept	   0.318	   0.030	   10.628	  *	  	   Charter	   0.117	   0.052	   2.274	  *	  	   	   	   	   	  Hisp.	  CBG	  Pop.	   Intercept	   0.088	   0.011	   8.266	  *	  	   Charter	   -­‐0.002	   0.018	   -­‐0.125	  	   	   	   	   	  Black	  CBG	  Pop.	   Intercept	   0.592	   0.035	   17.023	  *	  	   Charter	   -­‐0.128	   0.060	   -­‐2.123	  *	  	   	   	   	   	  	  In	  Cleveland,	  charters	  locate	  in	  CBGs	  with	  11.7%	  higher	  white	  population	  and	  12.8%	  lower	  Black	  population,	  yet	  enroll	  students	  at	  racially	  indistinguishable	  numbers.	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Figure	  A3.16:	  FRL	  Rates	  By	  CBG	  Income	  and	  School	  Type.	  	  	  
0=Non-­Charters,	  1=Ind.	  Charters,	  2=Non-­Profit	  Charters,	  3=For-­Profit	  Charters	  
	  	   213	  
Figure	  A3.17:	  Miami	  Black	  Student	  Proportion	  By	  School	  Type	  
0	  =	  Non-­Charter	  ,	  1	  =	  Ind.	  Charter,	  2	  =	  Non-­Profit	  Charter,	  3	  =	  For-­Profit	  Charter	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Figure	  A3.18:	  Miami	  Hispanic	  Student	  Proportion	  By	  School	  Type	  
0	  =	  Non-­Charter	  ,	  1	  =	  Ind.	  Charter,	  2	  =	  Non-­Profit	  Charter,	  3	  =	  For-­Profit	  Charter
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Table	  A3.14:	  Miami	  Race	  Results	  Disaggregated	  By	  Student	  Population	  and	  Location	  	  Miami	  School	  Racial	  Comp.	   	   	  Estimate	   	  Standard	  Error	   	  t-­‐value	  White	  Stud.	  Pop.	   Intercept	   0.075	   0.005	   14.350	  *	  	   Charter	   0.027	   0.012	   2.284	  *	  	  	   	   	   	   	  Hisp.	  Stud.	  Pop.	   Intercept	   0.574	   0.016	   36.544	  *	  	   Charter	   0.129	   0.036	   3.614	  *	  	   	   	   	   	  Black	  Stud.	  Pop.	   Intercept	   0.334	   0.017	   20.117	  *	  	   Charter	   -­‐0.154	   0.038	   -­‐4.066	  *	  	   	   	   	   	  	  Miami	  CBG	  Racial	  Comp.	   	   	  	   	  	   	  	  White	  CBG	  Pop.	   Intercept	   0.644	   0.016	   39.499	  	   Charter	   0.063	   0.037	   1.721	  	   	   	   	   	  Hisp.	  CBG	  Pop.	   Intercept	   0.574	   0.015	   37.758	  	   Charter	   0.087	   0.034	   2.536	  *	  	   	   	   	   	  Black	  CBG	  Pop.	   Intercept	   0.289	   0.016	   17.681	  *	  	   Charter	   -­‐0.082	   0.037	   -­‐2.225	  *	  	   	   	   	   	  	  In	  Miami,	  charters	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  be	  located	  in	  CBGs	  with	  8.7%	  higher	  Hispanic	  populations	  and	  8.2%	  lower	  Black	  populations.	  Charter	  enroll	  3.5%	  higher	  white	  student	  proportions,	  12.9%	  higher	  Hispanic	  student	  proportions,	  and	  15.4%	  lower	  Black	  student	  proportions	  than	  non-­‐charters.	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Figure	  A3.19:	  Detroit	  FRL	  Rates	  By	  CBG	  Income	  and	  School	  Type.	  	  	  
0=Non-­Charters,	  1=Ind.	  Charters,	  2=Non-­Profit	  Charters,	  3=For-­Profit	  Charters	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Figure	  A3.20:	  Detroit	  Black	  Student	  Proportion	  By	  School	  Type	  
	  
0	  =	  Non-­Charter	  ,	  1	  =	  Ind.	  Charter,	  2	  =	  Non-­Profit	  Charter,	  3	  =	  For-­Profit	  Charter
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Figure	  A3.21:	  Detroit	  Hispanic	  Student	  Proportion	  By	  School	  Type	  
	  
0	  =	  Non-­Charter	  ,	  1	  =	  Ind.	  Charter,	  2	  =	  Non-­Profit	  Charter,	  3	  =	  For-­Profit	  Charter	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Table	  A3.15:	  Detroit	  Race	  Results	  Disaggregated	  By	  Student	  Pop.	  and	  Location	  	  Detroit	  School	  Racial	  Comp.	   	   	  Estimate	   	  Standard	  Error	   	  t-­‐value	  White	  Stud.	  Pop.	   Intercept	   0.027	   0.011	   2.499	  *	  	   Charter	   0.035	   0.018	   1.902	  	   	   	   	   	  Hisp.	  Stud.	  Pop.	   Intercept	   0.090	   0.019	   4.615	  *	  	   Charter	   -­‐0.011	   0.033	   -­‐0.341	  	   	   	   	   	  Black	  Stud.	  Pop.	   Intercept	   0.873	   0.024	   36.908	  *	  	   Charter	   -­‐0.016	   0.040	   -­‐0.397	  	   	   	   	   	  	  Detroit	  CBG	  Racial	  Comp.	   	   	  	   	  	   	  	  White	  CBG	  Pop.	   Intercept	   0.098	   0.015	   6.627	  *	  	   Charter	   0.078	   0.025	   3.076	  *	  	   	   	   	   	  Hisp.	  CBG	  Pop.	   Intercept	   0.080	   0.017	   4.619	  *	  	   Charter	   0.018	   0.030	   0.593	  	   	   	   	   	  Black	  CBG	  Pop.	   Intercept	   0.834	   0.023	   35.538	  *	  	   Charter	   -­‐0.104	   0.040	   -­‐2.605	  *	  	   	   	   	   	  	  In	  Detroit,	  charters	  are	  located	  in	  neighborhoods	  that	  have	  7.8%	  more	  white	  people	  and	  10.4%	  fewer	  Black	  people.	  Despite	  this,	  the	  racial	  proportion	  of	  students	  at	  charters	  and	  non-­‐charters	  are	  statistically	  indistinguishable.	  Thus	  Blacks	  are	  proportionally	  over-­‐represented	  based	  on	  the	  CBGs	  where	  schools	  are	  located	  (as	  seen	  above	  after	  controlling	  for	  racial	  CBG).	  	  
	  	  
